The concept of cotransmission, including sympathetic nerve release of noradrenaline and ATP, was formalised in 1976, which challenged the accepted view known as ‘Dale's Principle’ that one nerve released only one transmitter. ATP was also shown to be a cotransmitter with acetylcholine in parasympathetic nerves supplying the urinary bladder and as a cotransmitter with nitric oxide in non-adrenergic, non-cholinergic inhibitory nerves supplying the intestine. It is now recognised that ATP is a cotransmitter in most, if not all, nerves in the peripheral and central nervous systems. The physiological significance of cotransmission will be considered. In pathophysiology, the role of ATP as a cotransmitter appears to increase as shown, for example, in the parasympathetic nerves supplying the diseased human bladder and in sympathetic nerves in spontaneously hypertensive rats. ATP is likely to be involved in sympathetic pain, causalgia and reflex sympathetic dystrophy. Purinergic signalling also appears to be enhanced in inflammatory and stress conditions.

In the last few decades several computing models using powerful tools from Nature have been developed (because of this, they are known as bio-inspired models). Commonly, the space-time trade-off method is used to develop efficient solutions to computationally hard problems. According to this, implementation of such models (in biological, electronic, or any other substrate) would provide a significant advance in the practical resolution of hard problems. Membrane Computing is a young branch of Natural Computing initiated by Gh. Păun at the end of 1998. It is inspired by the structure and functioning of living cells, as well as from the organization of cells in tissues, organs, and other higher order structures. The devices of this paradigm, called P systems or membrane systems, constitute models for distributed, parallel and non-deterministic computing. In this paper, a computational complexity theory within the framework of Membrane Computing is introduced. Polynomial complexity classes associated with different models of cell-like and tissue-like membrane systems are defined and the most relevant results obtained so far are presented. Different borderlines between efficiency and non-efficiency are shown, and many attractive characterizations of the P ≠ NP conjecture within the framework of this bio-inspired and non-conventional computing model are studied.

Along the West-Scandinavian coast, agrarian settlements, which are found along fjords and in valleys, are separated from each other and from the lands to the east by high mountains. Thus, seafaring was the main mode of communication from the Stone Age onwards. Unlike the coasts of Britain, Ireland and continental Europe, this 1000 km long coastline is littered with thousands of islands, islets and reefs, which create a protected coastal sailing route – the Norðvegr – from which the kingdom took its name. The author discusses this sailing-route's significance for the creation of the kingdom as well as for the Viking incursions in Britain, Ireland and the Continent c. 790–1050.

Medieval sagas of Icelanders are considered one of the most significant ‘contributions made by Nordic culture’,1 among ‘the great marvels of world literature […] so timelessly up-to-date’ and characterised by ‘a supreme, undistorted sense of actuality’.2 ‘We will never comprehend’, the famous novelist Milan Kundera said, ‘the significance of the fact that the first grand, enormous body of prose composed in a European national language sprang from the genius of a very small nation, perhaps the smallest in Europe … the glory of the sagas is indisputable’.1,2 What follows is an attempt to make comprehensible some of the aesthetic mechanisms through which the sagas attain their remarkable representational complexity. This is not in order to diminish the glory of the genius that Kundera refers to – the genius of the people and the many geniuses from among the people – but rather to appreciate it even more, as usually results from a deeper understanding of the workings of things.

Progress is hardly a given in the humanities or the suspect sciences. In many ways we are not quite as astute as our grandparents, and they not as much as theirs, and so forth in an infinite entropic regress. Would I trade Montaigne or Stendhal's psychological acumen for even the best work that comes from social psychology departments? In this short essay I want to show just how good some medieval people, medieval Icelanders to be exact, were at understanding the mental and emotional states of others, and if of others then presumably, though not necessarily, also of themselves. And I hope to show in some ways they were rather more sophisticated than we are.

The sea presented an important economic opportunity in the Middle Ages. The unpredictable risks of sea transport, the incalculability of time and distances opened a chance to those that were able to bridge the sea constantly and regularly and who were able to reduce the transaction costs most efficiently: the merchants of the late medieval ‘German Hansa’. The article will give a short introduction to the mechanisms and principles of international hanseatic trade in the Middle Ages.

The development of energy use in Northern Europe is investigated, with an emphasis on the region that some 13–1400 years ago became Denmark, and by using evidence from archaeological finds, climate science and written documents from more recent periods. The role of energy technology in permitting changes in society and – together with changes in food provision technologies – in allowing sustainable living for an increasing population, is demonstrated, with possible lessons relevant for the present debate on handling the required energy, economy and environmental management transitions. The author's recent book A History of Energy (Routledge, Cambridge 2011) is used as a reference.

The ocean carbon cycle plays a twofold role in the context of climate change: (1) through carbon dioxide gas exchange with the atmosphere and carbon cycle climate feedbacks, the ocean regulates the carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere and hence has a strong influence on the heat budget of the Earth; (2) the paleo-climatic marine sediment core record is largely based on biogenic matter fluxes from the ocean surface to the sea floor, which are part of the marine carbon cycle. The ocean is important for global carbon cycling, primarily due to three factors: (1) the ocean is a huge carbon reservoir with a relatively short turnover time; (2) carbon dioxide in sea water is effectively dissociated inorganically into other substances; (3) marine plankton is keeping the surface ocean carbon dioxide concentration at a lower level than would a lifeless ocean. On intermediate to long time scales, the ocean provides the most important sink for anthropogenic carbon dioxide. The marine uptake kinetics for carbon dioxide work on a longer time scale than current and projected emissions by humans.

