A former Prime Minister of Israel is alleged to have said that her country would never ascend to the status of authentic statehood until it possessed certain well-known social attributes — organized crime, prostitution, and corruption. These features, while obviously undesirable, were she felt, reliable indices of societal maturation. This anecdote is suggestive in understanding current events pertaining to the field of applied ethics.

Philosophers have produced a massive body of opinion and argument on a diverse range of subjects under the rubric of applied (or practical) ethics. Moreover, they have assumed positions on various panels, commissions, governmental bodies and committees in the hope of making an informed contribution to the formulation of institutional and public policy. These accomplishments have begun to elicit the kinds of attributes commonly associated with philosophical maturation — exposées, debunkings, refutations, and ideologically informed critiques.

Is doing nothing sometimes as bad as doing something bad? In this or some less naive form the question I address in this paper is an old one that has been asked not only by philosophers and religious thinkers but also by ordinary people in their more reflective moments. We have recently seen its relevance to such issues as abortion, euthanasia, and the legitimate conduct of war. Active euthanasia is distinguished from passive, aiming to kill from killing as an unintended effect of one's aims, bringing about harm from letting it happen. The Catholic doctrine of the double effect endorses the moral distinction between what one positively does and what one allows to occur.

Common Sense Morality condemns us for being indifferent to the suffering of others. Even so, it sharply distinguishes between this and our knowingly and needlessly contributing to the suffering of others. (That we are talking about voluntary behavior throughout is to be understood.) And it holds that the latter constitutes the greater moral wrong. It would seem that common sense morality is not without a point. From the premise that a person knowingly and needlessly takes steps to cause others to suffer, it would certainly be correct for us to conclude that he desires to see others suffer and is sufficiently motivated by this desire that he brings about the suffering of others.

Paternalism has generally been thought of as forcible or coercive interference with a person's liberty of action which is (believed to be) justified because it will prevent harm to that person's welfare interests or the like. Opposition to paternalistic interference with adults, whether it involves the intervention of the state (legal paternalism) or another adult individual, has usually been based on a concern to preserve human autonomy or self-determination. More strictly it is opposition to so-called ‘strong’ paternalism - interventions to protect or benefit a person despite the person's informed voluntary consent to the contrary- which has been grounded on such a commitment to self-determination. ‘Weak’ paternalism involves interference where there is (or is believed to be) a defect in the decision-making capacities of the person interfered with (or to ascertain whether the person's behaviour is fully reflective). It is claimed to be justifiable insofar as consent to the interference would be forthcoming were these capacities restored.

Much recent discussion in moral philosophy has focused on the contrast between those moral theories which are consequentialist in structure and those moral theories which admit independent side constraints on the means which can be used to achieve various ends. In this essay I shall attempt to show that this contrast provides an illuminating framework against which to understand two conflicting strategies for justifying paternalistic interference. The first, consequentialist strategy takes paternalistic interference to be justified when it will protect or perhaps enhance some valued goal or end state, such as an agent's welfare or future ability to choose. Gerald Dworkin's essay “Paternalism” contains what is perhaps the most compelling recent development of this sort of rationale for paternalistic interference and accordingly much of my subsequent discussion will focus on this essay.

We would not be far wide of the mark if we suggested that the prevailing social ideology is structured round the presumption that interpersonal and political relationships ought to be, and for the most part are, based on the mutual consent of the parties involved. Liberal democratic theory has secured for consent a crucial role in the justification of political obligation and authority. In law, the maxim volenti non fit injuria, to the one who consents no wrong is done, constitutes a defence in cases where one person invades the interests of another. In the bioethical field, there is a preoccupation with the formulation of a standard of ‘informed consent’ in patient-doctor and subject-researcher relationships. And in the broader domain of ethical theory there is an influential view that consensual acts do not differ in moral quality from selfregarding behaviour.

‘Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.’ But when is a mens rea? In the last twenty years discussions of this question have been stimulated by controversial decisions in the English House of Lords in the cases of Smith, Morgan and Majewski.

The case of Smith decided that a man might be guilty of murder if a reasonable person, knowing the circumstances, would have foreseen that death would result even if the agent himself did not so foresee. This appeal to the ‘reasonable person’ imports what is known as the ‘objective test’ as opposed to the ‘subjective test’ of the agent's actual foresight or knowledge. The case of Morgan inclined per contra to the subjective test.

The question concerning the morality of abortion has been debated thoroughly over the past fifteen years, so thoroughly that it is difficult to add anything new to the debate. However, as the number of arguments has become numerous, it is still possible to formulate a new moral stance based on a new combination of old arguments. In what follows I shall develop and defend a moral stance based on the concept of moral contract and the concept of intentional pregnancy. Though these concepts are not new, the way they will be interpreted and combined here is unique.

The analysis that I shall provide presupposes that the traditional arguments either for or against abortion are problematical. (In what follows, ‘for’ and ‘against’ are used in the moral sense only.) The first part of this paper is devoted to surveying briefly the principal arguments and to showing why they are problematical. In the second part I shall discuss a couple of arguments which I regard as of the right sort, although they too seem unsatisfactory. Finally, I shall attempt to indicate in my own way whether and when abortion is morally permissible.

When soldiers find it morally comfortable to kill civilians and the public accepts such actions easily, philosophers are inclined to ask whether their comfort and acceptance rests on a misunderstanding. If it does, then philosophy could save lives by clearing up the problem. But most recent discussion has been about the wrong issue — whether killing non-combatants is wrong, and if so, why. That is all beside the point. Soldiers who kill civilians, in my experience, believe already that it is a bad thing to do. That they consider their actions at least prima facie wrong is evident from their readiness with excuses and justifications. Indeed, many of them take care to silence their consciences in advance with arguments of self-exoneration for the wrongs they are about to commit. We may reasonably hope that these soldiers would find it harder to kill civilians without those arguments to relieve their anticipated guilt.

In recent years, the right of employees to know about health hazards in the workplace has emerged as a major issue in occupational health policy. A general consensus has gradually evolved that there is a right to know, and correlatively that there is a moral obligation to disclose relevant information to workers. For example, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), and several other U.S. federal agencies, informed the U.S. Senate as early as July 1977 that ‘workers have the right to know whether or not they are exposed to hazardous chemical and physical agents regulated by the Federal Government.’ In 1980, the Occupational Safety and Health Adminstration (OSHA) promulgated regulations guaranteeing workers access to medical and exposure records.

Does the existence of a capitalist market economy foster the character trait of selfishness? Does a market elicit narrowly self-interested conduct? Many great minds have advanced notably weak arguments to support affirmative answers to these questions. In section I, I canvass several unsuccessful attempts by Karl Marx to demonstrate that market economies are causally implicated in the production of undesirable character traits. Sections II and Ill venture a suggestion that partially vindicates Marx's hunch. The suggestion I develop relies on the truth of an empirical hypothesis regarding the effect on the disposition to altruism of activity by public authority that is perceived by those affected to be fair.