Lawmaking by judicial institutions requires legitimation. As international courts gradually play an ever more significant part in the shaping of international law, they share with any other lawmaker the need for a convincing basis of legitimacy. In the case of international courts, however, this need has to be addressed by taking into account their special function: that is, to review decisions made by other lawmakers (mainly domestic). The question of the legitimacy of judicial institutions is thus crucially connected with the standard they apply in reviewing such decisions.

The German Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling of May 5, 2020 on the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) stated, for the first time ever, that some decisions by European institutions are not covered by the competence allocations of the European Treaties and cannot therefore take effect in Germany. This article argues that the judgment came as no surprise, as it is consistent with the principle of conferral of powers. According to this principle the EU and its institutions can only act within the limits of their competences. The German Basic Law prohibits any transfer of sovereign rights whose exercise would confer sua sponte additional competences to the supranational level. Against this background, the Federal Constitutional Court judgment does not seek to limit the ECB’s scope for appraisal and evaluation in the exercise of its monetary policy mandate. It focuses rather on the conditions which legitimize the ECB’s leeway. The issue in this case is not the applicability of the proportionality principle as a criterion governing the delimitation of powers, but the different reference points for the assessment of proportionality. In this regard the CJEU had failed to discuss whether monetary policy and the effects on economic policy are proportionate by themselves. Hence, in constitutional terms, the CJEU’s interpretation was found to be “arbitrary”, since the German Constitutional Court defined arbitrariness as jurisprudence that “in a reasonable reading … [appears] unintelligible and clearly untenable.” In other words, it is “simply not comprehensible.” Despite the harsh words of the German Constitutional Court, the authors argue that the judgement in the end can help to create a European legal culture that will strengthen the European Union in the long term if, in future, the CJEU engages more constructively with criticisms from Member State courts.

The history of the European Union has been fraught with constant friction between the sovereignty of the Member States and the supranational powers of the Union, with the Union gaining terrain in fields of law traditionally belonging to the Member States. Despite this tension, certain legal fields are steadfastly asserted as belonging to the Member States. Notably, Member States regulate the grounds of the acquisition and loss of nationality. The Treaty of Lisbon highlights that the nationality of Member States is scarcely governed by European Union law, if at all. The sole provision governing the relationship between Member State nationality and Union law, i.e., Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) stresses the primacy of Member State nationality.

Reality, however, is often not as simple as such a cursory reading implies. European Union citizenship, once a mere complementary facet of the national citizenships, has transformed into an institution in its own right, forming a symbiotic relationship between the Member State nationality and the European Union.

This Article critically analyzes seven elements of the Biden administration trade policy: (1) buy American; (2) tariffs; (3) World Trade Organization; (4) free trade agreements; (5) China; (6) technology; and (7) Russia. Although President Biden has made a clean break from Trump policies in many areas, this is not the case when it comes to international trade. Regretfully, Biden has chosen to keep in place most of the failed trade policies of his predecessor—the Trump tariffs and the China trade war. It is not too late to shift ground, to negotiate mutual abolition of the Trump tariffs, to open free trade negotiations with the EU and UK, to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, to adopt a multilateral strategy with allies to check Chinese trade excesses, and to reengage with the World Trade Organization. Topping the list of needed reforms of the multilateral trading system are: (1) subsidies; (2) state-owned enterprises; and (3) forced technology transfer. These are best addressed through a WTO plurilateral agreement and/or preferential trade agreements. The Biden administration should prioritize these urgent reforms. Rather than promoting “free” trade and multilateral trade reforms, the Biden administration continues its predecessor’s nationalistic policies so that trade serves domestic political ends. Such state intervention in trade policy consists of the strategic use of tariffs, subsidies, “buy American” rules, and regional trade arrangements without regard to the rules of the multilateral trading system. These new policies represent a decisive retreat from globalization and openness to trade.

