A substantial experimental literature in behavioral economics and psychology finds that individuals rely on heuristics and cognitive biases when they make decisions. These heuristics and biases impact the choices of individuals from all walks of life, including police officers entrusted with the power to enforce laws. Individuals act within an institutional context. We examine how the institutions that structure American policing interact with the heuristics and biases of individual police officers. We then suggest institutional changes that may result in better performance from boundedly rational police officers.

The effectiveness and uptake of financial incentives can differ substantially between reward- and deposit-based incentives. Therefore, it is unclear to whom and how different incentives should be assigned. In this study, the effect of different modes of assigning reward- and deposit-based financial incentives on effort is explored in a two-session experiment. First, students’ (n = 228, recruited online) discounting, loss aversion and willingness to pay a deposit were elicited. Second, an incentivized real-effort task was completed (n = 171, 25% drop-out). Two modes of assigning reward- or deposit-based financial incentives were compared: random assignment and ‘nudged’ assignment – assignment based on respondent characteristics allowing opting out. Our results show that respondents receiving nudged assignment earned more and persisted longer on the real-effort task than respondents randomly assigned to incentives. We find no differences in effectiveness between reward-based or deposit-based incentives. Overall, 39% of respondents in the nudged assignment mode followed-up the advice to take deposit-based incentives. The effect of deposit-based incentives was larger for the respondents who followed-up the advice than for respondents that randomly received deposit-based incentives. Overall, these findings suggest that nudged assignment may increase incentives’ effect on effort. Future work should extend this approach to other contexts (e.g., behaviour change).

Four experiments examine the impact of a firm deciding to no longer pay salaries for executives versus employees on consumer behavior, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Study 1 explores the effect of announcing either pay cessations or continued pay for either CEO or employees, and shows that firms’ commitment to maintaining employee pay leads to the most positive consumer reactions. Study 2 examines the effects of simultaneously announcing employee and CEO pay cessations: consumers respond most positively to firms prioritizing employee pay, regardless of their strategy for CEO pay. Moreover, these positive perceptions are mediated by perceptions of financial pain to employees, more than perceptions of CEO-to-worker pay ratio fairness. Study 3, using an incentive-compatible design, shows that firms’ commitment to paying employees their full wages matters more to consumers than cuts to executive pay, even when those executive pay cuts lead to a lower CEO-to-worker pay ratio. Study 4 tests our account in a non-COVID-19 context, and shows that consumers continue to react favorably to firms that maintain employee pay, but when loss is less salient, consumers prioritize cutting CEO pay and lowering the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. We discuss the implications of our results for firms and policymakers during economic crises.

The purpose of this paper is to first review William James's explicit positions on paternalism in the context of medical licensure and the annexation of the Philippines. Then I wish to show that these positions, as well as a more generalized antipaternalist stance, are the implications of James's philosophy and psychology and not simply his ‘personal’ sentiments. The elements of James's thought are arranged in such a way as to facilitate a comparison with contemporary behavioral (heuristics and biases) paternalism. The conclusion is that James has arguments against behavioral paternalism avant la lettre that are still useful and deserve discussion.

The ultimatum and dictator games were developed to help identify the fundamental motivators of human behavior, typically by asking participants to share windfall endowments with other persons. In the ultimatum game, a common observation is that proposers offer, and responders refuse to accept, a much larger share of the endowment than is predicted by rational choice theory. However, in the real world, windfalls are rare: money is usually earned. I report here a small study aimed at testing how participants react to an ultimatum game after they have earned their endowments by either building a Lego model or spending some time sorting out screws by their length. I find that the shares that proposers offer and responders accept are significantly lower than that typically observed with windfall money, an observation that is intensified when the task undertaken to earn the endowment is generally less enjoyable and thus perhaps more effortful (i.e., screw sorting compared to Lego building). I suggest, therefore, that considerations of effort-based desert are often important drivers behind individual decision-making, and that laboratory experiments, if intended to inform public policy design and implementation, ought to mirror the broad characteristics of the realities that people face.

The relevant literature notes a lack of applications relative to the theoretical impact of prospect theory. In this paper, I provide a brief review of this literature aimed at policymakers before developing an idea for lottery-based government subsidy policies. I consider the general conditions under which such policies could be effective in (1) increasing the performance of desired behaviours and (2) saving governments money. I provide two examples of current Canadian subsidies that I argue could be improved with the addition of a lottery option.

