When Leonid Brezhnev came to power in 1964, the Soviet empire consisted of Cuba and six reliable satellites in Eastern Europe, the bloc was dominated politically and economically by the Soviet Union, and East–West interactions were kept to a minimum. Soviet military capabilities at this time, moreover, were clearly inferior to the military power of the West. And while East–West relations were testy, they had improved in the aftermath of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

Few events shatter confidence in widely held theory more than failure to predict colossal changes. Just such an instance has occurred in the budgetary politics of American cities. City budgeting can no longer be accurately described in terms of an incremental model that assumes stability, routine decisions and marginal adjustments in public spending and taxation. More than a decade of dramatic and largely unanticipated change – fiscal crises, illegal deficits, new groups demanding public services, severe retrenchment, emergency bail-outs and more – has surely challenged the conventional wisdom.

This article examines the concept of interests in politics which has been the subject of major debate in recent years. It makes two proposals: one concerns the elucidation of the concept of interests; the other concerns the relative status of an agent's perception of his or her own interests and an observer's specification of them. For brevity, statements of the form ‘x is in A's interest’ are referred to as interest-statements.

This essay is the relic of a projected history of ‘individualism in politics’. That enterprise – the reasons for abandoning it will be transparent from what follows – prompted some reflections which may be of more general interest. For no habit is better established in the humanities and social sciences, as well as in political speech, than that of constituting a subject-matter for oneself by means of an -ism. And while there may be instances where the context makes this practice unproblematic, a survey of the past and contemporary record of -isms gives grounds for suspicion and reservations.

People who take part in acts of civil disobedience or political violence are discontented about something. That is a truism. The interesting research problem is to identify particular kinds of discontent that are associated systematically with aggressive political behaviour-discontent that operates as a ‘precondition’ of aggressive behaviour in contrast to discontent that is peculiar to particular groups at particular times and places and serves only as a ‘precipitant’ of aggressive behaviour.

Over the past fifteen years, there has been a steady stream of books and articles on business-government relations describing the ‘privileged position’ occupied by the business corporation in the American political system. Taking issue with the pluralist paradigm that dominated writing and research on American national politics in the two decades after the Second World War, these writers have argued that business is not simply another interest group. Instead, they have suggested that its role in American society is more akin to that of a dominant class, power elite or private government: it thus possesses a degree of influence that invariably exceeds that of any other class or interest group. This appraisal of the political dominance of business in contemporary American society primarily rests on four sets of interrelated observations. These include the ability of business to define the political agenda; the extent to which business gains disproportionate benefits from the political process; the need for elected officials to maintain a high degree of ‘business confidence’; and the superior capacity of business interests to mobilize political resources, work closely with each other and shape the climate of public and elite opinion.

Political scientists who set out to test theories of coalition formation in parliamentary contexts (notably Browne, de Swaan, and Taylor and Laver) found only limited evidence to support the more classical game-theoretic propositions, which predict the formation of coalitions that command a majority of seats in a parliament but are otherwise as small as possible, in some sense of the word ‘small’. As a consequence, Browne later advocated the laying aside of these size theories in favour of theories that took account of the policy preferences of potential coalition partners, and in two separate studies theories were tested that focused upon the ideological component in coalition formation. Both these studies found theories based on presumed policy preferences to perform better than size theories. A more recent study has shown that the relative performance of theories based on size and ideological considerations depends on assumptions made in conducting the research. This study employed multiple regression analysis to establish that both kinds of theory had parts to play in an explanation of formation outcomes, which were dominated sometimes by size and sometimes by ideology, depending on country and time period. In the course of the analysis an additive combination of size and ideology was found to correlate to the extent of r ≃ 0·4 with formation outcomes, producing consistently better predictions than any existing theory.

Two major traditions of belief, democracy and capitalism, have dominated American public life from its inception. Although they have not always coexisted in perfect harmony – indeed their union has often been torn by conflict – they have managed to accommodate to each other with sufficient flexibility to have forged a viable political culture.

Elections in democratic societies are open, well-publicized events. But preceding the glamour of modern election campaigns and the drama of election-night broadcasts there is a process which usually receives little attention or publicity. Political parties, which dominate elections, choose their candidates.

Roughly two centuries ago the Marquis de Condorcet and Chevalier Jean-Charles de Borda originated a research tradition – by no means a continuous one – that over the decades has produced results casting doubt on many widely used collective decision-making procedures. The phenomenon known as the Condorcet effect or the Condorcet paradox is the well-known problem of the simple majority rule. The paradox bearing the name of Borda is less commonly known, but it also relates to a procedure that is widely used, namely the plurality principle. Either one of these paradoxes is serious enough to make these procedures suspect unless one is convinced that the situations giving rise to these paradoxical features are extremely rare. In this article we review some voting procedures that have been introduced in the literature. We aim at giving a synthesis of the assessments of procedures with respect to various criteria.

