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Top-down and bottom-up views of public choice: should wellbeing be government's only goal?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 January 2020

NICK CHATER Open the ORCID record for NICK CHATER [Opens in a new window]
NICK CHATER*
Affiliation:
Behavioural Science Group, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
*
*Correspondence to: Behavioural Science Group, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Scarman Rd, CoventryCV4 7AL, UK. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Frijters et al. make a powerful and lucid case for a top-down approach to government, in which the maximization of wellbeing should be the ultimate goal. I argue, by contrast, for a bottom-up approach: that the variety of goals, plans, norms and rules that govern our lives should be the starting point for political discussion. From this standpoint, the goal of individual and collective decision-making of all kinds is the reconciliation of conflicting objectives and priorities on a piecemeal basis. The distinction between top-down and bottom-up approaches in political decision-making parallels debates between ‘foundationalists’ and ‘coherentists’ in epistemology.

Type
Articles
Information
Behavioural Public Policy , Volume 4 , Special Issue 2: On Happiness Being the Goal of Government , July 2020 , pp. 254 - 262
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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