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Moral Contracts and the Morality of Abortion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

A.T. Nuyen
A.T. Nuyen*
Affiliation:
University of Queensland
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Extract

The question concerning the morality of abortion has been debated thoroughly over the past fifteen years, so thoroughly that it is difficult to add anything new to the debate. However, as the number of arguments has become numerous, it is still possible to formulate a new moral stance based on a new combination of old arguments. In what follows I shall develop and defend a moral stance based on the concept of moral contract and the concept of intentional pregnancy. Though these concepts are not new, the way they will be interpreted and combined here is unique.

The analysis that I shall provide presupposes that the traditional arguments either for or against abortion are problematical. (In what follows, ‘for’ and ‘against’ are used in the moral sense only.) The first part of this paper is devoted to surveying briefly the principal arguments and to showing why they are problematical. In the second part I shall discuss a couple of arguments which I regard as of the right sort, although they too seem unsatisfactory. Finally, I shall attempt to indicate in my own way whether and when abortion is morally permissible.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 8: New Essays in Ethics and Public Policy , 1982 , pp. 147 - 158
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1982

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