Similarly to other domains of the social sciences, behavioural science has grappled with a crisis concerning the effect sizes of research findings. Different solutions have been provided to answer this challenge. This paper will discuss analytical strategies developed in the context of computational social science, namely causal tree and forest, that will benefit behavioural scientists in harnessing heterogeneity of treatment effects in RCTs. As a mixture of theoretical and data-driven approaches, these techniques are well suited to exploit the rich information provided by large studies conducted using RCTs. We discuss the characteristics of these methods and their methodological rationale and provide simulations to illustrate their use. We simulate two scenarios of RCTs-generated data and explore the heterogeneity of treatment effects using causal tree and causal forest methods. Furthermore, we outlined a potential theoretical use of these techniques to enrich behavioural science ecological validity by introducing the notion of behavioural niche.

Frijters et al. make a powerful and lucid case for a top-down approach to government, in which the maximization of wellbeing should be the ultimate goal. I argue, by contrast, for a bottom-up approach: that the variety of goals, plans, norms and rules that govern our lives should be the starting point for political discussion. From this standpoint, the goal of individual and collective decision-making of all kinds is the reconciliation of conflicting objectives and priorities on a piecemeal basis. The distinction between top-down and bottom-up approaches in political decision-making parallels debates between ‘foundationalists’ and ‘coherentists’ in epistemology.

A multi-item questionnaire concerning lay people's attitudes toward organ procurement without consent from executed prisoners was given to several hundred respondents. The items ranged from all-out condemnation (“It is tantamount to murder”) to enthusiasm (“It is great to have this organ supply”). Overall, we found two guiding principles upheld by most respondents: (1) Convicts have as much a right to their bodies and organs as other people, so the practice should be judged by the same standards as those that guide organ procurement from any donor. Procuring organs without consent is wrong. (2) Benefiting from those organs should be held to more lenient standards than are demanded for their procurement. So, benefitting from these ill-gotten organs should be tolerated.

There are both negative and positive stereotypes about public sector workers. Most studies focus on negative stereotypes, like the idea that public servants are lazy. We, however, do the opposite. We focus on a positive stereotype: public sector workers are seen as caring and helpful. We test the effects of positive stereotypes on the quality of public service delivery. Using a pre-registered audit experiment in elderly care in the Netherlands and Belgium, we find that activating a pro-social stereotype does not affect the outcome of public service quality in terms of response rate and information provision. However, it does improve the bureaucratic process: public sector workers are friendlier toward citizens. They say around 12% more ‘thank you’ in their replies. Moreover, the citizens’ gender affects the response rate: female citizens receive around 10% more replies. Concluding, we show that positive stereotyping can improve parts of the quality of public service delivery but not all.

This paper explores the complexities and unintended consequences of conflict of interest (COI) disclosures in various professional settings. It highlights key psychological processes encountered by recipients of such disclosures. Notably, it describes the burden of disclosure effect, which paradoxically reduces trust while increasing compliance due to social pressures, and disclosure's expertise cue, where disclosures inadvertently increase trust and persuasiveness by signalling expertise. The paper also outlines best practices for improving COI disclosures, emphasising the need for external third-party involvement and encouraging deliberation. It concludes that effective disclosure depends not only on how recipients process information but also critically on how the disclosure influences the behaviour of advisors, underscoring the need for a holistic approach to managing COIs that goes beyond mere transparency. A version of this paper was presented as a keynote at the Second Annual International Behavioural Public Policy Conference at the University of North Carolina in September 2023.

We have previously argued thatbehavioral scientists have been testing and advocating individualistic (i-frame) solutions to policy problems that have systemic (s-frame) causes and require systemic solutions. Here, we consider the implications of adopting an s-frame approach for research. We argue that an s-frame approach will involve addressing different types of questions, which will, in turn, require a different toolbox of research methods.

Effective communication is essential for delivering public health messages and enabling behaviour change. Little is known about possible backfiring, or spillover effects, of COVID-19 vaccine messaging. In a study with n = 1,848 United Kingdom (UK) adults, we assess whether communication strategies that target vaccine hesitancy have any unintended, positive or negative, spillover effects on people's intention to engage in protective, compliance and prosocial behaviours. In June–July 2021, we conducted an online experiment to assess the potential spillover effects of three messages, emphasising (a) the medical benefits of COVID-19 vaccination, (b) the non-medical collective benefits of vaccination or (c) the non-medical individual benefits of holding a vaccination certificate. Exposure to different messages did not significantly affect people's intention to engage in protective, compliance, or prosocial behaviours. Instead, vaccination status (being vaccinated vs not) was positively associated with intentions to engage in protective, compliance and prosocial behaviours. Our results suggest that communication strategies that aim to increase vaccination uptake do not have any unintended effects on other health behaviours and vaccination campaigns can be tailored to specific populations to increase uptake and compliance.

