This study examines how moral intuitions toward debt relief vary depending on whether a debt contract involves one country borrowing from another country or an individual borrowing from a bank. Participants respond to a vignette describing a basic debt dispute between a debtor and a lender. A judge in charge of settling the dispute decides to allow debt relief and participants express how fair they find the decision. Treatments vary (1) the debt context (international or person-bank), (2) the responsibility of lenders and debtors (whether their situations stem from bad luck or poor choices) and (3) whether a lender's profit motive is made salient. Results show that, across both international and person-bank debt, debt relief is perceived as being fairer when debtors are unlucky and when lenders are careless; profit salience, however, does not affect the perceived fairness of debt relief in either debt context. Results, when integrated with those from an initial related study, also point to anti-bank sentiment increasing the perceived fairness of debt relief when an individual borrows from a bank and to a consistent across-context ranking of the perceived fairness of debt relief in the scenario.

We provide experimental evidence for the existence of “rent stigma,” a preference for owning goods or real estate to renting them. In one experiment, anonymous respondents preferred owning a car or house to renting them, even though the transaction was constructed to be identical in each case in terms of economic payoffs and risk. In a second experiment, a survey of law students who were asked how much they would pay to own rather than rent a laptop found similar results. However, we found little or no evidence for our hypotheses that rent stigma would decline in conditions in which the advantages of renting were made salient. The existence of rent stigma raises concerns that the framing of a transaction in terms of purchasing rather than rent may be used to manipulate consumers.

Modern consumers typically face complex goods and services. In the interest of customer protection, these companies are asked to disclose information about the products and consumers are typically required to indicate their understanding of the information provided. In truth, consumers seldom consult, even less understand the information provided. I present here the state of evidence about how commercial disclosure actually works (or rather does not work) with consumers characterized with human limitations in information processing. I discuss ways to improve disclosure regulation to improve customer protection.

Nudges – light-touch interventions aimed to help people achieve socially desirable outcomes – can take place without individuals being aware of them. It would seem to be ethically superior to tell individuals that they are being nudged, encouraging them to be aware of the reasons for the official interest in their behaviours. Aided by internal reflection, individuals may make informed choices whether to go along with officially-preferred options or not. In general, this paper adopts this line of argument, justifying self-awareness from the liberal belief in autonomy of the person. However, awareness and/or reflection are not always necessarily ethically superior to passivity, as in cases where manipulation is also present with information provision, when there is framing of deliberative exercises, and where there is harm done to others due to reflectively-driven actions. Most of the time self-awareness is to be preferred, but not always.

Parochialism, by which we mean in-group preferences and out-group prejudice, has the potential to influence public policy. In-group preferences and out-group prejudice can lead individuals to evaluate a policy based on how that policy affects the groups they belong to rather than on the basis of their ideological priors or the impact of that policy on society at large. Unchecked, parochialism likely leads to problematic policies and perverse social outcomes. While the evidence suggests that this bias can be mitigated if issues are framed in ways that encourage reflection as opposed to unreflective immediate responses, policy makers face incentives to leverage parochialism rather than combat it. The solution may instead require limiting policy makers and our ability to make decisions for others and promoting an institutional environment that encourages our interacting with diverse others rather than insularity. Stated another way, limited government and open society may be the path beyond our parochialism.

Self-control failure occurs when an individual experiences a conflict between immediate desires and longer-term goals, recognises psychological forces that hinder goal-directed action, tries to resist them but fails in the attempt. Behavioural economists often invoke assumptions about self-control failure to justify proposals for policy interventions. These arguments require workable methods for eliciting individuals’ goals and for verifying occurrences of self-control failure, but developing such methods confronts two problems. First, it is not clear that individuals’ goals are context-independent. Second, facing an actual conflict between a desire and a self-acknowledged goal, a person may consciously choose not to resist the desire, thinking that spontaneity is more important than self-control. We address these issues through an online survey that elicited individuals’ self-reported judgements about the relative importance of self-control and spontaneity in conflicts between enjoyment and health-related goals. To test for context-sensitivity, the judgement-elicitation questions were preceded by a memory recall task which directed participants’ attention either to the enjoyment of acting on desires or to the satisfaction of achieving goals. We found little evidence of context-sensitivity. In both treatments, however, judgements that favoured spontaneity were expressed with roughly the same frequency and strength as judgments that favoured self-control.