The Congress, directed by the Biden administration, has adopted a far-reaching industrial policy in the form of four laws that subsidize key sectors of the U.S. economy: American Rescue Plan Act ($40 billion); Infrastructure and Jobs Act ($1.2 trillion); Inflation Reduction Act ($369 billion); and Chips Act ($252.7 billion). This subsidization coupled with “buy American” protectionism constitute a departure from the free trade ideal that has characterized U.S. policy since the end of World War II.

Incitement by police officers is a well-known and often utilized police measure in the German investigation process. Yet, when it comes to prosecuting the perpetrators, a moral conflict arises. Should a State, bound by its own constitution and committed to protect its citizens, be allowed to incite or support a possible offender and afterwards judge on his or her wrongful actions? After Germany’s higher courts had to deal with multiple cases of entrapped perpetrators, there has been a strong debate about the admissibility, requirements, and consequences of entrapment within the German legal system. International and national courts as well as scholars represent different legal standpoints in this regard. In particular, the approaches of the European Court of Human Rights and the German Federal Court of Justice differ significantly in their results. As Germany ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and therefore has to adhere to the European Court of Human Rights’ ruling, an additional legal conflict arises. This article depicts and discusses the most relevant approaches to resolve this moral and legal conflict and satisfy both the need for effective prosecution and the procedural rights of the individual person subject to the act of entrapment. Additionally, recent legislative ambitions are presented.

The treatment of shareholder loans in corporate insolvency is a controversial issue in many jurisdictions. On both sides of the Atlantic, lawmakers and courts have struggled to answer the question if and under what circumstances shareholder loans should be treated differently from loans granted by outsiders. In particular, the difficulties turn on three issues: (i) whether shareholder loans should rank pari passu with the claims of outside creditors or whether they should be subordinated; (ii) whether the repayment of shareholder loans should be subject to specific restrictions, particularly in the vicinity of insolvency; and (iii) whether specific restrictions should apply to secured shareholder loans.

This birthday gives rise to many considerations. Some reflect upon achievements – the German constitution, named “Basic Law”, has proven to work although many did not believe in it when it was framed. Others emphasize desiderata. Sabine Berghahn commented at the 50th birthday that it has developed “far too slowly and [some] has even gone completely wrong.” Jutta Limbach, former President of the Federal Constitutional Court, observed that constitutional history was “anything but regal, but very difficult and full of obstacles.” Former Chancellor Willy Brandt famously called the constitution “a snail on thin ice.” So what is missing when we analyze the Basic Law, and what should be finally added - as spirit, in interpretation, in clarifying words? I will try to point to achievements and show what might still be lacking. This is what studies in constitutionalism always do. To do justice to the occasion, I will also think about who we should invite to celebrate this birthday. More precisely, if we are to celebrate the 60th birthday of Article 3 of the Basic Law, which is the equality guarantee, and which has been amended since its birthday, I will encourage you to think about who should come to this party.

In the environment of ongoing endeavors to “rescue” the Euro, the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) is meanwhile dealing with several constitutional complaints challenging matters that could be described as “the future of the German Bundesbank” and “the present and the past of the German Federal Government and the German Bundestag.” Or, to be more specific, the complainants currently challenge the prospective participation of the German Bundesbank in possible future implementations of the so called “OMT Framework” of 6 September 2012. They also argue that the German Federal Government and the German Bundestag “failed to act” regarding this OMT framework.

In their contribution in this issue Mattias Derlén and Johan Lindholm use social network analysis to show that the European Court of Justice is a precedent-driven constitutional court that is comparable to the US Supreme Court with regard to the citation of precedents. The article and its use of network analysis as a method provoked a lively debate on the editorial board of the German Law Journal about comparative law theory and methods generally and the place of empirical (including network) analyses in the comparative law discipline. For this reason, the editorial board commissioned this “special section” of contributions dedicated broadly to approaches to comparative law. In his essay in this section, for example, Jens Frankenreiter offers a detailed assessment of Derlén's and Lindholm's analysis. In this piece, we take a broader perspective and look at the utility and the limits of network analysis for legal scholarship generally.

