The purpose of this article is to make available in somewhat more detailed form than has heretofore appeared, the results of a population projection recently made by Mr. M. C. MacLean and the present writer and to discuss some of the more important implications of the indicated changes in the Canadian population structure.

The Basis of Projection. In making the projection specific, birthrates were computed by relating the average number of births over the six years 1931-6 to the estimated number of survivors of the 1931 adult female population at the mid-point of that period. The projection was carried forward by five-year intervals for the two sexes separately using birth-rates so computed and mortality rates derived from the official all-Canada life tables for 1931. These rates were held constant throughout and no account was taken of the possible future effects of immigration and emigration or of war.

The reason tor this procedure as well as tor the selection oi the above-mentioned birth- and death-rates may be stated briefly. During the post-war decade (1921-31) the crude birth-rate in Canada as reflected by the ratio of children 0-4 to women 15-44 experienced a quite unusual and drastic decline. It fell by as much as 14.4 per cent in the ten-year period as compared with an average drop of approximately 5 per cent per decade in the preceding fifty years. About half of the decline in the last intercensal decade may be attributed to postponed marriages. A further drastic decline was registered during the depression years which undoubtedly resulted in many more postponed marriages. It seemed reasonable, therefore, to regard the existing low rates as somewhat abnormal and cyclical in character, and to anticipate at least a moderate though perhaps temporary revival as soon as economic conditions permitted the resumption of marriages on anything approaching a normal level. At the same time experience in Canada, as well as in other countries, suggests that the underlying trend in Canadian birthrates is likely to be downward for some time to come. Instead of attempting corrections for trend and cyclical movements which at best would involve a good deal of guess-work, it was decided to use throughout the low rates prevailing during the first part of the present decade (1931-6) on the assumption that their use would offset in some measure the neglect of the long-term downward trend.

The first purpose of this article is to outline an approach to war finance which probably receives the approval of most economists, but which has seldom if ever been set down in black and white. This approach is that of a balance between the expansive and restrictive forces operating on money incomes. An alternative approach is the popular three-fold division of the subject into “taxation, borrowing, and inflation”; and it is argued at the end of the article that this approach is likely to be misleading. Certainly it is often misused. But before discussing the “three-fold division” it is convenient to see what light the “balance of forces” approach throws on the role of war loans and of central banking operations. The approach itself is probably more widely understood than are its implications in these directions.

No attempt is made to explain why taxation is generally preferable to borrowing or why inflation is to be avoided. That ground is by now sufficiently familiar. This article proceeds on the assumption that taxation will be used as far as it can be without damage to civilian morale and business incentive, but that a considerable amount of borrowing will be required nevertheless. The assumption is also made that inflation is undesirable. This is a point on which economists seem to have reached general agreement. Yet it is not beyond dispute; nor would the present writer wish to interpret the policy very rigorously.

In Britain the public corporation has for some time been almost universally regarded as the appropriate form of organization for publicly-owned commercial undertakings, but the only common article of faith underlying this agreement is the negative proposition that such undertakings cannot be run efficiently by organizations on the lines of government departments, staffed by civil servants. Beyond that there is nothing approaching unanimity, either between or within the political parties. And now that the nationalization programme of the Labour party is substantially completed (and, with the important exceptions of road transport and steel, substantially accepted by the Opposition) attention centres increasingly on those questions which remain in dispute.

Foremost among these is the question of public control: how much control? and by whom? The scheme adopted by the Labour Government rests on two premises: first, that by eliminating the motive of maximizing profits, nationalization eliminates much of the need for external controls, since the industries may now be expected to devote themselves wholeheartedly to public service; and, second, that the equity interest which passes from the shareholders to the general public can only be exercised by a minister of the Crown, answerable for his actions to the public's representatives in Parliament. Thus, while the various nationalized industries differ from each other in a number of respects, all may be classified together under the general description: “public corporations, strong minister type.”

Au cours des dernières années, plusieurs recherches ont été menées sur un phénomène relativement récent en Occident: l'accès plus important des femmes à des charges publiques électives. Ces recherches ont porté soit sur les caractéristiques des femmes qui sollicitaient un mandat électif et qui parvenaient à se faire élire, soit sur les obstacles qui jonchaient leur route vers le pouvoir, soit sur certaines de leurs attitudes et opinions et sur certaines perceptions, notamment quant au rôle des femmes en politique . Ces études ont été effectuées à tous les paliers de gouvernement, bien que le palier municipal ait été quelque peu négligé, reflétant peut-être un désintérêt plus large de notre discipline pour cette instance décisionnelle.

