This birthday gives rise to many considerations. Some reflect upon achievements – the German constitution, named “Basic Law”, has proven to work although many did not believe in it when it was framed. Others emphasize desiderata. Sabine Berghahn commented at the 50th birthday that it has developed “far too slowly and [some] has even gone completely wrong.” Jutta Limbach, former President of the Federal Constitutional Court, observed that constitutional history was “anything but regal, but very difficult and full of obstacles.” Former Chancellor Willy Brandt famously called the constitution “a snail on thin ice.” So what is missing when we analyze the Basic Law, and what should be finally added - as spirit, in interpretation, in clarifying words? I will try to point to achievements and show what might still be lacking. This is what studies in constitutionalism always do. To do justice to the occasion, I will also think about who we should invite to celebrate this birthday. More precisely, if we are to celebrate the 60th birthday of Article 3 of the Basic Law, which is the equality guarantee, and which has been amended since its birthday, I will encourage you to think about who should come to this party.

The European Company – or Societas Europaea (SE) – has been referred to as the “flagship of European Company Law”. This is certainly true if one considers the ambitious origins of the project. In 1970, the European Commission presented the first draft of the Statute for a European Company. A completely autonomous European legal form was intended, freely floating above the national legal forms and based solely on the sturdy branch of a purely European corporate law. The text of 1970 was, in substance, a complete code of corporate law. From the management structure to shareholders’ actions, from the law of corporate groups (Konzernrecht) to accounting law, from tax law to co-determination – every regulation required in a modern corporate law was provided for.

From the perspective of a non-American jurist, student-edited law reviews seem to be one of the most distinctive features of the United States legal education system. The development of law reviews in the United States has been particularly sustained in more recent years, with a literal proliferation of law (schools and law) reviews, both of general focus and subject-specific. With student-edited law journals making up the largest share of the legal periodical “market,” publication in highly ranked student-edited law reviews has come to acquire great significance also in relation to the law faculty selection and tenure-granting mechanism.

The relationship between human rights law and business has emerged in recent years as one of the most topical to be discussed and put on the agenda almost worldwide. The activities of corporations in this globalized environment have often served as the catalyst for human rights violations; due to the lack of institutional protection, some corporations are able to exploit regulatory lacunae and the lack of human rights protection. On 9 April 2010 Professor John Ruggie, the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General on human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, submitted his fifth Report under the title “Business and Human Rights: Further steps toward the operationalization of the ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework.” The objective of this short article is to examine his 2010 report and to establish whether this Report has contributed to clarifying standards in the field of human rights and business.

This Article discusses existing WTO rules on subsidies and state enterprises, relevant caselaw and reform prospects in light of key geopolitical developments and changes in the global economy emerging in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Following a general introduction, the Article critically analyzes present WTO rules on industrial subsidies, focusing inter alia on the new problems raised by activist industrial policies pursued by global trading powers, foreign subsidization, the climate change shock and environmental exigencies. It then shifts attention to the application of WTO rules on subsidies to the state sector and the increasing demands for new international trade rules on non-subsidies measures to address the negative spillover effects on trade from government influence on state-owned enterprises (SOEs). With respect to each of these matters, the Article first clarifies the terms of the problem in relation to existing WTO rules and caselaw, and next examines the question of how, and to what extent, “deeper” free trade agreements (FTAs)—those that experts designate as models for WTO reforms on the matter—establish new rules that permit to adequately address the trade concerns raised by SOEs’ commercial and financial activities. Based on this multi-layered analysis, the article concludes by examining prospects of reform of WTO rules on state interventionism.

