Over the last decades, various groups seeking international legal recognition of new human rights claims have succeeded in their endeavors. Some movements have crafted such convincing demands that their participation has even become an implicit condition of the legitimacy of the resulting human rights documents. But what are the bases of claims for new human rights, and how do they help to confront the argument that human rights’ expansion also entails their dilution? This Article explores narratives based on two different concepts, namely the political-science concept of affectedness and the legal-ethical concept of vulnerability. It does so by drawing on the process for the recognition of peasant human rights at the United Nations. The Article explores what it understands as the peasant critique of existing human rights by looking at the differences and interrelations between affectedness and vulnerability-based argumentation. It argues that an approach premised purely on affectedness, and thus focused on participation, is less empowering than one that includes a regard for vulnerability, which serves as a heuristic device for identifying and challenging inequalities, demands substantive outcomes, and can serve to craft a convincing theoretical account of human rights protections.

This Article answers the question of whether investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) discriminates against nationals by providing foreign investors with an extra avenue to challenge state measures. The complaint that ISDS is discriminatory as a matter of principle has surfaced before several European constitutional courts—including the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice—in connection with the ratification of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union (“CETA”). This Article rejects this complaint. The Federal Constitutional Court was able to leave the question of discrimination open in the applications for a preliminary injunction to stop ratification. It will have to take a stand, however, in the principal proceedings. If the Court were to side with the applicants, it would sound the death knell not only for the CETA in its present form, but also for the multilateral investment court system promoted by the European Union and, in particular, Germany. The point made by the applicants in the CETA complaint is not only of importance in a European constitutional law context. Whether ISDS is per se discriminatory is a fundamental issue which requires answering before any reform steps in relation to ISDS are addressed.

Large-scale investments in farmland can generate adverse effects on food security, minority groups, and the environment. Consequently, this Article analyzes to what extent international investment law has the potential to prevent those effects, considering the current investment treaty reform towards a symmetrical mechanism promoting sustainable development. First this Article presents the current substantive standard on expropriation of large-scale investments in farmland and the regulatory space left for host states. This Article then frames a potential public interest clause that would have the effect of granting due protection to investors and the right to regulate to host states, while not undermining the public interest and also preventing the adverse effects of these investments.

In the context of the encounter of UK and German socio-legal studies in this issue, this Article develops preliminary thoughts on a research agenda for the comparative interdisciplinary empirical study of legal doctrine. Based on a working definition of doctrine as an institutionally legitimized practice of making statements on the law, it presents an overview of sociological and comparative theorizing about doctrine in Germany, and of the data and methods being used to study it, in order to identify similar or diverging trends in the UK and elsewhere. This Article aims to show that legal doctrine, which is often regarded by non-lawyers as arcane and/or tedious, is an interesting and important subject for comparative socio-legal research.

Paradoxically, at roughly the same time in the Netherlands the amendment bill to introduce constitutional review by the judiciary of acts of parliament lapsed in 2018, the State Commission on the Parliamentary System recommended that such review be introduced. This Article analyzes Dutch exceptionalism on the topic of prohibiting constitutional review and comes to the conclusion that it cannot be justified. Focusing on the nature of constitutional change in the country, the recommendation is made that the quest for reform should start with the courts, and not with the constitutional legislature, as has been the case to date.

According to EU policy documents, “[s]aving lives of people in distress is a primary goal of EU action in relation to managing the EU external borders.” The EU preferred strategy to achieve this objective is to take measures against human smuggling—including the establishment of cooperation with third countries—ostensibly so that migrants are contained and their irregular movement is prevented. This Article examines whether this strategy complies with the positive obligations corresponding to the right to life as enshrined in Article 2 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. After considering any formal obstacles that might prevent the activation of the Charter, this Article clarifies the factors that determine the scope of these positive obligations. Procedural and substantive obligations are then distinguished. The procedural positive obligation demands that the EU and its Member States (MS) consider alternatives to the measures of containment. Due to difficulties in assessing the reasonableness of such alternatives, the EU and the MS are also under the positive obligation to initiate studies that can provide reliable evidence that alternative measures—such as the possibility of issuing humanitarian visas—would be too burdensome. As to the substantive positive obligation corresponding to the right to life, this Article will argue that the EU and the MS need to be attentive about the cumulative outcome of their migration policies. The more successful they are in their indiscriminate containment policies—and the more unlikely any protection possibilities in the region of containment—the more likely it is that the positive obligation to protect life will remain unfulfilled.

This Article argues that a) constitutional supremacy is affected by the legal tradition, which implies that it is a concept largely shaped by the legal context in which it is elaborated, and b) the common law version of constitutional supremacy determines a sort of cultural resistance to constitutional imperialism. In making its argument, this Article begins with the doctrine of sources of law with a view to unpack its operational logic within the common law and, therefore, to understand how the supremacy of constitutions is conceptualized. It then examines the embryonic conceptualization of constitutional supremacy in the British legal culture by addressing the “constitutional statutes.” It goes on to analyse how constitutional supremacy is safeguarded in jurisdictions that are affected by the British tradition and equipped with written constitutions, to show how constitutions concretely established themselves as supreme laws without neglecting the relevance of traditions pre-dating the constitutional texts. It then shows how the common law finds its way to be applied alongside or even instead of the constitution. Eventually, this Article offers some conclusions as to the implications of such a conceptualization of constitutional supremacy for comparative and global constitutional studies.