Abstract. The article explores the relationship between institutional constraints and nation-building. Non-recognized Rusyns in Ukraine and Silesians in Poland respond instrumentally to state definitions of “minority.” Moreover, both groups adjust their strategies to European structures and discourses which provide new ways to frame their identity claims. Institutions determine the constraints and incentives of group action. Identity is not only constructed, but is reconstructed in a rational way. Contrary, however, to the rational choice instrumental perspective which would predict an assimilation process, state policies encourage the Rusyns and Silesians to re-imagine and reinforce their distinctiveness.

Résumé. L'article examine le lien qui existe entre les contraintes institutionnelles et l'édification de la nation. Non reconnus, les Ruthènes en Ukraine et les Silésiens en Pologne réagissent instrumentalement aux définitions du terme «minorité» établies par ces États. De plus, les deux groupes adaptent leurs stratégies aux structures et aux discours de l'Europe, qui leur permet de formuler leurs revendications identitaires d'une nouvelle manière. Les institutions établissent les contraintes et les incitatifs à l'action collective. L'identité n'est pas seulement construite, elle est reconstruite de façon rationnelle. Contrairement, toutefois, à la perspective instrumentale du choix rationnel qui aurait prédit un processus d'assimilation, les politiques étatiques incitent les Ruthènes et les Silésiens à ré-imaginer et à renforcer leur identité distincte.

The Legislature of Alberta has distinguished itself by enacting the most drastic reform measures ever seen in Canada. Supported by a very large body of public opinion, it has reduced debts, both public and private, has attempted to take several matters out of the hands of the Courts, and has, so far as legal enactment could do so, substituted the people’s own credit—Social Credit—for the financial credit which has hitherto been relied on. It is thought that this substitution is possible and might be complete. Whether or not this belief is sound, time only can tell. The present, however, offers a good opportunity to survey the situation in the light of the circumstances of the province and the general characteristics of its people.

I am happy to have been given this opportunity to pay tribute—a warm personal tribute, and a tribute from my colleagues and the University which I represent—to the distinguished Department of the University of Toronto whose half-century of accomplishment is being celebrated in this series of lectures. Though longevity provides the occasion for the celebration, it is quality that we honour. Distinguished as its history has been, at no time has the Department of Political Science in the University of Toronto commanded more respect among economists and political scientists than it does at present.

I welcome, also, the opportunity to pay loyal tribute to the founder of the Department of Political and Economic Science of Queen's University whose work did much to set the direction and the tone of teaching and studies in Politics and Economics, not only at Queen's University, but elsewhere in this country.

This paper re-examines the issue of hate propaganda under the Canadian Charter of Rights and the US Bill of Rights. It also reconsiders the significance of Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration. What the paper attempts to show is that one strand of Locke's famous argument supports First Amendment exceptionalism and Justice Holmes's dissenting opinions in Abrams and Schwimmer, but another strand buttresses the Keegstra and Butler decisions and the Report of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada. In the contemporary context of the debate over free speech and its limits, Lockean toleration has communitarian as well as libertarian dimensions, and the control of hate propaganda in Canada's multicultural and multinational polity becomes more clearly an important part of the liberal tradition.

How should citizens be educated about complicated political issues like electoral reform? Are there basic principles that should be followed? This article tests one potential principle for government bodies, the media and educators to follow when conducting information campaigns: namely, lowering the reading level of information. Educators have long argued that texts can be confusing when written at a literacy level higher than the reader is able to digest. This article tests the impact of reading level on knowledge, interest and opinion on an electoral reform proposal. It employs an experimental design, conducted in person in fall 2018 with college students in Ontario, Canada. The experiment asked the students to read a text on a single transferable vote (STV) electoral system at one of three reading levels (or a control text) and then answer a series of questions gauging their knowledge, interest and opinion on the electoral reform proposal. The results provide an assessment of the impact of different levels of information on these factors and suggest concrete recommendations for election management bodies (EMBs) and other actors seeking to educate the public on complex political issues.

Incumbent city councillors have an almost insurmountable advantage in Canadian municipal elections. This article aims to improve our understanding of the municipal incumbency advantage by considering the ability of electors to correctly identify the two most competitive candidates in one's ward and the factors associated with being able to do so. Using survey data from the Canadian Municipal Election Study (CMES), we consider the case of the 2018 elections in Mississauga, a city with typically high rates of incumbent re-election. Survey respondents were asked to identify the two most competitive candidates in their local ward races. We find that comparatively few electors are able to recognize which challenger serves as the strongest threat to a sitting councillor, a finding that suggests that coordination problems may help to contribute to high rates of incumbent success. We identify several individual-level and ward-level correlates of correctly identifying the first-place and second-place finishers. We do note, however, that there is a significant amount of variation among the thousands of municipalities in Canada, so findings from this case should be tested in other settings, including larger or smaller cities where levels of information might be different.

