This special issue of Business Ethics Quarterly on ethics in finance was planned before the high profile scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco, and Arthur Andersen, among other firms. Although these unfortunate events make this special issue especially timely, the subject matter of finance ethics has long been in need of scholarly attention. It is ironic that business ethics as an academic field owes its existence in part to the insider trading and junk bond scandals of the 1980s, and yet business ethics scholars have devoted comparatively little attention to financial topics. Now that another wave of ethical failures in finance is upon us, it is appropriate to present this collection of the best work on finance ethics.

From a theoretical point of view, finance is a unique field for ethical exploration. The central activity of finance is financial contracting, in which parties make agreements with regard to the assets that they control. An individual who rents a home, leases a car, buys an insurance policy, invests in a mutual fund, or saves for retirement is entering into a contract with someone who promises something in return. In making these contracts, individuals are assumed by finance theorists to be entirely self-interested and opportunistic, which is to say that they will renege on their promises if they can do so safely. The response of rational contractors, therefore, is to build in safeguards to ensure compliance with the agreements made.

Critics attack normative ethical stakeholder theory for failing to recognize the special moral status of shareholders that justifies the fiduciary duties owed to them at law by managers. Stakeholder theorists reply that there is nothing morally significant about shareholders that can underwrite those fiduciary duties. I advance an argument that seeks to demonstrate both the special moral status of shareholders in a firm and the concomitant moral inadequacy of stakeholder theory. I argue that (i) if some relations morally require fiduciary duties, and (ii) the shareholder-manager relation possesses the features that make fiduciary duties morally necessary to those relations, then (iii) stakeholder theory is morally lacking.

This paper examines two recent trends relative to boards of directors’ compensation, and their potential incompatibility. There has been some progress in increasing board diversity, specifically the inclusion of women and minorities on boards. The increasing trend requiring directors to hold/purchase equity as a requirement of board membership may seriously compromise further improvements in diversifying boards. Also, an increasing number of companies compensate directors partially or fully in stock grants and options. These compensation policies may be exclusionary, especially for women and minorities, impacting the quality of boardroom discussions and decisions. This study systematically examines whether corporations requiring director equity are exclusionary toward women and minority directors. Contrary to being exclusionary, companies with director stock requirements and annual stock awards have greater representation by women and minorities on their board. Moreover, larger companies are both more likely to have such policies and have higher proportions of women and minorities on the board.

Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) suggest in a brief discussion that a manager may in some cases rely on his or her own values in making organizational decisions. Our paper examines the role of diversity in values in an organizational context. Our central contention is that value diversity among managers, employees, and other stakeholders on dimensions such as prudence-boldness, clarity-flexibility, and rigor-mercy is highly useful for an organization. We introduce nontechnical models of individual and board decision-making in which value diversity cuts across group interests that would otherwise control the decision. In these models, decision-makers who are influenced by values such as prudence or boldness as well as by their group interests are more likely to avoid suboptimal decisions, because their weaker but not their more intense group interests are likely to be overridden by their cross-cutting value inclinations.

This paper is a preliminary attempt to better understand the concept of legitimacy in stakeholder theory. The normative component of stakeholder theory plays a central role in the concept of legitimacy. Though the elaboration of legitimacy contained herein applies generally to all “normative cores” this paper relies on Phillips’s principle of stakeholder fairness and therefore begins with a brief description of this work. This is followed by a discussion of the importance of legitimacy to stakeholder theory as well as the general ambiguity of the term. A distinction is then drawn between normative and derivative legitimacy. Reference to this distinction helps distinguish between a relationship with the organization based on direct moral obligation and one based on the power to help or harm the organization. It is concluded that stakeholders who retain the ability to affect the organization are legitimate (derivatively), but that this legitimacy is derived from the moral obligation owed other (normative) stakeholders and that the two sorts of legitimacy are importantly different from one another. An example of the normative/derivative distinction at work in managerial decision making is elaborated upon and managerial and research implications are then suggested.

What does socially responsible investing (SRI) accomplish for investors and for society? Proponents of SRI claim that the practice yields competitive portfolio returns for investors, while at the same time achieving better outcomes for society at large. Skeptics view SRI as ineffective at best and ill-conceived marketing hype at worst. My objective in this paper is to apply mainstream finance research findings to the question of whether SRI may be expected to lead to superior social outcomes. I conclude that under the perfect markets assumptions underlying most finance theory, SRI will not affect social outcomes. However, given well documented imperfections in equity markets, the claim that SRI “makes a difference” to society is a reasonable one that is consistent with current theoretical and empirical research in finance.

During recent years, the principle and practice of employment-at-will have been under attack. While progress has been made in eroding the practice, the principle still governs the philosophical assumptions underlying employment practices in the United States, and, indeed, EAW has been promulgated as one of the ways to address economic ills in other countries. This paper will briefly review the major critiques of EAW. Given the failure of these arguments to erode the underpinnings of EAW, we shall suggest new avenues for approaching employment issues to achieve the desirable goal of employee dignity and respect.

Should the responsibilities of business managers be understood independently of the social circumstances and “market forces” that surround them, or (in accord with empiricism and the social sciences) are agents and their choices shaped by their circumstances, free only insofar as they act in accordance with antecedently established dispositions, their “character”? Virtue ethics, of which I consider myself a proponent, shares with empiricism this emphasis on character as well as an affinity with the social sciences. But recent criticisms of both empiricist and virtue ethical accounts of character deny even this apparent compromise between agency and environment. Here is an account of character that emphasizes dynamic interaction both in the formation and in the interplay between personal agency and responsibility on the one hand and social pressures and the environment on the other.