The energy crisis has, at least for the time being, been replaced in newspaper headlines and public attention by other, more fashionable, and seemingly more pressing preoccupations. In the United States, for example, the dilemmas posed by the shortages and spiralling price increases of the 1970s gave way to different policy problems and the Reagan Administration has all but ceased to consider the energy question important.

The distinguishing features of recent electoral politics in Wales have been the continued predominance of the Labour party and the failure of the nationalist party, Plaid Cymru. Since 1945 Labour has taken between twenty-one and thirty-two of the thirty-six seats at each general election and not less than 47 per cent of the vote. There has been some weakening of Labour's position since the high point of 60·6 per cent in 1966, but the party still secured 46·9 per cent of the vote in 1979, and rode out the Conservative victory in Britain as a whole with the loss of only two seats in Wales. Some variation in the Labour vote can be explained in terms of general shifts in British politics. However the enduring weight of Labour support in Wales in unpropitious times requires further explanation.

In the general election of October 1974 the Scottish National Party gained 30·4 per cent of the vote in Scotland. This result and the build-up to it in the previous two elections, seemed to indicate a new pattern for Scottish voting. British and American writers had drawn attention to the decline of partisanship as a basis for voting. In Britain, the class basis of this partisanship had been dominant but now appeared to recede. Growing support for the SNP might have been an extension of this. Some went further and argued that a new issue – self-government for Scotland – had displaced class loyalties.

The relatively recent proliferation of books and articles on Spain and Portugal is obviously a consequence of the profound socio-political changes that have occurred in those countries over the past decade. The range and variety of this growth area of academic literature has been considerable. It is almost as if after more than forty years of dictatorship, everybody wanted to acquire, in a few years, the knowledge they had been deprived of before. New journals newspapers, books and booklets appear and disappear from bookstores and newspaper stands with amazing rapidity, revealing the importance of the anxieties and frustrations created by so many years of intellectual and physical repression and censorship. In the light of this publishing explosion this article will attempt to review the major contributions to the debate on the Spanish and Portuguese transitions to democracy, with the intention of delineating the most prominent issues and themes (political, social and economic) involved.

A concern with the relationships between different levels of centralization and the management of change is long-standing in many of the social sciences. The French educational system has always stood in the minds of many as a monument to over-centralization and red tape. In her recent magisterial study, The Social Origins of Educational Systems, Archer has examined the consequences for educational change of different levels of centralization in the educational system in a variety of national settings. In her book she argues with great care and a wealth of historical example that it is possible to establish certain broad generalizations which describe the manner in which educational change is produced, and that sharp distinctions in this regard must be made between the centralized systems and the more decentralized systems. Her study covers the period up to 1974. Since then there have been very important changes in the French educational system. These changes and the political conflict which surrounded them, particularly between 1974 and 1978, are of considerable interest in their own right, to students of both comparative public policy and French politics. The principal purpose of this discussion, however, is to examine Archer's propositions about the modes of change typical of centralized systems in the light of the reforms introduced in these years. My concern is therefore with the administrative and political consequences of centralization and this inquiry leads in turn to some discussion of the role of pressure groups in the Fifth French Republic.

The increasing importance of women in politics is a common feature of almost all advanced industrial societies. Women have become increasingly active in most aspects of political life during the 1970s: as voters, as lobbyists and, perhaps most significantly of all, as candidates for election to public office. The traditional prejudice against women in public life, which assumes women to be less suited to politics by temperament and training, suggests that they could be expected to receive fewer votes than men in an election. But it is unclear to what extent this prejudice has been mitigated by the broad changes which have taken place in women's roles in recent years. Can we still expect women candidates to fare less well than their male counterparts?

Such eviddce as there is in Australia suggests that the parties are less likely to nominate women but that, once nominated, women candidates fare neither better nor worse than men. Sawer concludes that ‘the differential electoral fortunes of male and female candidates has always reflected the failure to pre-select women for safe and winnable seats, not any failure to win votes.’ In a similar vein Mackerras argues that ‘the average performance of women is neither better nor worse than that of men. Women will be elected when parties select them for winnable seats.’ Research in the United States and Britain also suggests that a candidate's sex does not matter: Darcy and Schramm found that sex did not matter in the United States, controlling for incumbency and party, and in an analysis of three British general elections, Hills concluded that ‘the gender of a candidate makes only a very small difference to the voters.’

The purpose of this brief note has been to test the behavioural postulates of the neighbourhood effect. The results do not support the construction that minority voters are converted to the majority view by local information flows. These findings suggest the model of the neighbourhood effect needs to be amended and that alternative explanations of the polarization trends need to be examined more closely.