Robert Nozick argues that inviolable capitalist property rights are a necessary corollary of the free society. This view is grounded in his commitment to the classical liberal principle of equal liberty. This article tests the internal coherence of Nozick's perspective with reference to the demands set by this principle. It is argued that his laissez-faire proposals cannot satisfy these demands. This prompts a consideration of the type of socio-economic arrangements that could respond to the dilemmas posed by the equal liberty principle, the suggestion being that a participatory democratic framework would promote a response superior to Nozick's.

Anti-separatism and messianism in Quebec since 1960

Confronted by a political debate now omnipresent in Quebec society, observers have naturally focused their attention – academic or not – on the content and proponents of the “séparatiste” solution to the current Canadian dilemma. Our contention is that it takes two sides to have a debate and that some light could be thrown on the intellectual history of French Canada by reversing the perspective and focusing instead on those who oppose independence for Quebec: the anti-separatists.

Although widely diversified as to the specifics of their opposition and as to their own solution to the problem, anti-separatists nevertheless share certain ideological traits in their portrait of the French-Canadian Homus and in the characteristics and roles which they assigned to the French-Canadian collectivity. Individually, French Canadians are judged to be weak, unstable, verbose, and un-democratic; as a collectivity they are perceived as fulfilling all the requirements of a “chosen” people whose mission it is to reconquer Canada through the strength of their intellect and to show the world an example of binational co-operation.

This schizophrenic vision of French Canada is hypothesized to be a secularized version of the traditional nationalist vision first enunciated by Garneau and Parent and later developed by Groulx, Barbeau, and others. The persistence of this messianic orientation in the intellectual history of French Canada is tentatively explained through the contributions of the sociology of utopia (French Canada as an aborted utopia) and of the sociology of colonial development (French Canada as a colonial society).

A rejoinder to a rejoinder must be brief, even if the issues it discusses are complex. Nelson Wiseman's rejoinder to my article on Hartz and Horowitz raises no important questions about my presentation of Hartzian theory, so I shall concentrate on his objections to my interpretation of French-Canadian history.

L'étude des idées politiques est, malgré l'apparente floraison des approches, d'une homogénéité étonnante. La raison m'en semble être l'incapacité générale des formes de pensée dominantes de dépasser la distinction théorique entre le monde-langage et le “monde-monde”. Que l'on se tourne vers l'exégèse développée par Leo Strauss, vers les différentes versions contemporaines du matérialisme et de la sociocritique, ou vers les théories de moyenne portée à la Quentin Skinner ou à la Pierre Bourdieu, une constante se révèle: les “idées” et la “réalité” sont deux choses bien distinctes, et nul n'oserait se pencher sur les phénomènes de la vie politique sans l'arme cognitive que constitue cette distinction. L'incapacité théorique de dépasser cette dernière, telle est l'intuition à la base de ce texte, est liée à une méconnaissance des idées politiques comme phénomène humain. Avant de donner le détail de cette intuition et d'indiquer le plan de son exploration théorique, il faut définir les notions qui seront ici mises en oeuvre.

Resumé Cet article examine la façon dont les constitutionnalistes allemands ont cherché à tirer leçon de l'échec de la République de Weimar, ainsi que le rôle de repoussoir que cette référence traumatique a joué dans la mise en place d'une compréhension «robuste» et «défensive» de la démocratie libérale dès les années 1930. À partir des réflexions de quelques juristes émigrés aux États-Unis, il distingue trois programmes concurrents : celui de l'antiextrémisme, qui trouve son origine dans l'antipositivisme weimarien; celui de la «démocratie militante» (Karl Loewenstein); et celui de la «dictature constitutionnelle» (Carl J. Friedrich). Au sein de chacun, la confrontation avec Carl Schmitt revêt une importance décisive, en dépit de son caractère parfois implicite et médiatisé. Éclairer ces échanges permet de juger dans quelle mesure les régimes démocratiques post-1945 ont intégré les idées de Schmitt.

Abstract This paper explores the lessons drawn by German constitutional scholars from the breakdown of the Weimar Republic, and how this traumatic experience became a starting point at the end of the 1930s for a new conception of democracy both liberal and robust (or “defensive”). Emigré constitutional scholars devised three distinctive versions of this “democratic robustness”: an “anti-extremist” (which originated in Weimar legal antipositivism); a “militant democracy” (first exposed by Karl Loewenstein); and a “constitutional dictatorship” (Carl J. Friedrich, Frederick W. Watkins). At the heart of each one lies a decisive debate with Carl Schmitt, even if implicit or diffracted. By reconstructing these debates one can appreciate to what extent postwar constitutional democracies have incorporated Schmitt's ideas.