We conducted a large-scale online experiment to examine whether climate change messaging can induce emotions and motivate pro-environmental action. We study how exposure to explicit positive (‘warm glow’) and negative (‘cold prickle’) emotional appeals as well as a traditional social norm communication affects pro-environmental action. We find that a simple call to take action to mitigate climate change is at least as affective as social norm message framing and emotional appeals. Our results highlight the difficulty of designing messaging interventions that effectively harness emotional incentives to promote pro-environmental action. Messages that explicitly emphasise the personal emotional benefits of contributing to environmental causes or the adverse emotional effects of not doing so seem to fall short of motivating pro-environmental effort. Our findings underscore the need for caution when incorporating emotive appeals into policy interventions.

Evolutionary explanations for behavioral findings are often both fascinating and plausible. But even so, they do not establish that people are acting rationally, that they are not making mistakes, or that their decisions are promoting their welfare. For example, present bias, optimistic overconfidence, and use of the availability heuristic can produce terrible mistakes and serious welfare losses, and this is so even if they have evolutionary foundations. There might well be evolutionary explanations for certain kinds of in-group favoritism, and also for certain male attitudes and actions toward women, and also for human mistreatment of and cruelty toward nonhuman animals. But those explanations would not justify anything at all. It is not clear that in Darwinia (a nation in which departures from perfect rationality have an evolutionary explanation), policymakers should behave very differently from Durkheimian policymakers (a nation in which departures from perfect rationality have a cultural explanation).

The economic model for scaling described by Al-Ubaydli and colleagues offers recommendations to policymakers who make decisions about whether or not to implement evidence-based programs. The core economic model does not currently acknowledge the broader context of policy decision-making and therefore may fail to achieve its objectives. The model focuses primarily on the generation and use of available research in the decision on whether to scale a program. Research studying the use of evidence in policymaking points to a complex set of factors beyond just the strength of the evidence such as leadership, relationships, timing and financial resources that contribute to decisions to scale a program. Second, there is already a robust evidence-based policy movement at the federal, state and local levels. The economic model should leverage this movement rather than providing recommendations that might stall or redirect the movement. The economic model can push the field to strengthen the available evidence while providing recommendations on selecting models to scale within the currently available evidence. This commentary finishes with suggestions for moving forward.

The value of a statistical life (VSL) monetizes the expected loss in wellbeing associated with the risk of death. The utility loss resulting from a fatality is central to the empirical framework for estimating the VSL. The VSL trajectory over the life cycle exhibits an inverted-U shape, following a trajectory similar to that of lifetime patterns of consumption. The U-shaped pattern displayed by happiness measures over the life cycle is the opposite of the inverted-U shape pattern displayed by the VSL. It is consequently inappropriate to use happiness measures as ordinal ranking substitutes for the VSL for the purposes of estimating the benefits of mortality risk reduction. Compared to ordinal wellbeing scales, the VSL also offers a variety of additional capabilities by providing a cardinal index of the unit benefits for changes in mortality risks.

The Happiness Movement is moving from research to action; this contribution discusses some public policy issues that emerge in this process. The paper also states that the Happiness Movement proposes a new notion of development and a new narrative of social progress. The contribution argues that wellbeing is a goal of governments, but also, fundamentally, a goal of societies.

People buy some goods that they do not enjoy and wish did not exist. They might even be willing to pay a great deal for such goods, whether the currency involves time, commitment or money. One reason involves signaling to others; so long as the good exists, nonconsumption might give an unwanted signal to friends or colleagues. Another reason involves self-signaling; so long as the good exists, nonconsumption might give an unwanted signal to an agent about himself or herself. Yet another reason involves a combination of network effects and status competition; nonconsumption might deprive people of the benefits of participating in a network and thus cause them to lose relative position. With respect to real-world goods (including activities) of this kind, there is typically heterogeneity in relevant populations, with some people deriving positive utility from goods to which other people are indifferent, or which other people deplore. Efforts to measure people's willingness to pay for goods of this kind will suggest a welfare gain, and possibly a substantial one, even though the existence of such goods produces a welfare loss, and possibly a substantial one. Collective action, private or public, is necessary to eliminate goods that people consume but wish did not exist. Legal responses here might be contemplated when someone successfully maneuvers people into a situation in which they are incentivized to act against their interests, by consuming a product or engaging in an activity they do not enjoy, in order to avoid offering an unwanted signal. Prohibitions on waiving certain rights might be justified in this way; some restrictions on uses of social media, especially by young people, might be similarly justified.

