Meierhenrich’s book is an important book. For those seeking to learn about law under Nazism, it gives an excellent introduction. It is also highly relevant to the understanding of the general relationship between law and authoritarianism. This makes the book important for all who are concerned about the fate of the rule of law today.

General questions of name of the state are rarely discussed in the literature of public law, political science or legal theory, its terminology is neglected, and in its current state, it is a source of many misunderstandings. Pointed out these terminological problems this study proposes a theoretical framework for the naming system of states which takes into accounts the public law components of names. Among these components the significance of four factors are emphasized: the form of state (form of government), the structure, or organization of state, the role of seemingly neutral terms (for example, the words “commonwealth” or “state”), and, on the contrary, the role of politically, religiously or ethnically bound terms (such as “democratic”, “people’s”, “Arab” or “Islamic”) in the names of states. After clarifying the difference between the terms country name and state name (state title), this study shows that there are cases when the state name (state title) function as country name, and when the country name fulfills the communicative function of the state title.

This article explores the challenges of the extraterritorial application of the right to be forgotten and, more broadly, of EU data protection law in light of the recent case law of the ECJ. The paper explains that there are good arguments for the EU to apply its high data protection standards outside its borders, but that such an extraterritorial application faces challenges, as it may clash with duties of international comity, legal diversity, or contrasting rulings delivered by courts in other jurisdictions. As the article points out from a comparative perspective, the protection of privacy in the digital age increasingly exposes a tension between efforts by legal systems to impose their high standards of data protection outside their borders – a dynamic which could be regarded as ‘imperialist’ – and claims by other legal systems to assert their own power over data – a dynamic which one could name ‘sovereigntist’. As the article suggests, navigating between the Scylla of imperialism and the Charybdis of sovereigntism will not be an easy task. In this context, greater convergence in the data protection framework of liberal democratic systems worldwide appears as the preferable path to secure privacy in the digital age.

The recent COVID-19 outbreak has pushed the tension of protecting personal data in a transnational context to an apex. Using a real case where the personal data of an international traveler was illegally released by Chinese media, this Article identifies three trends that have emerged at each stage of conflict-of-laws analysis for lex causae: (1) The EU, the US, and China characterize the right to personal data differently; (2) the spread-out unilateral applicable law approach comes from the fact that all three jurisdictions either consider the law for personal data protection as a mandatory law or adopt connecting factors leading to the law of the forum; and (3) the EU and China strongly advocate deAmericanization of substantive data protection laws. The trends and their dynamics provide valuable implications for developing the choice of laws for transnational personal data. First, this finding informs parties that jurisdiction is a predominant issue in data breach cases because courts and regulators would apply the law of the forum. Second, currently, there is no international treaty or model law on choice-of-law issues for transnational personal data. International harmonization efforts will be a long and difficult journey considering how the trends demonstrate not only the states’ irreconcilable interests but also how states may consider these interests as their fundamental values that they do not want to trade off. Therefore, for states and international organizations, a feasible priority is to achieve regional coordination or interoperation among states with similar values on personal data protection.

More than seventy years after the end of the Second World War, atrocities committed under the National Socialist regime still continue to occupy the courts in Germany. The recent case of Oscar Gröning raised a number of highly relevant legal issues, particularly with regard to the degree of participation in criminal offenses in general, and more specifically, with regard to the possible level of criminal liability of individuals who, as part of a large-scale “killing machinery”, were acting under the command of superiors and, as such, not directly involved in the acts of homicide which were perpetrated. Different theories pertaining to the level of participation are analyzed, and the German Federal Court’s decision in the Gröning case is dealt with in detail.

This Article focuses on the accountability challenges raised by the increased involvement of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC) in migration control. I argue that migration control activities outsourced to PMSC can be classified as high-risk operations for the purposes of the application of relevant business and human rights standards. This reclassification of migration control activities as high-risk business operations, in turn, has two significant implications in terms of establishing accountability for PMSC’s wrongful conduct. First, it acknowledges that the privatization of migration control, especially within the context of continued containment and deterrence trends, entails a high risk of human rights abuses to which PMSC may contribute, both directly and indirectly. Second, this reclassification enables us to identify heightened obligations vested upon the home state of a PMSC, as well as the heightened responsibility of PMSC themselves. The article also examines what these heightened obligations and responsibilities entail.