Employee-employee conflicts are common occasions for managerial intervention. In judging such disputes, managers bring to encounters a frame that is not conducive to employee due process. Making managers aware of their legal responsibilities in resolving employee disputes is a poor substitute for managers’ understanding and implementation of their ethical due process obligations. Moreover, moral imagination is necessary in order to counter the effects of the managerial frame that employees are either not worthy of due process protections or that such protections are not a priority.

While a ubiquitous phenomenon, initial public offerings (IPOs) have received no attention in the ethics literature. We provide an overview of a series of potential conflicts of interest that pervade the IPO process. We also report the results of an empirical assessment of IPOs and those elements that may inform a substantive moral hazard faced by key players in the period prior to and just after an IPO.

Boundaryless careers may be beneficial to people with rare and valuable skills, but might prove harmful to many others. The idea of employability as an ethical responsibility of employers to employees is introduced; it is argued that attention to employability in private practice and public policy partially resolves the ethical problems inherent to in boundaryless careers. Because employability programs are considered to be voluntary, some means of holding employers accountable for such responsibilities needs to be considered when discussing boundaryless careers. Implications for practice and public policy are also discussed.

This study examined the effect of various antecedent variables on marketers’ perceptions of the role of ethics and social responsibility in the overall success of the firm. Variables examined included Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, and Confucian dynamism), as well as corporate ethical values and enforcement of an ethics code. Additionally, individual variables such as ethical idealism and relativism were included. Results indicated that most of these variables impacted marketers’ perceptions of the importance of ethics and social responsibility, although to varying degrees.

The term stakeholder is a powerful one. This is due, to a significant degree, to its conceptual breadth. The term means different things to different people and hence evokes praise or scorn from a wide variety of scholars and practitioners. Such breadth of interpretation, though one of stakeholder theory’s greatest strengths, is also one of its most prominent theoretical liabilities. The goal of the current paper is like that of a controlled burn that clears away some of the underbrush of misinterpretation in the hope of denying easy fuel to the critical conflagration that would raze the theory. We aim to narrow its technical meaning for greater facility of use in management and organizational studies. By elaborating a number of common misinterpretations – critical and friendly – of the theory, we hope to render a stronger and more convincing theory as a starting place for future research.

Over the last two decades, institutional investing has rocked the world of corporate governance in a transformation that has begun to be reflected in the finance, legal, and management literatures. Traditional players have seen their roles change and bases of power shift, and new actors have entered the governance equation. These transitions have entailed an ethical upheaval that is only beginning to be addressed in the business ethics literature.

This paper attempts to facilitate research in this area by integrating various literatures into an examination of a series of business ethics issues related to pension fund activism and portfolio management, fund staffing, and employee compensation. The primary intent of this project is to encourage increased business ethics research in the area of institutional investing in general and pension fund management in particular.

The United States is distinctive among advanced economies in that its employment laws and practices are governed by Employment at Will (EAW). Most other nations have variations on Just Cause dismissal rules. I argue that the U.S. preference for EAW is unsupported by concerns about net social or economic consequences. More centrally, I argue that the basic moral commitments that underlie the U.S. system of private property and freedom of contract are commitments that lend support to Just Cause over EAW.

Solomon argues that, although recent research in social psychology has important implications for business ethics, it does not undermine an approach that stresses virtue ethics. However, he underestimates the empirical threat to virtue ethics, and his a priori claim that empirical research cannot overturn our ordinary moral psychology is overstated. His appeal to seemingly obvious differences in character traits between people simply illustrates the fundamental attribution error. His suggestion that the Milgram and Darley and Batson experiments have to do with such character traits as obedience and punctuality cannot help to explain the relevant differences in the way people behave in different situations. His appeal to personality theory fails, because, as an intellectual academic discipline, personality theory is in shambles, mainly because it has been concerned with conceptions of personality rather than with what is true about personality. Solomon’s rejection of Doris’s claims about the fragmentation of character is at odds with the received view in social psychology. Finally, he is mistaken to think that rejecting virtue ethics implies rejecting free will and moral responsibility.

In the last two decades the composition of the labor force in the United States has changed significantly. Today, most employees are mothers or fathers of children under eighteen in families where both parents are employed or where the employed parent is a single mother. This represents a reversal of the older family ideal in which a father worked to provide income and a mother performed the domestic work that sustained families. The practices of business and much of the attention of business ethicists have assumed the older ideal. However, the wage work of mothers raises serious concerns about how business should view their parent-employees. Business has responded with family friendly corporate policies. This article analyzes these policies in light of two particular values: The social equality of women and the well-being of families. Finding current policies inadequate to meet these values, this paper calls for renewed ethical attention to the issues of time demands on employees and just wages.

Extrapolating from Carroll’s four domains of corporate social responsibility (1979) and Pyramid of CSR (1991), an alternative approach to conceptualizing corporate social responsibility (CSR) is proposed. A three-domain approach is presented in which the three core domains of economic, legal, and ethical responsibilities are depicted in a Venn model framework. The Venn framework yields seven CSR categories resulting from the overlap of the three core domains. Corporate examples are suggested and classified according to the new model, followed by a discussion of limitations and teaching and research implications.

In this paper the co-responsibility of the North for the development of the South, the chance of an authentic development and Rawls’s maximin rule are indicated as the ethical perspectives from which the financial integration of developing countries will be evaluated. It follows a brief economic analysis of possible problems of high inflows of portfolio investments for developing countries. They become more vulnerable to financial and monetary crises and their domestic banking systems are weakened by a higher risk of devaluation. This will lead to an outline of the goals for reshaping the financial integration: among others limitation of capital inflows, strengthening of the domestic banking system and further development of the country’s particular economic style. Finally some regulations of external financial relations and the proposal of a cooperative monetary arrangement between the South and the North are discussed as possible measures to improve this integration.