In the early modern period (1500–1800), shipping and trade within Europe were the domain of individual merchants and small companies organised on a temporary basis. Outside Europe, however, new financial and commercial institutions such as permanent joint stock companies came into existence in order to limit the risks. These large institutions played an important role in inter-continental trade and shipping, albeit that their role in Asia differed from that in the Atlantic, where small companies as well as individual merchants remained the dominant form of organisation. In addition, privateers played an important role in the Atlantic economy in times of war while piracy could flourish in those parts of the overseas world where the Iberian trade circuits bordered on those of France, England and the Dutch republic. The conclusion points to the fact that a direct link between the overseas expansion of Europe and its industrialisation might be difficult to construct, but that the creation of long distance trading companies created the institutional environment that must have facilitated Europe's rapid economic growth after the middle of the eighteenth century.

In the first chapter of his celebrated Mimesis (1946) Auerbach discussed a specimen of Ancient Greek literature (Homer) both as the starting point of a European literary history of realism and as a comparandum to biblical storytelling. Both lines of approach have recently been given new impetuses. On the one hand there is Martin West's The East Face of Helicon,1 which does not merely compare early Greek literature and Near Eastern literature but describes the former as largely a product of the latter. On the other hand there is the series Studies in ancient Greek narrative, edited by Irene J.F. de Jong, which describes the early development of – what will become quintessential – European storytelling devices in Ancient Greek literature. Both scholarly projects, independently, have put the same urgent question on the agenda: how exactly are we to evaluate resemblances between ancient Greek literature and contemporary Near Eastern literature and later European literature. Can we speak of some form of historical connection, i.e. one literature taking over devices and motifs from another literature, or should we rather think in terms of typological resemblances, i.e. of the same narrative universals being employed at different places and at different times? Or is there some middle way to be found in the recent cognitive turn of comparative literature? Despite the methodological problems involved, investigating the history of European literature is an extremely rewarding task. The project of Europe as an economical and political unity has at the moment reached a critical phase. Literary scholars can contribute to this issue by showing the cultural unity of Europe, a mission that is just as urgent as it was in 1946, when Auerbach published his Mimesis.

For many centuries, Roma/Gypsy people have been an oppressed and stateless minority. Until 1989 most Roma/Gypsy people resided in the former Central and Eastern European communist countries. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Roma/Gypsy became one of the communities that were regarded as a scapegoat for post-Communist society's ills. Despite much rhetoric to the contrary, Roma/Gypsy communities were not welcomed in the West and much of the persecution they endured in the East they saw repeated in the West. The European Union (EU) has sought to place Human Rights as a focal point of its approach in all matters including the issue of Roma/Gypsy communities. Since 2007, Romania and Bulgaria, two states with large numbers of Roma/Gypsy, have become members of the EU. In the last few years France (and Italy) have been cautioned on their expulsion of Roma/Gypsy people. Not only have these actions contravened the European Union charter on Human Rights, but just as seriously, France and Italy have actually expelled citizens who are members of another European Member State because they were Roma/Gypsies. Turkey, on the other hand, as the home of one of the oldest and largest Roma/Gypsy settlements, had for long periods of time subjected Roma/Gypsy people to a life of social and economic disadvantage. Recently this has changed, ironically as part of Turkey's EU accession process. The aim of this article is to explore and compare the actions of European member States (France and Italy primarily) on the question of Roma/Gypsy integration with their integration in future EU accession states such as Turkey. The EU's moral high ground with regard to minorities seems to be ruined by the deplorable behaviour of some of its member states on the question of Roma/Gypsies while Turkey, which has an uneven record on human rights violations, has shown greater, although contradictory concern for the fate of the Roma/Gypsies.

Spurred by the recent global economic crisis, Social Innovation (SI) has gained increasing attention in the European Commission (EC) agenda. However, it remains a heterogeneous and ill-defined concept, whose boundaries are unclear. Currently, within EC discussions, it encapsulates a variety of concepts from social enterprises to societal change. Adopting an ethnographic methodology, this analysis provides insight into the contrasting official ‘front-stage’ and ‘back-stage’ views, constraints and practices by which SI has been adopted and promoted by the EC. While the ‘front-stage’ perspective is more intentionally based on the official situations, documents, and statements, the ‘back-stage’ is informed by both the ethnographic analysis and its relationship with the ‘front-stage’ perspective. The main finding of the analysis is that SI might presumably be seen as the only way to align the Commission's conservative-liberal policy, which is rooted in the Lisbon Agenda, with the pressing social demands that stem from the 2008 financial crisis. However, this analysis also indicates that, rather than a novel policy stream, SI can also be seen as a policy compromise that can be used to detract from debates around the need to develop a fully-fledged EU Social Policy; more deeply, it can detract the policy debate from facing a thorough reflection on our society and development model. The analysis here will also provide an overview of the risks associated with current thinking viewed from the perspective of EU players operating in the socio-political domain.

Reflecting on the tension between progressives and traditionalists in present-day Egypt, the author surveys comparable conflicts in the European past. In nineteenth-century Britain and Belgium the struggle between liberals and conservatives dominated public life. In eighteenth-century France the progressive forces of the Enlightenment were for a long time in bitter conflict with the traditional defenders of King and Church, until the latter were defeated in the French Revolution. In seventeenth-century England the Puritan Revolution overthrew Stuart absolutism, which was a democratic move, but Cromwell then established his own fundamentalist Republic, which was illiberal. In the sixteenth century Humanists and Protestants were progressive and broke with medieval modes of thought and papal domination, but were opposed by traditional forces around the House of Habsburg and the Counter-reformation, neither party claiming total victory. By the fifteenth century the progressive conciliar movement attempted to democratize the Catholic Church by putting the papal curia under the supreme authority of the general council, an assembly representing Christian people of all nations. This short-lived attempt was foiled by defenders of the traditional papal supremacy.