Llewellyn's proposal that rapid eye movement (REM) dreaming reflects elaborative encoding mediated by the hippocampus (“seahorse”) offers an interesting perspective for understanding hallucinations accompanying sleep paralysis (SP; “night-mare”). SP arises from anomalous intrusion of REM processes into waking consciousness, including threat-detection systems mediated by the amygdala (“almond”). Unique aspects of SP hallucinations offer additional prospects for investigation of Llewellyn's theory of elaborative encoding.

Art can be experienced in numerous ways, ranging from sensory pleasure to elaborated ways of finding meaning (Leder et al. 2004). However, rather ignored by Bullot & Reber (B&R), in empirical aesthetics several lines of research have studied how knowledge of artistic style, descriptive and elaborate information, expertise, and context all affect aesthetic experiences from art. Limiting aesthetics to rather rare experiences unnecessarily narrows the scope of a science of art.

Van de Vliert associates a greater difference between upper- and lower-class freedoms under less favorable environmental conditions. This pattern is similar to models of the emergence of state-level hierarchies. I argue that Van de Vliert has provided a supportive strand to the history of ancient Near East religion.

We suggest that the hierarchical predictive processing account detailed by Clark can be usefully integrated with narrative psychology by situating personal narratives at the top of an individual's knowledge hierarchy. Narrative representations function as high-level generative models that direct our attention and structure our expectations about unfolding events. Implications for integrating scientific and humanistic views of human experience are discussed.

Attention is drawn to the distinction between the actual (or factual) and the apparent (or ostensible) causal history of a work of art, and how the authors' recommendation “to assume the design stance” in the name of understanding works of art blurs that distinction, thus inadvertently reinforcing the hoary idea, against which the authors otherwise rightly battle, that what one needs to properly appreciate an artwork can be found in even suitably framed observation of the work alone.

Sometimes while sleeping we find ourselves thrown amidst an authentic, albeit bizarre, world. The process of integration by means of which memory elements might be fabricated into a seamless world indistinguishable from the world of waking life is not explained by Llewellyn, who focuses instead on the elaborative encoding of memories. Ontological implications of the sometimes indiscernibility of wake and dream worlds are considered.

We present empirical evidence from dialogue that challenges some of the key assumptions in the Pickering & Garrod (P&G) model of speaker-hearer coordination in dialogue. The P&G model also invokes an unnecessarily complex set of mechanisms. We show that a computational implementation, currently in development and based on a simpler model, can account for more of this type of dialogue data.

The target article focuses on the predictive coding of “what” and “where” something happened and the “where” and “what” response to make. We extend that scope by addressing the “when” aspect of perception and action. Successful interaction with the environment requires predictions of everything from millisecond-accurate motor timing to far future events. The hierarchical framework seems appropriate for timing.

McCullough et al. suggest that revenge and forgiveness rest upon risk computation. Risk computation is implemented by emotions that evolved for additional functions, giving rise to phenomena such as betrayal aversion and taboo-tradeoffs, and specific patterns of forgiveness we have documented. A complete account of revenge and reconciliation should incorporate broader constructs from social psychology, including emotions and values hierarchies.

The target article's climato-economic theory will benefit by allowing for bidirectional effects and the heterogeneity of types of freedom, in order to more fully capture the coevolution of societal wealth and freedom. We also suggest alternative methods of testing climato-economic theory, such as longitudinal analyses of these countries' histories and micro-level experiments of each of the theory's hypotheses.

McCullough et al. propose adaptations that motivate forgiveness when the potential benefits of continuing the relationship outweigh the costs incurred by the transgression. The costs incurred are definite, whereas future benefits of forgiveness are only probabilistic. This situation exposes the forgiver to cheating in the form of repeat transgression. Adaptations motivating genuine forgiveness are therefore unlikely to evolve.

Whereas the target article stresses the neurobiology and psychology of dreams, this commentary emphasizes that the role of dreams in emotional integration and adaptation contributes to a fuller understanding of dreaming and memory. The dream presented in the target article is used, within the constraints of space, as a possible example of a broader approach to dream material.

Bullot & Reber (B&R) begin asking if the study of the mind's inner life can provide a foundation for a science of art. Clearly there are many epistemological problems involved in the study of the cognitive and affective basis of art appreciation. I argue that context is key. I also propose that as long as the “mind's life” continues to be perceived as an “inner” intracranial phenomenon, little progress can be made. Mind and art are one.

We welcome the proposal to use forward models to understand predictive processes in language processing. However, Pickering & Garrod (P&G) miss the opportunity to provide a strong framework for future work. Forward models need to be pursued in the context of learning. This naturally leads to questions about what prediction error these models aim to minimize.

The climato-economic theory postulates mechanisms of threat and challenge to explain differences between countries. Interestingly, both of these mechanisms are often considered to be components of the models of organizational climate for creativity. We show that among rich countries, climatic demands are related to creative achievement in a reversed-U manner, whereas the relationship is linear among poor countries.

The brain is involved in theory-laden cognitive processes. But there are two different theory-laden processes. In cases where the theory is based on facts, more facts can either falsify or confirm a theory. In cases where the theory is about the choice of a benchmark or a standard, more facts can only make a theory either more or less warranted.

In addition to general criticisms of scientific studies on empirical aesthetics, Bullot & Reber (B&R) particularly criticise two “representative studies” that manipulated paintings by Mondrian, those studies seemingly, “fail[ing] to consider the predictions suggested by a contextualist approach to the appreciation of imbalance” (sect. 4.2, para.2). Those criticisms are unjustified, both within the approaches of empirical aesthetics and the historical context and aims of Mondrian's work.

To evaluate and extend climato-economic theory, the use of more micro units of analysis, such as cities and families, may open up new data sources. The consideration of environmental demands other than thermal climate may also broaden the range of useful data. Longitudinal designs can provide causal evidence, and so can experiments if the theory can be applied to individuals.

We argue that brains generate predictions only within the constraints of the action repertoire. This makes the computational complexity tractable and fosters a step-by-step parallel development of sensory and motor systems. Hence, it is more of a benefit than a literal constraint and may serve as a universal normative principle to understand sensorimotor coupling and interactions with the world.

We propose that revenge responses are often influenced more by affective reactions than by deliberate decision making as McCullough et al. suggest. We review social psychological evidence suggesting that justice judgments and reactions may be determined more by emotions than by cognitions.