The phenomenon of judicial self-government at international courts has thus far been vastly understudied. Our article fills this gap and systematically explores its personal dimension, both from formal and informal perspectives. Specifically, we focus on the selection, promotion, and removal of international judges. We build our analysis on studying legal instruments, such as constitutive treaties, statutes, and rules of procedure, which we subsequently supplement by anecdotal evidence of how they work in practice. We show that each international court is unique in terms of the forms and extent of participation of its judges in deciding on international judicial careers. There is a variation as regards the forms and degree of judicial self-government across international courts and across the relevant areas of decision-making for each court. However, some broader patterns and trends emerge from our examination of relevant provisions and practices. First, some courts display consistently low degrees of judicial self-government across all these areas of decision-making, while other courts display relatively higher degrees. Second, judicial self-government does not manifest itself at the international level in entirely the same way as it does at the national level. We found that while judicial self-government manifests itself relatively strongly in the areas of promotions and removals of international judges, it is limited in the area of selection of international judges. International courts are not, strictly speaking, self-governing in the latter area, because the sitting judges of these courts are rarely members of the bodies that decide or advise on selecting new judges. However, sitting judges of some international courts have become involved in the formation of the bodies screening candidates and/or in selecting the members of such bodies. Hence, judicial self-government has started manifesting itself in selection processes internationally, albeit in a limited fashion, with only indirect involvement of sitting international judges.

The need to fulfil treaty obligations in good faith bases both the principle of pacta sunt servanda under Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the principle of loyalty under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union. This article seeks to understand the precise relationship between the two principles. It argues that the principles are different embodiments of the same root concept. In particular, it argues that loyalty is a more sophisticated and specific version of the concept, since it establishes that the relevant states and institutions must take account of each other's efforts to fulfill their obligations faithfully. While the Court of Justice of the European Union has observed the consequent need for greater flexibility when determining Member State liability, it has not done so consistently, especially in the context of EU external relations. Lastly, this article proposes that the presented conceptualization of loyalty and pacta sunt servanda could help us understand how other international subsystems might develop the basic concepts in general international law.

In their contribution in this issue Mattias Derlén and Johan Lindholm use social network analysis to show that the European Court of Justice is a precedent-driven constitutional court that is comparable to the US Supreme Court with regard to the citation of precedents. The article and its use of network analysis as a method provoked a lively debate on the editorial board of the German Law Journal about comparative law theory and methods generally and the place of empirical (including network) analyses in the comparative law discipline. For this reason, the editorial board commissioned this “special section” of contributions dedicated broadly to approaches to comparative law. In his essay in this section, for example, Jens Frankenreiter offers a detailed assessment of Derlén's and Lindholm's analysis. In this piece, we take a broader perspective and look at the utility and the limits of network analysis for legal scholarship generally.

This Article questions in what sense law in the German tradition has been—and can still be—considered a form of culture. The Article offers an overview of traditional approaches to law and culture in German Legal Theory and the Theory of Methods, and argues that the law has shifted from being perceived as culture during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to being in contrast with culture, which is considered the “other” of the law. Mediated by “legal culture,” the discourse pendulum has swung back to the notion of “Law as Culture” during the last three decades. Thomas Gutmann, the German lawyer, has fiercely challenged equating law with culture, describing it as “murky” and irrelevant. Similarly, the concept of “Law as Culture” is questioned by the provocations of “Law and Affect.” This Article claims that, irrespective of conceptual framework trends, applying the law remains a highly challenging cultural practice in terms of both fact-finding and interpreting legal norms.

Over the past two decades, authors, many of whom are included in this volume, have addressed several salient foundational issues concerning citizenship in Europe. Others in this volume address some of these issues—such as the relationship between national and European citizenship regarded as multilevel (Rainer Baubock and Ulf Bernitz), the relationship between citizenship and legal human rights (Samantha Besson), the relationship between citizenship and political rights in particular (Agustin Menendez and Jo Shaw), and citizenship and social rights (Stefano Giuboni).

This essay elaborates on the need for shared values among those who share citizenship in Europe, as either citizens of Member States engaged in multilevel governance or as Union citizens. The European crisis has increased the call for such values, and also shows that people contest these values. The issues include: What is the responsible exercise of political rights in national elections with repercussions for EU governance, how to trust authorities at all levels concerning human rights, the extent of cross-border solidarity at the risk of free-riders, and the trust that the political and legal order will remain responsive to the best interests of all affected.