Existing research demonstrates that parents are poorly informed consumers of early childhood education and care (ECEC) services. Choosing such services is a complex process shaped by a combination of logistical limitations (e.g., cost/location), informational barriers and ideas about what the goal of care should be (e.g., education of young children or provision of an environment that feels like home). Experimental studies have also demonstrated that when study participants are informed of the importance of a specific decision, they engage in more complex decision-making. In this article, we test whether providing parents with information about the regulatory stringency of ECEC options available influences their choices regarding ECEC. A conjoint survey designed to capture quasi-behavioural choices for ECEC services was completed by 682 parents. Before engaging with the survey, participants were randomly assigned into either a control group or a treatment group that informed them about the stringency of oversight regarding ECEC options available in the province of Ontario, Canada. Receiving information did not meaningfully change the choices of the entire sample. However, a subgroup analysis revealed an important information effect on parent decisions for lower income/lower-education parents.

The serial rapist model claims that a small number of intentional, repeat offenders are responsible for the majority of sexual assaults on college campuses. The model has formed the dominant argument for some of the most popular forms of campus intervention programs and is cited by high profile advocates and policymakers. Despite enthusiasm for the serial rapist model, it is not empirically well-supported and is contradicted by recent robust data. In this article, we ask: why does the serial rapist model have such broad and enduring appeal? In two US-based samples, one convenience and one representative, we find that people's endorsement of the serial rapist model correlates with worldviews that cohere around ideas of a just and good status quo, and a preference for simple stories. Specifically, we find a positive relationship between endorsement of the serial rapist model and belief in a just world, system justification, social dominance orientation, need for closure and essentialism.

Behavioural science has found growing application in applied public policy settings, offering a vast literature to bring to bear on apparent cognitive errors. The potential, however, is not without peril. Policymakers and scholars may draw unwarranted confidence that successful behavioural interventions from elsewhere will replicate in their institutional settings. In this research, I partner with Minneapolis Public Housing and use a design-based approach to identify interventions that can reduce eviction actions. This study presents three vignettes that demonstrate and categorize the mistakes behavioural science can make when it fails to understand how formal and informal institutional features influence decision-making. But, in integrating methods and theories from the design sciences, public policy and public administration, we have the potential to create behavioural interventions that fit the social context.

Under what circumstances will members of the public hold positive attitudes toward new or higher taxes? While some scholars have posited that the practice of “earmarking” – designating tax revenues for a particular purpose – can increase support for taxes, the existing literature has not identified the conditions under which earmarking will prove effective in this regard. Here, we draw upon previous research on consumer behavior to hypothesize that support for earmarked taxes will be stronger when such taxes satisfy the criterion of “source–use alignment” (i.e., when the connection between the revenue source and the use for which those revenues are earmarked accords with familiar consumer fairness norms). Evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from two experiments on a sample of US residents matched to Census data, in which subjects were randomly assigned to read descriptions of hypothetical earmarked taxes with varying levels of alignment. Individuals consistently expressed stronger support for earmarked taxes that achieved source–use alignment as compared to earmarked taxes that did not satisfy the source–use alignment criterion. Our theory and results not only help to explain why some earmarked taxes are more popular than others, but also suggest a means for increasing public support for taxes.

The purpose of this paper is to first review William James's explicit positions on paternalism in the context of medical licensure and the annexation of the Philippines. Then I wish to show that these positions, as well as a more generalized antipaternalist stance, are the implications of James's philosophy and psychology and not simply his ‘personal’ sentiments. The elements of James's thought are arranged in such a way as to facilitate a comparison with contemporary behavioral (heuristics and biases) paternalism. The conclusion is that James has arguments against behavioral paternalism avant la lettre that are still useful and deserve discussion.