Sociological approaches to law in both Germany and the UK have been characterized by internal divisions and divergent methodologies and aspirations. While, in the UK, empirical socio-legal studies have been a prominent way of studying how law shapes and is shaped by social institutions, in Germany, the “grand theory” of systemtheoretical approaches to law has had a lasting impact. In this Article, I discuss the epistemological contrast between these two sociological approaches to law by focusing on how they address transnational private regulation. Empirical socio-legal studies share an epistemic commitment to an objective and knowable social reality, and they tend to see human actors as the motors of history. Thus they focus on the interrelational dynamics within Global Value Chains (GVCs), searching for “what works” in transnational private regulation. On the contrary, systemstheory oriented sociological jurisprudence views social reality as constructed and fragmented into the epistemes of different social systems. GVCs are understood as selfreferential normative orders, in which the question of agency and human actors is secondary—the emphasis is on communications and anonymous forces of ordering. Attempting to inspect the possibilities for synthesis, I ask how “big” we can and should think in law and society. I thus attempt to outline an approach that starts from the materiality of social structures to investigate processes beyond individual agency and to uncover elements of normative reconstruction of the particular area of social activity.

The commentary, especially from abroad, on the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment concerning the bond-buying programme undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB) conveys the impression that something unimaginable has occurred. The German court has refused to follow the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), thereby setting “a bomb under the EU legal order.”1 Yet there is nothing new about the risk of conflict between the two courts. It came about when the Court of Justice of the European Union implicitly presumed, in 1963,2 and explicitly declared, in 1964,3 that European law takes precedence over domestic law, even over domestic constitutional law. This view was by no means without alternative, given that the Treaties of Rome do not address the precedence of Community law. The Member States involved in the dispute denied having agreed to any such precedence in the Treaties. Even the CJEU’s Advocate General was unable to find any basis in the Treaties for the precedence of European law.4 The CJEU derived the precedence of European law from the purpose of the European Economic Community.5 It argued that there could be no common market if each Member State applied and interpreted European law however it saw fit.

The scope of this Article is to understand to what extent a recent and fruitful private initiative sponsoring a safe alternative legal pathway spread from Italy, called “humanitarian corridors,” may in the future become a general and uniform alternative model for all the European Union States. Such a practice—which currently represents an exceptional route for vulnerable migrants to enter the country without harm after a security screening and to be materially supported by the same sponsors in the crucial initial phase of integration—is at present restricted to a relatively small number of beneficiaries, but it could potentially be extended to other States.

In order to achieve this goal, it is argued that the present model should be slightly adjusted—especially with regard to the actual reference to Article 25 of the Visa Code as its legal basis. The latter seems difficult to be formally maintained after the much criticized 2017 judgment X and X v. Belgium, in which the Court of Justice of the European Union conferred to Member States a wide margin of discretion when requested to grant humanitarian visas by vulnerable people exposed to serious irreversible harm. Against this background, clear obligations to grant humanitarian visas to vulnerable people at risk already exist. This obligation stems from international law—both general and conventional—and constitutes the adequate legal basis both for States and civil society to act in a “multi-stakeholder alliance” to find solutions to the challenges and opportunities deriving from international migration, as indicated in the Global Compact for Migration.

The German police stopped and searched a car crossing the border from the Netherlands and thereby detected large quantities of drugs. What sounds like a standard procedure is actually a very controversial case recently heard at the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof; BGH), dealing with so called legendierte Polizeikontrollen. These are apparently random police checks that are, in reality, well prepared and specifically targeted at the subject of the police check due to ongoing investigations. This case raised the issue of lawful evidence gathering by the police when pursuing both preventive and repressive objectives, as well as the question of the subsequent exploitation in court of the evidence obtained. Addressing issues of the utmost significance, such as the circumvention of the rights of the accused, this BGH judgment was critically reviewed among legal scholars.