Counter-serious and organised crime (SOC) strategies often include an awareness-raising element. Such messaging aims to build support for counter-SOC efforts, and intolerance for organised criminal activity. However, a growing body of research suggests that raising awareness to ‘social bads’ like SOC may risk backfiring by encouraging pessimistic attitudes about whether they can be controlled and could even nudge people to agree with populist narratives which argue that political outsiders represent the only hope for tackling systemic problems. A nationally representative survey experiment in Albania was conducted to test, for the first time, the impact of messages about SOC. Typical of counter-SOC messaging in practice, the first message emphasised the harms SOC causes. The second was more positive, highlighting high levels of social disapproval of SOC, a theme that social norms research suggests may be effective. We find that the first message backfires by reducing confidence in law enforcement and encouraging support for populist ideas. The second message is unexpectedly found to also encourage support for a populist sentiment, while having no positive impact on attitudes about law enforcement. This suggests that even positive messaging about ‘social bads’ can risk triggering unwanted responses.

Commercial practices such as drip pricing, reference pricing and best-price guarantee can be used to set higher prices and mislead consumers, but protective measures can restore efficiency. In a placebo-controlled market experiment, we examined a treatment allowing for the use and misuse of commercial practices. Three additional treatments tested the effects of formal sanctions, informal sanctions and a regret nudge. We found that commercial practices led to higher prices, cheating was systematic and regret nudging was ineffective. Furthermore, formal and informal sanctions reduced both the likelihood of using commercial practices and the likelihood of cheating, leading to welfare increases.

We evaluate whether people will outsource their opinion on public policy to consensus conference participants. The ideal consensus conference brings together a representative sample of citizens and introduces them to the range of perspectives and evidence related to some policy. The sample is given the opportunity to ask questions of experts and to deliberate. Attitudes about each policy are queried before and after the conference to see if the event has changed minds. In general, such conferences do produce opinion shifts. Our hypothesis is that the shift can be leveraged by simply communicating conference results – absent substantive information about the merits of the policies discussed – to scale up the value of conferences to the population at large. In five studies, we tell participants about the impact of a consensus conference on a sample of citizens’ opinions for a range of policies without providing any new information about the inherent value of the policy itself. For several of the policies, we see a shift in opinion. We conclude that the value of consensus conferences can be scaled up simply by telling an electorate about its results. This suggests an economical way to bring evidence and rational argument to bear on citizens’ policy attitudes.

Public figures often apologize after making controversial statements. There are reasons to believe, however, that apologizing makes public figures appear weak and risk averse, which may make them less likeable and lead members of the public to want to punish them. This paper presents the results of an experiment in which respondents were given two versions of two real-life controversies involving public figures. Approximately half of the participants read a story that made it appear as if the person had apologized, while the rest were led to believe that the individual had stood firm. In the first experiment, hearing that Rand Paul apologized for his comments on civil rights did not change whether respondents were less likely to vote for him. When presented with two versions of the controversy surrounding Larry Summers and his comments about women scientists and engineers, however, liberals and females were more likely to say that he should have faced negative consequences for his statement when presented with his apology. The effects on other groups were smaller or neutral. The evidence suggests that when a prominent figure apologizes for a controversial statement, individuals are either unaffected or become more likely to desire that the individual be punished.

We explore whether simple behavioural insights techniques can be successful for addressing a policy issue within one of society's more complex and difficult sectors: child protection. Child protection reporting practices in New South Wales, Australia, reveal that the public's primary response is to report to the statutory authority, who only deal with cases of the highest risk. As a result, a large volume of statutory resources are spent processing lower-risk reports that lead to no benefits for lower-risk families and slow down response times for families that require a statutory response most. Our goal was to reduce lower-risk reporting by encouraging alternative responses to these situations. To do this, we altered report feedback for cases deemed lower risk in order to make alternative responses more salient and we added a persuasive message framed as a gain or loss. We then examined subsequent reporting accuracy. We found that our trial was linked to a modest improvement in reporting accuracy, though the results may have been diluted by a spill-over effect. We discuss how facilitating a greater behavioural change likely requires multi-organization collaborations, extending the range of insights drawn from behavioural science and/or addressing issues from multiple angles.

Why are take up rates incomplete or low when the relevant opportunities are unambiguously advantageous to people who are eligible for them? How can public officials promote higher take up of opportunities? All over the world, these are challenges of the first order. There are three primary barriers to take up: learning costs, compliance costs, and psychological costs. These costs lower the net expected benefit of opportunities, and reduce participation in otherwise advantageous programs. Fully rational agents would consider these costs in their take up decisions, and in light of behavioral biases, such costs loom especially large and may seem prohibitive. Experimental and other evidence suggest methods for reducing the barriers to take up and the effects of behavioral biases. Use of such methods has the potential to significantly increase access to a wide range of opportunities that would increase individual well-being and social welfare.