The development and consultation experience of an ethics committee in an urban community hospital has been presented, and various approaches to case consultation have been considered. Our committee has concentrated on the clinical evaluation model. As expected, most consultations have centered on issues of withdrawing or limiting medical care. Most patients evaluated have been unable to clearly express their wishes concerning further treatments, highlighting the need for promoting advance directives. When resorting to substituted judgment, our committee has supported continued care in a majority of cases. Limitation of the consultation process to the attending physician has, in our experience, actually served to increase the credibility of the committee and has promoted acceptance of its recommendations. The committee's most useful function seems to be in assisting physicians and their patients in defining realistic goals and limitations of treatment. Within this context, the coming decade may find ethics committees concerned less with promoting the autonomous wishes of individual patients than with defining the limits of that autonomy against the competing demands of the larger society. Such a shift be approached with caution.

Ethics consults at a university medical center share many qualitites with those in other settings. What makes them different, if at all, is a difference of degree, not kind. All consult services share the tasks of exploring cases for possible recommendation, contributing to the development of institutional and public policy, and educating colleagues and patients about medical ethics dimensions. Nonetheless, the university setting, devoted as it is to teaching, research, and public service, brings a slightly different focus to these tasks and adds other, peripheral ones.

Hospital ehtics committees are often consulted when cmopeting patient interests blur an otherwise clear course of medical treatment. Nowhere is the potential for competing interests greater than in the field of abosterics, wherer obstetricians have traditionally viewed themselves as having two patients: the pregnant woman and the fetus.

It is a common assumption in ethics that everyone is due equal access to basic human goods. In our modern society, at least since the French Revolution, healthcare is counted along with food, shelter, and security as such a basic good. Anyone suffering from a treatable life-threatening disease can therefore, be seen as having a prima facie claim on medical treatment.

Not that long ago, any thought of transferring body parts, or fluids like blood, among individuals was expressed in terms of a nightmare. Consider the problem of involuntary blood transfusions to Count Dracula! Or recall the infamous brain transplant to the brutish body under Dr. Frankenstein's ministrations. The very thought of bodily transference stimulated writers to create monsters. The stuff of evil seemed to surround any attempt. Hubris was considered the evil that exceeded the normal limits of scientific research and development. Transplantation seemed to make humans into gods who defied death but who, like Icarus and his wax wings, flew too close to the sun.

Medical ethics committees are increasingly called on to assist doctors, patients, and families in resolving difficult ethics issues. Although committees are becoming more sophisticated in the substance of medical ethics, little attention has been given to the processes these committees use to facilitate decision-making. In 1990, the National Institute for Dispute Resolution in Washington, D.C., provided a planning grant from its Innovation Fund to the Institute of Public Law of the University of New Mexico School of Law to look at what ethics committees can learn from facilitation and mediation techniques. The study's thesis was that, if adapted for use by medical ethics committees, facilitation and mediation techniques can be helpful to those bodies in case review consultations and in other internal committee processes. This article reports on that project.

An increasing number of HIV-infected patients require surgical care. Many surgeons, regardless of their venue of practice, would prefer not to treat HIV-infected patients.1 The reasons for this attitude differ from individual to individual but include the fear of contracting an incurable fatal illness, a desire to avoid interaction with homosexuals and intravenous drug users, and fears that occupationally acquired HIV infection would result in restriction of clinical privileges and loss of income.2,3 At the same time, many individuals, institutions, and professional organizations have affirmed the obligation of all healthcare workers, including surgeons, to care for patients without regard to their HIV status.4-6 This article explores the nature of this obligation from the perspective of a clinical surgeon working in an inner city hospital.

The recent case of Baby Theresa has once again raised the dilemma of organ donation from anencephalic infants. Baby Theresa's distraught parents wanted to create something good from something tragic, by donating the baby's organs so that other children could live. If the physician waited for their baby to die naturally, the organs would not be suitable for transplantation. If they took them before death they could be harvested. For this reason, the parents petitioned the Florida courts to declare their baby dead at birth so the organs could be removed at an earlier, more propitious time. The court refused. The infant died, its vital organs unusable.

Heathcare spending, which was almost 13% of the gross national product last year, is estimated to jump to 14% in 1992. For the first time, hosital expenditures are projected to exceed $300 biilion, representing over 38% of the nation's total healthcare bill. In an effort to reduce federal and state budget deficits and to stimulate institutional cost containment, Medicare and Medicaid officials are becoming even more parsimonious in negotitation reimbursement levels.

The Patient Self-Determination Act is a fact. Finally, respect for patient autonomy has been guaranteed. At first sight, there seems little reason to object to any measure that intends to increase the autonomy of the patient. Too long, one may argue, physicians have behaved paternalistically; too often, they have been advised to change this habit. If the profession of medicine is unwilling or simply unable to grant the patient the decision-making power that is her due, the law has to step in. One may add, this law in no way hinders professional autonomy; by requiring a hospital official to provide the patient with information about advance directive, the law actually reduces the work load of the physician, who is already overburdened.

Baby Theresa, in her short 9-day life, cast a national spotlight on the question “Should anencephalic infants be used for organ procurement?” In denying her parents′ wishes to donate the baby's healthy organs to other children in need of kidneys, liver, heart, and lungs, Circuit Court Judge Estella Moriarty said, “I cannot authorized someone to take your baby's life, however short, however unsatisfactory, to save another child.”In citing a1988 Florida statute that does not allow a person to be declared dead while any part of the brain is functioning, Judge Moriarty ruled that doctors could only remove organs not vital to Theresa Ann's life. As the baby slowly died, so too did her vital organs.

The word “euthanasia” is hopelessly overloaded with emotional connotations. It means so many things to many different people. The implications of euthanasia associated with the Second World War have often rendered the term unsuitable for discussions of a rational manner. As far as I am concerned, what happened in Germany under Hitler had nothing to do with the classic meaning of a gentle and easy death but was rather simply a policy of mass murder.