Without presenting a full definition, it can be said that the notion of judicial lawmaking implies the idea that courts create normative expectations beyond the individual case. That is, our question is whether courts' normative declarations have an effect which is abstract and general. Our purpose here is to ask about judicial lawmaking in this sense with respect to international criminal courts and tribunals. In particular, we will focus on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). No other international criminal court or tribunal has issued so many judgments as the ICTY, so it seems a particularly useful focus for examining the creation of normative expectations.

Although Ireland is often cited as part of the vanguard of countries adopting forms of judicial self-governance in the 1990s, this appearance can be misleading: the Irish judiciary are self-governing only in limited respects. The judge-led Court Service is in charge of court estate, non-judicial personnel and provision of information on the court system to the public. Many key matters – discipline, promotions and deployment – remain largely out of the control of the corporate judiciary. Judicial appointments are significantly at the discretion of the government. In the last decade, there have been significant moves towards a more corporate judiciary and these are reflected in the creation of a judges’ representative body, the Association of Judges of Ireland, and a shadow Judges Council. There are currently proposals to create a new independent mechanism for appointing judges and to create a Judicial Council with a significant role in disciplining the judiciary.

The Irish experience highlights the importance of political and cultural factors in establishing and maintaining judicial independence and self-governance. Despite the significant role for the government in judicial appointments, and the presence of a culture of political patronage in these appointments, there is nonetheless a robust culture of individual judicial independence once judges have been appointed. The creation of the Courts Service in 1999 was a significant transfer of administrative power to the judiciary but it was approved without demur by the political branches, who welcomed the depoliticization of controversial decisions about court estate. Conversely, reforms to judicial appointments have been weak because politicians saw value in maintaining a relatively harmless form of political patronage, and proposals for a Judicial Council that have agreed in outline for two decades have yet to be enacted, apparently because they lack sufficient political salience. The defence of judicial independence, and the creation of robust institutional mechanisms for defending it, ultimately requires the goodwill of politicians.

Google's position in the information market has caused interesting legal developments insofar as its obligations are concerned. On various grounds, courts worldwide have begun to impose injunctions on Google that require the company to withdraw the search results—in fact, information sources—that its search engines provide. This article looks at this recent phenomenon of imposing obligations on Google to withdraw some information through the lens of judicial dialogue. In particular, we analyze the “inspiring” role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its Google Spain judgment. This case represents a clear migration of some ideas that might be perceived as universal. Some courts outside of Europe—such as Canada—are gaining “inspiration” from the CJEU's Google Spain judgment in order to reinforce their own decisions. The legitimacy and techniques of this process are also discussed in this article.

Germany was the first country to open trial against a person who has allegedly participated in the 9/11 terror attack in the US. Shortly after September 2001 intelligence services in- and outside Germany concentrated on Hamburg as one of the places where the pilots and their supporters planned the attack. The Maroccan national Mounir El Motassadeq was the first who was arrested and charged by the General Federal Prosecutor with (1) abbeting murder in 3066 cases and (2) with being a member of a terrorist organisation . The trial took place before the Oberlandesgericht (Upper Regional Court – OLG) in Hamburg, where the accused resided at that time. He was sentenced by this Court in first instance to 15 years imprisonment – the first conviction for the 9/11 attack. The accused nevertheless appealed to the Bundesgerichtshof – BGH, Federal Court of Justice, and his conviction was quashed and a re-trial ordered at the Court in Hamburg. In reaction to the BGH's decision Motassadeq was released from detention pending trial on 8 April 2004. The accused now awaits his re-trial on conditional bail.

Before delving into the details of a specific German theory of sentencing, this first section attempts to very briefly outline the general framework of the sentencing process according to German law.