This Article questions in what sense law in the German tradition has been—and can still be—considered a form of culture. The Article offers an overview of traditional approaches to law and culture in German Legal Theory and the Theory of Methods, and argues that the law has shifted from being perceived as culture during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to being in contrast with culture, which is considered the “other” of the law. Mediated by “legal culture,” the discourse pendulum has swung back to the notion of “Law as Culture” during the last three decades. Thomas Gutmann, the German lawyer, has fiercely challenged equating law with culture, describing it as “murky” and irrelevant. Similarly, the concept of “Law as Culture” is questioned by the provocations of “Law and Affect.” This Article claims that, irrespective of conceptual framework trends, applying the law remains a highly challenging cultural practice in terms of both fact-finding and interpreting legal norms.

The European Company – or Societas Europaea (SE) – has been referred to as the “flagship of European Company Law”. This is certainly true if one considers the ambitious origins of the project. In 1970, the European Commission presented the first draft of the Statute for a European Company. A completely autonomous European legal form was intended, freely floating above the national legal forms and based solely on the sturdy branch of a purely European corporate law. The text of 1970 was, in substance, a complete code of corporate law. From the management structure to shareholders’ actions, from the law of corporate groups (Konzernrecht) to accounting law, from tax law to co-determination – every regulation required in a modern corporate law was provided for.

Benjamin Cardozo, a great promoter of the concept of the unity of form and content in law and literature, once wrote that “[t]he perplexity of judges becomes the scholar's opportunity.” Cardozo's observation prompts my contribution on narratives in the law to this special issue on pluralities in the law because of the interrelation between law in academic theory and law in practice. My experience as a judge and an academic working in both the fields of law and literature, and law and humanities, allows me to provide a unique point of view. This Article argues the following: First, “to narrate is already to explain” as Paul Ricoeur wrote; the way in which the facts of a case are narrated largely determines the outcome of that case, therefore jurists need to develop and cherish narrative knowledge. Second, jurists should be imaginative about both the law and the people whose fates they determine when they use language to translate brute facts into the reality of the legal narrative. Third, this Article investigates and critically responds to literary theorists' various views on narrative and narratology, explaining which elements can be fruitfully incorporated into a legal narratology. I argue that jurists, while acting as authors and readers of legal narratives, all too often disregard what literary theory and the humanities more generally have to offer to legal practice, which is to highlight points of misunderstanding in our interdisciplinary literary-legal discussions. Here, too, scholarly opportunities remain to be seized for further clarification and theoretical elaboration of the bond of law and narrative.

The phenomenon of judicial self-government at international courts has thus far been vastly understudied. Our article fills this gap and systematically explores its personal dimension, both from formal and informal perspectives. Specifically, we focus on the selection, promotion, and removal of international judges. We build our analysis on studying legal instruments, such as constitutive treaties, statutes, and rules of procedure, which we subsequently supplement by anecdotal evidence of how they work in practice. We show that each international court is unique in terms of the forms and extent of participation of its judges in deciding on international judicial careers. There is a variation as regards the forms and degree of judicial self-government across international courts and across the relevant areas of decision-making for each court. However, some broader patterns and trends emerge from our examination of relevant provisions and practices. First, some courts display consistently low degrees of judicial self-government across all these areas of decision-making, while other courts display relatively higher degrees. Second, judicial self-government does not manifest itself at the international level in entirely the same way as it does at the national level. We found that while judicial self-government manifests itself relatively strongly in the areas of promotions and removals of international judges, it is limited in the area of selection of international judges. International courts are not, strictly speaking, self-governing in the latter area, because the sitting judges of these courts are rarely members of the bodies that decide or advise on selecting new judges. However, sitting judges of some international courts have become involved in the formation of the bodies screening candidates and/or in selecting the members of such bodies. Hence, judicial self-government has started manifesting itself in selection processes internationally, albeit in a limited fashion, with only indirect involvement of sitting international judges.