There is no point in denying the significance of the Right to be forgotten for the state of judicial dialogue in Europe. It vindicates the position of the BVerfG as a court deserving international recognition for advancing the law in the crucial field of data protection. Nevertheless, restricting the scope of analysis to the narrow context of judicial dialogue misses the wider context of the rise of authoritarian constitutionalism in certain EU Member States. In this respect, it is of the highest significance that the decisions on the Right to be forgotten effectively eliminate the imagined normative hierarchy between domestic and EU law that provided the basis for the BVerfG’s jurisprudence ever since Solange I and Maastricht. Moreover, by reasserting the primacy of EU law, the BVerfG strengthens the position of embattled judges in Poland facing disciplinary action for implementing the primacy of EU law. The concern shown by some members of the First Senate for the situation in Poland corroborates this reading.

This Article attempts to outline the optimal implementation of collective redress by using a comparative approach. After exploring the weaknesses of individual actions, which should be avoided, this Article presents the main forms of collective redress that exist in the various states. In particular, these forms include: Group action, representative action, and group settlement. The comparison of the various legal orders demonstrates the existence of several important parameters that need to be evaluated in order to design appropriate legislation. As a result, this Article supports alignment with the American class action and proposes specific modifications in order to eliminate several disadvantages of the original model.

Multiple laws and regulations in Western Europe have been enacted on the premise that headscarves and face veils constitute an existential threat to the constitutional identity of the respective legal systems. Thus, the logic of militant democracy as a justification for restricting fundamental rights have been applied in order to restrict the freedom to manifest one’s religion. Yet, the politicymakers claiming to defend the constitutional identity through militant democracy have not been able to prove the existence of a concrete, imminent threat against the state from the women who wear headscarves or face veils. Nonetheless, the European judiciaries have taken the political claim at face value and allowed the restrictions without compelling the political decision-makers to provide substantive justifications. Thus, the cases of headscarves and face veils offer a prism, through which we can study fundamental paradoxes of liberal democracy and constitutionalism.

Labor law scholars have been receptive to socio legal methods, going beyond doctrinal legal sources and looking to other disciplines including industrial relations, sociology, and history. This Article revisits the development of socio legal labor law scholarship in Germany and the UK in order to understand the different approaches within the context of two different legal and academic cultures, and considers how a comparison can provide new insights at a time when the discipline is in a state of flux. In particular, this Article focuses on how history can provide an entrée into different ways of comparing labor law and labor relations systems. It seeks to start a methodological debate on “how to do” labor law history within the context of the discipline’s socio legal origins. In a final section, it uses insights from history and comparative law in order to develop a new methodology—a “minor comparativism”—which unearths the processes and influences underpinning the historical development of labor law which have hitherto escaped the legal record. Such an approach enables scholars to reassess traditional narratives—a worthwhile endeavor at a time when the future role of labor law in regulating work is under scrutiny.

The Federal Constitutional Court has decided that the prohibition to strike for career civil servants, as it has traditionally been part of the German legal order, is in compliance with the German Constitution. The Court thereby put a (provisional) end to a long-lasting debate on how to solve the tension between the fundamental freedom to form associations under Article 9(3) of the Basic Law, which arguably encompasses a right to strike, and Article 33(5) of the Basic Law, which protects the traditional principles of the career civil servants, which arguably encompasses the prohibition to strike. Through recognizing that the ban on strike action by career civil servants is not only allowed but required under the German Constitution, the Constitutional Court navigates the German legal order on a potential collision course with the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. In this context, the Constitutional Court on the one hand reaffirms the openness of the German constitutional order towards international law in general and human rights and the European Convention on Human Rights in particular. On the other hand, the Court somehow marginalizes the role of the European Court of Human Rights and threatens to not follow the Court should it hold that the European Convention on Human Rights demands a right to strike also for career civil servants.

Criminal offenses ignite the political debate. Questions about the causes, development, and combating of crime touch on widespread fears; those who make them their subject can be sure of public attention. This Article looks at 242 press releases of the German right-wing populist party, the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland; AfD) from 2018 dealing with criminal offenses. It examines which crime phenomena the reports describe, which perpetrator and victim images they project, and how crime and immigration are depicted as related threats.