In this interview, Paul Kahn discusses central aspects of his approach to the academic study of law. On the one hand, he reflects on the identity of the cultural analysis of law. In this regard, he points out how his approach differs from other forms of legal scholarship, in general, and from other cultural perspectives of law, in particular. He also makes explicit the philosophical tradition within which the cultural analysis of law is immersed and identifies his main theoretical influences. On the other hand, Kahn discusses the methods of the cultural analysis of law—that is, genealogy and architecture. Finally, Kahn examines the aims pursued by cultural analysis, as well as its contributions to the description and analysis of law. He also responds to some of the main objections that critics have offered against this form of scholarship.

The German Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling of May 5, 2020 on the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) stated, for the first time ever, that some decisions by European institutions are not covered by the competence allocations of the European Treaties and cannot therefore take effect in Germany. This article argues that the judgment came as no surprise, as it is consistent with the principle of conferral of powers. According to this principle the EU and its institutions can only act within the limits of their competences. The German Basic Law prohibits any transfer of sovereign rights whose exercise would confer sua sponte additional competences to the supranational level. Against this background, the Federal Constitutional Court judgment does not seek to limit the ECB’s scope for appraisal and evaluation in the exercise of its monetary policy mandate. It focuses rather on the conditions which legitimize the ECB’s leeway. The issue in this case is not the applicability of the proportionality principle as a criterion governing the delimitation of powers, but the different reference points for the assessment of proportionality. In this regard the CJEU had failed to discuss whether monetary policy and the effects on economic policy are proportionate by themselves. Hence, in constitutional terms, the CJEU’s interpretation was found to be “arbitrary”, since the German Constitutional Court defined arbitrariness as jurisprudence that “in a reasonable reading … [appears] unintelligible and clearly untenable.” In other words, it is “simply not comprehensible.” Despite the harsh words of the German Constitutional Court, the authors argue that the judgement in the end can help to create a European legal culture that will strengthen the European Union in the long term if, in future, the CJEU engages more constructively with criticisms from Member State courts.

This Article looks for signs of Anglo-German life in the literature and practice under-pinning the current move to use “designerly ways” in socio-legal research; and asks whether design has a role to play in nurturing a sense of Anglo-German socio-legal community. It argues that a “sociological imagination” is essential if we are to fully understand possible synergies between design and socio-legal research, and the risks and rewards of activating them; and that while we cannot know what socio-legal research will or ought to look like in the coming months and years we must pay more attention to designing those moments that we are lucky enough to share in person.

The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) seeks to harmonize national asylum procedures. The initial implementation design of the CEAS, reflective of the theory of executive federalism, foresaw that national authorities were to conduct asylum processing and implement the harmonized norms. The implementation design of the EU asylum policy has, nevertheless, started to shift. An integrated European administration is emerging. One area this is pronounced in is asylum decision-making, where patterns of joint implementation have surfaced. This term broadly refers to staff and experts deployed by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), an EU agency, working alongside national administrators, including on the processing of asylum claims. This Article scrutinizes the emergence of joint implementation patterns in EU asylum policy and the resulting accountability challenge, drawing both from legal analysis and political science theories. I also refer to administrative practice as documented in secondary sources. EASO is currently subject to a mosaic of accountability processes. Two main pitfalls emerge: the intricate balance between accountability and independence; and accessibility for the individual. Against this backdrop, I focus on extra-judicial accountability through the European Ombudsman which, combined with the envisaged internal “individual complaints mechanism” within EASO, could go some way in ensuring applicants’ procedural rights.

Constitutions traffic in magic and deceit, argues Günter Frankenberg, promising freedom and democracy even as they underwrite the exercise of coercive power on a massive scale. Scholars should approach constitutions with a healthy skepticism, but, Frankenberg contends, most mainstream scholars are too credulous, especially regarding the claims of liberal constitutionalism. Comparative Constitutional Studies serves as his corrective to the perceived blind spots and predilections of mainstream comparative constitutional scholarship, and it gives attention to little-known constitutions, forgotten histories, and alternatives to liberal constitutionalism. It’s a rich, challenging, and valuable book, one that takes the reader to some off-the-beaten-track places and offers some new perspectives on well-studied landmarks. It does not, however, represent such a radical break from mainstream scholarship as the author supposes, both because the book’s own analysis, in practice, is not deeply unconventional, and because mainstream scholarship is more diverse than Frankenberg gives it credit for.