This Article discusses existing WTO rules on subsidies and state enterprises, relevant caselaw and reform prospects in light of key geopolitical developments and changes in the global economy emerging in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Following a general introduction, the Article critically analyzes present WTO rules on industrial subsidies, focusing inter alia on the new problems raised by activist industrial policies pursued by global trading powers, foreign subsidization, the climate change shock and environmental exigencies. It then shifts attention to the application of WTO rules on subsidies to the state sector and the increasing demands for new international trade rules on non-subsidies measures to address the negative spillover effects on trade from government influence on state-owned enterprises (SOEs). With respect to each of these matters, the Article first clarifies the terms of the problem in relation to existing WTO rules and caselaw, and next examines the question of how, and to what extent, “deeper” free trade agreements (FTAs)—those that experts designate as models for WTO reforms on the matter—establish new rules that permit to adequately address the trade concerns raised by SOEs’ commercial and financial activities. Based on this multi-layered analysis, the article concludes by examining prospects of reform of WTO rules on state interventionism.

The need to fulfil treaty obligations in good faith bases both the principle of pacta sunt servanda under Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the principle of loyalty under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union. This article seeks to understand the precise relationship between the two principles. It argues that the principles are different embodiments of the same root concept. In particular, it argues that loyalty is a more sophisticated and specific version of the concept, since it establishes that the relevant states and institutions must take account of each other's efforts to fulfill their obligations faithfully. While the Court of Justice of the European Union has observed the consequent need for greater flexibility when determining Member State liability, it has not done so consistently, especially in the context of EU external relations. Lastly, this article proposes that the presented conceptualization of loyalty and pacta sunt servanda could help us understand how other international subsystems might develop the basic concepts in general international law.

Before delving into the details of a specific German theory of sentencing, this first section attempts to very briefly outline the general framework of the sentencing process according to German law.

German law is codified law. This means that not only the individual crimes are laid down in the German Criminal Code, but also the general principles concerning sentencing are contained therein. The constitutional basis of the sentencing structure can be drawn from the notion of the Rechtsstaat, which can be translated with the term “rule of law.” This principle, which is laid down in Article 20 § 1 Grundgesetz (German Constitution – GG), encompasses the culpability-principle, under which the punishment must be proportionate to the individual guilt of the offender. Thus, section 46 § I of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch – StGB) reads: “the guilt of the perpetrator is the foundation for determining punishment.” The culpability-principle is a specific expression of the proportionality principle, which is also a constitutional requirement of the “rule of law.”

It is an irony of our times. The 9/11 attacks catapulted international humanitarian law (IHL) – otherwise known as the “laws of war” or the “law of armed conflict” – into popular conversation as never before. Who ever heard of Common Article 3 before the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan? Can anyone recall arguing about the criteria for prisoner of war status before the Taliban and al Qaeda? Was anyone parsing the difference between civilian trials, courts martial and military commissions before Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo?

From the perspective of a non-American jurist, student-edited law reviews seem to be one of the most distinctive features of the United States legal education system. The development of law reviews in the United States has been particularly sustained in more recent years, with a literal proliferation of law (schools and law) reviews, both of general focus and subject-specific. With student-edited law journals making up the largest share of the legal periodical “market,” publication in highly ranked student-edited law reviews has come to acquire great significance also in relation to the law faculty selection and tenure-granting mechanism.

Over the past two decades, authors, many of whom are included in this volume, have addressed several salient foundational issues concerning citizenship in Europe. Others in this volume address some of these issues—such as the relationship between national and European citizenship regarded as multilevel (Rainer Baubock and Ulf Bernitz), the relationship between citizenship and legal human rights (Samantha Besson), the relationship between citizenship and political rights in particular (Agustin Menendez and Jo Shaw), and citizenship and social rights (Stefano Giuboni).

This essay elaborates on the need for shared values among those who share citizenship in Europe, as either citizens of Member States engaged in multilevel governance or as Union citizens. The European crisis has increased the call for such values, and also shows that people contest these values. The issues include: What is the responsible exercise of political rights in national elections with repercussions for EU governance, how to trust authorities at all levels concerning human rights, the extent of cross-border solidarity at the risk of free-riders, and the trust that the political and legal order will remain responsive to the best interests of all affected.