This Article analyzes the value of behavioral economics for EU judicial decision-making. The first part introduces the foundations of behavioral economics by focusing on cognitive illusions, prospect theory, and the underlying distinction between different processes of thought. The second part examines the influence of selected biases and heuristics, namely the anchoring effect, availability bias, zero-risk bias, and hindsight bias on diverse legal issues in EU law including, among others, the scope of the fundamental freedoms, the proportionality test as well as the roles of the Advocate General and Reporting Judge. The Article outlines how behavioral economic findings can be taken into account to improve judicial decision-making. Accordingly, the adaptation of judicial training concerning cognitive illusions, the establishment of a de minimis rule regarding the scope of the fundamental freedoms, and the use of economic models when determining the impact of certain measures on fundamental freedoms is suggested. Finally, an “unbiased jury” concentrating exclusively on specific factual issues such as causal connections within the proportionality test is necessary, if the hindsight bias is to be avoided. While it is of great importance to take behavioral economic findings into account, judicial decision-making is unlikely to become flawless based on natural intelligence. Despite bearing fundamental risks, artificial intelligence may provide means to achieve greater fairness, consistency, and legal certainty in the future.

Given the debate at the seventy-second Conference of the Association of German Jurists (Deutscher Juristentag) in September 2018 on whether German sentencing needs reform, this Article will explore this very question in greater detail. In this regard, this Article will present various empirical studies in order to demonstrate that notable inconsistencies in German sentencing practice exist. This Article will then point out that broad statutory sentencing ranges, along with fairly vague sentencing guidance, are among the main causes of these disparities. Subsequently, this Article will examine several mechanisms that selected foreign jurisdictions—namely the U.S., the U.K., and Australia—have put in place in order to enhance consistency in their sentencing practices. Three mechanisms of sentencing guidance will be distinguished here: First, formal sentencing guidelines; second, guideline judgments; and third, sentencing advisory bodies as they operate in some Australian states. This Article will compare these mechanisms and assess their merits and drawbacks. Based on this comparative study, this Article will look at how to improve consistency in German sentencing practice. In this respect, this Article will present three steps that German criminal law reform should follow, including a better sentencing framework, the strategic gathering of sentencing data, and the implementation of a flexible sentencing guidelines regime.

Since contracts form a basic institution of every legal order, the interdisciplinary orientation of concepts of contracts reveals socio-legal inclinations of a legal order more broadly. Contrasting the UK and US Common Law of contracts with developments under German law, this Article examines the relation between normative and social science approaches, notably rooted in economics, economic sociology, and social theory in the genealogy of contract law. A shared leitmotif over the 20th century has been the drive to account for the societal embeddedness of contract. However, conceptualizations of “Contract and Society” differ considerably between legal orders in their disciplinary ingredients and design. In the US, and to a lesser extent also in the UK, the rather continuous reception of legal realism has paved the way for broad interdisciplinary perspectives on contract law, ranging from classical socio-legal, empirical work (e.g., Macaulay), economics (e.g., Williamson), sociology (e.g., Powell), and critical theory (e.g., Kennedy) to today’s landscape, where essentially instrumental and ideal-normative theories compete. Alternatively, in Germany, where the realist heritage was more ephemeral, the transformations of contract law were processed from within legal discourse and foremost in their effects on private autonomy as conceptualized, for example, in German idealism, discourse theory and critical theory. Similarly, the “constitutionalization” of contract law—even if championed for fostering private law’s reflexivity—has, for the most part, defied a socio-legal orientation. Finally, the Article highlights the path dependencies with which these different starting points translate in current debates around the role of contract in transnational governance.

Extraterritorial cooperation—including by providing funds, equipment, training, and technical support—has become central to policies aimed at preventing access of refugees and “irregular” migrants to particular countries and regions. But cooperating countries and international organizations have due diligence obligations under human rights law to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the cooperation they provide does not result in human rights violations, even when the violations are perpetrated extraterritorially by third parties. Consequently, they can become liable for the failure to exercise due diligence to prevent human rights violations from occurring in the receiving states. Also, they may incur responsibility for the resulting acts where they knowingly aided or assisted the receiving state to commit human rights violations with the support provided.

International organizations and some states have begun to adopt human rights due diligence policies to assess and mitigate the risks of such cooperation. Using the examples of European Union and United Kingdom support to Libya, this Article analyzes the due diligence policies they have applied to extraterritorial cooperation in the area of border control and the detention of refugees and other migrants. It finds that the policies as implemented have provided only superficial scrutiny and argues that they should be made more robust and transparent. Ultimately, this will help mitigate the human rights risks associated with extraterritorial assistance, and ideally help ensure that assistance contributes to the strengthening of human rights protections in recipient countries.

Commerce in some data is, and should be, limited by the law because some data embody values and interests—in particular, human dignity—that may be detrimentally affected by trade. In this Article, drawing on the Roman law principles regarding res extra commercium, we investigate the example of personal data as regulated under the EU Charter and the GDPR. We observe that transactions in personal data are not forbidden but subject to what we call a dynamically limited alienability rule. This rule is based on two dynamic variables: The nature of data and the legal basis for commercially trading such data at a primary or secondary level. Accordingly, in order to deal with such dynamism and the uncertainty it poses, we propose a general two-stage reasonableness test that should help legal practitioners, judges, and lawmakers to consider when trade in data is illicit and who, if anyone, shall be held responsible for this mischief. Finally, we show how the two-stage test and the limited alienability rule can advance European contract law and help enforce legal principles associated with such data extra commercium in automated and autonomous data trading systems.