Revenge appears among a “suite” of social interactions that includes competition, alliance building (a prerequisite for tribal revenge raids), and so forth. Rather than a modular “system” directly reflecting evolutionary fitness constraints, revenge may be (another) social cost-benefit calculation involving potential or actual aggression and proximately controlled by individual personality characteristics and beliefs that can work against fitness.

Our commentary is focused on the idea that “freedom” takes on its full significance whenever its relativistic nature, in the short- and long terms, is taken into account. Given the transformations brought about by “globalization,” application of a general model of freedom based on ecological-economic factors clearly seems to be rather untimely. We examine this idea through egocentric and ethnocentric views of the social and environmental analyses of “freedom.”

We consider a computational model comparing the possible roles of “association” and “simulation” in phonetic decoding, demonstrating that these two routes can contain similar information in some “perfect” communication situations and highlighting situations where their decoding performance differs. We conclude that optimal decoding should involve some sort of fusion of association and simulation in the human brain.

Life is preserved and enhanced by coordinated selectivity in local neural circuits. Narrow receptive-field selectivity is necessary to avoid the curse-of-dimensionality, but local activities can be made coherent and relevant by guiding learning and processing using broad coordinating contextual gain-controlling interactions. Better understanding of the functions and mechanisms of those interactions is therefore crucial to the issues Clark examines.

Certain method of loci (MoL) prerequisites – familiar, coherently ordered locations – should appear during dreaming if the latter is, in fact, elaborative memory encoding as hypothesized by Llewellyn. A review of the literature suggests that dreamed locations are neither familiar nor coherently ordered and thus unsuitable for facilitating memory in this sense. This conclusion converges with other evidence that episodic memory is dependent upon non–rapid eye movement (NREM), rather than REM, sleep.

I applaud and elaborate on the contextualism at the heart of Bullot & Reber's (B&R's) theory, challenge two aspects of the appreciative structure they posit (the causal reasoning that allegedly underlies the design stance and the segregation of the component stages), suggest that expert and novice appreciators operate differently, and question the degree to which B&R's final theory is open to empirical investigation.

According to the tuning-for-criticality theory, the essential role of sleep is to protect the brain from super-critical behaviour. Here we argue that this protective role determines the content of dreams and any apparent relationship to the art of memory is secondary to this.

McCullough et al. propose an evolved cognitive revenge system which imposes retaliatory costs on aggressors. They distinguish between this and other forms of punishment (e.g., those administered by judges) which are not underpinned by a specifically designed evolutionary mechanism. Here we outline mechanisms and circumstances through which the revenge system might nonetheless infiltrate decision-making within the criminal justice system.

Climate stresses and monetary resources seem to lead to different collective adaptations. However, the reference to adaptation and to ambiguous collective dimensions appears premature; populations may entertain nothing more than shared adaptiveness. At this point, the intricacy of the underlying evolutionary processes (cultural selection, fitness-utility decoupling) very much obscures any diagnosis based on correlations.

The predictive processing framework lacks many of the architectural and implementational details needed to fully investigate or evaluate the ideas it presents. One way to begin to fill in these details is by turning to standard control-theoretic descriptions of these types of systems (e.g., Kalman filters), and by building complex, unified computational models in biologically realistic neural simulations.

Although we agree with Pickering & Garrod (P&G) that prediction-by-simulation and prediction-by-association are important mechanisms of anticipatory language processing, this commentary suggests that they: (1) overlook other potential mechanisms that might underlie prediction in language processing, (2) overestimate the importance of prediction-by-association in early childhood, and (3) underestimate the complexity and significance of several factors that might mediate prediction during language processing.

In the context of a broad welcome to Bullot & Reber's (B&R's) proposals concerning the incorporation of contextual awareness into the study of the psychology of art appreciation, I raise two concerns. First, the proposal makes no allowance for degrees of relevance of contextual awareness to appreciation. Second, the authors assume that “basic exposure” and “artistic understanding” can be maintained as separate phases or modes, but this may be more problematic than anticipated.

Van de Vliert's findings may be explained by the psychology of threat and bargaining. Poor people facing extreme threats must cope by surrendering individual freedom in service of shared group needs. Wealthier people are more able to flee from threats and/or resist authoritarianism, so their leaders must concede greater freedom. Incorporating these factors (plus inequality) can sharpen researchers' predictions.

Although Pickering & Garrod (P&G) argue convincingly for a unified system for language comprehension and production, they fail to explain how such a system might develop. Using a recent computational model of language acquisition as an example, we sketch a developmental perspective on the integration of comprehension and production. We conclude that only through development can we fully understand the intertwined nature of comprehension and production in adult processing.

Predictive processing models of cognition are promising an elegant way to unite action, perception, and learning. However, in the current formulations, they are species-unspecific and have very little particularly human about them. I propose to examine how, in this framework, humans can be able to massively interact and to build shared worlds that are both material and symbolic.

This comment proposes that Bullot & Reber's (B&R's) emphasis on historical and intentional knowledge expands the range of emotions that can be properly viewed as aesthetic states. Many feelings, such as anger, contempt, shame, confusion, and pride, come about through complex aesthetic meanings, which integrate conceptual knowledge, beliefs about the work and the artist's intentions, and the perceiver's goals and values.

McCullough et al. recognize that revenge and forgiveness jointly constitute a functional strategic complex. However, they model the halves of the complex as outputs of modules selected for regulating dyadic relationships. This is backwards. Forgiveness is a culturally evolved institution that can be exapted for use in dyadic contexts; it would be cheap talk among dyads were it not for the shadow of society.

Toward illuminating the structure of Llewellyn's dream theory, I compare it in formal terms to Freud's dream theory. An alternative to both of these dream machines, grounded in the distribution of cholinergic activation in the central nervous system, is presented. It is suggested that neither “high” nor “low” dream theory is sufficient to account for the properties of dreams.

Many authors have recently highlighted the importance of prediction for language comprehension. Pickering & Garrod (P&G) are the first to propose a central role for prediction in language production. This is an intriguing idea, but it is not clear what it means for speakers to predict their own utterances, and how prediction during production can be empirically distinguished from production proper.

Clark expresses reservations about Friston's reductive interpretation of action-oriented predictive processing (AOPP) models of cognition, but he doesn't link these reservations to specific alternatives. Neuroeconomic models of sub-cognitive reward valuation, which, like AOPP, integrate attention with action based on prediction error, are such an alternative. They interpret reward valuation as an input to neocortical processing instead of reducing it.