German law is codified law. This means that not only the individual crimes are laid down in the German Criminal Code, but also the general principles concerning sentencing are contained therein. The constitutional basis of the sentencing structure can be drawn from the notion of the Rechtsstaat, which can be translated with the term “rule of law.” This principle, which is laid down in Article 20 § 1 Grundgesetz (German Constitution – GG), encompasses the culpability-principle, under which the punishment must be proportionate to the individual guilt of the offender. Thus, section 46 § I of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch – StGB) reads: “the guilt of the perpetrator is the foundation for determining punishment.” The culpability-principle is a specific expression of the proportionality principle, which is also a constitutional requirement of the “rule of law.”

On 17 March 2005, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Jakob Kellenberger, presented a study (hereinafter “the Study”) of customary international humanitarian law (IHL). A decade earlier, the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent had mandated the ICRC to “prepare […] a report on customary rules of IHL applicable in international [IAC] and non-international armed conflicts [NIAC], and to circulate the report to States and competent international bodies.” The Study's objective was to capture a “photograph” of the existing, hitherto unwritten rules that make up customary IHL. Comprehensive, high-level research into customary IHL followed; the end result of which is undeniably a remarkable feat and a significant contribution to scholarship and debate in this area of international law.

This introductory Article provides a conceptual umbrella for the Special Issue on Informal Institutions and Democratic Decay. It offers conceptual clarity to studying informal institutions and explains their relationship to other concepts such as constitutional conventions or judicial culture. The article summarizes findings of the Special issue in four key observations. First, it shows that it is impossible to understand the functioning of courts without understanding the informal rules that shape courts’ governance and decision-making. These informal rules (institutions) appear within courts (internal), between courts and other actors (mixed) and among non-judicial actors with effects on courts (external judicial institutions). Second, it identifies a strong trend of formalization of rules, sponsored mostly on the supranational European level .Third, it explains why reforms of formal rules are often not sufficient to trigger behavioral changes and highlights the role of informal institutions in created commitment of actors to key democratic principles. Fourth, it argues that informal judicial institutions significantly impact the quality of democracy.

July 8, 2004, marked a cornerstone for the German law against unfair competition. The amending Statute Against Unfair Competition (UWG 2004) came into force on that day. That day also ended a long discussion among researchers who had called for a thorough modernization of the UWG. In particular, researchers criticized the prohibitions on sales promotion; these prohibitions are now abolished. Furthermore, the new UWG addresses European Union demands for greater liberalization and consumer protection, especially with respect to the electronic communications sector. The new law is a complete reorganization of the old act of 1909. The revised UWG is much more liberal, but still guarantees a high standard of protection for consumers and competitors.

In autumn 2005 a group of Sudanese asylum seekers and refugees discontented with the unbearable conditions in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refuges (UNHCR) office in Cairo started a sit-in protest near the office. The protesters were, besides venting their anger at the suspension of Refugee Status Determination procedures for Sudanese refugees due to the ceasefire between the Sudanese government and Sudan's People Liberation Army, also making their frustrations heard regarding UNHCR's lengthy procedures, its failure to provide them with proper assistance, the high numbers of rejected applications, improper interviews and their general treatment by UNHCR's personnel as well as their difficult social and health conditions which had been aggravated by the lack of proper assistance. They were demanding that this situation be remedied and calling for transparent and fair procedures. Shortly thereafter they were joined by many more protesters so that in the following three months a group of between 1,800 and 2,500 people stayed around UNHCR's premises. However, meetings and negotiations with UNCHR eventually failed. The crisis ended in a tragedy. On December 30, 2005 the Egyptian security forces proceeded with the forcible removal of the protesters from the venue in an action in which 28 refugees were killed, more than half of which were children and women, with several protesters missing after the events. The Cairo incident illustrates what the cited report on the events has rightly called “a tragedy of failures and false expectations” regarding international humanitarian and human rights institutions.