Barbey & Sloman (B&S) relegate the logical rule of the excluded middle to a footnote. But this logical rule is necessary for natural sampling. Making the rule explicit in a logical tree can make a problem easier to solve. Examples are given of uses of the rule that are non-constructive and not reducible to a domain-specific module.

In this response I discuss some of the key issues raised by the commentators on The Rational Imagination. I consider whether the imaginative creation of alternatives to reality is rational or irrational, and what happens in childhood cognition to enable a rational imagination to develop. I outline how thoughts about causality, counterfactuality, and controllability are intertwined and why some sorts of possibilities are more readily imagined than others. I conclude with a consideration of what the counterfactual imagination is for.

The commentaries address conceptual issues ranging from our narrow focus on neuroimaging to the various definitions of intelligence. The integration of the P-FIT and data from cognitive neuroscience is particularly important and considerable consistency is found. Overall, the commentaries affirm that advances in neuroscience techniques have caused intelligence research to enter a new phase. The P-FIT is recognized as a reasonable empirical framework to test hypotheses about the relationship of brain structure and function with intelligence and reasoning.

We argue that the operational definition proposed by Ramsey et al. does not represent a significant improvement for students of innovation, because it is so restrictive that it might actually prevent the testing of hypotheses on the relationships between innovation, ecology, evolution, culture, and intelligence. To avoid tautological thinking, we need to use an operational definition that is taxonomically unbiased and neutral with respect to the hypotheses to be tested.

We applaud Gintis's attempt to provide an evolutionary-based framework for the behavioral sciences, and note a number of similarities with our own recent cultural evolutionary structure for the social sciences. Gintis's proposal would be further strengthened by a greater emphasis on additional methods to evolutionary game theory, clearer empirical predictions, and a broader consideration of cultural transmission.

Ramsey et al. attempt to clarify methodological issues for identifying innovative behaviour. Their effort is seriously weakened by an underlying presumption that the behavior of primates is generally learned and that of non-primates is generally “innate.” This presumption is based on a poor grasp of the non-primate literature and a flawed understanding of how learned behaviour is genetically assimilated.

Cultural group selection seems the only compelling explanation for the evolution of the uniquely human form of cooperation by large teams of unrelated individuals. Inspired by descriptions of sanctioning in mutualistic interactions between members of different species, I propose partner choice by powerful individuals or institutions as an alternative explanation for the evolution of behavior typical for “team players.”

The target article makes an impressive case that nested set operations (NS) facilitate probability computations by helping make clear the relevant natural frequency partitions; however, NS can also contribute to common errors. That NS constitute a general reasoning process is supported by their role in deductive, modal, causal, and other reasoning. That NS are solely a rule-based process is problematic.

How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases – when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority – and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is “Yes,” then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is “Yes”? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.

The functions of the somatosensory system are multiple. We use tactile input to localize and experience the various qualities of touch, and proprioceptive information to determine the position of different parts of the body with respect to each other, which provides fundamental information for action. Further, tactile exploration of the characteristics of external objects can result in conscious perceptual experience and stimulus or object recognition. Neuroanatomical studies suggest parallel processing as well as serial processing within the cerebral somatosensory system that reflect these separate functions, with one processing stream terminating in the posterior parietal cortex (PPC), and the other terminating in the insula. We suggest that, analogously to the organisation of the visual system, somatosensory processing for the guidance of action can be dissociated from the processing that leads to perception and memory. In addition, we find a second division between tactile information processing about external targets in service of object recognition and tactile information processing related to the body itself. We suggest the posterior parietal cortex subserves both perception and action, whereas the insula principally subserves perceptual recognition and learning.

We agree with Ramsey et al. regarding the need for new methods and concepts in the study of innovation, and welcome their initiative, but are concerned that their operationalization is over-reliant on subjective judgements.

Economics and evolutionary biology share a long history of interaction and parallel development. This pattern persists with regard to how the two fields address the issues of selfishness and cooperation. The recent renewed emphasis on empiricism in both fields provides a solid foundation on which to build a truly scientific unification of the behavioral sciences.

In the haptic domain, a double dissociation can be proposed on the basis of neurological deficits between tactile information for action, represented by tactile apraxia, and tactile information for perception, represented by tactile agnosia. We suggest that this dissociation comes from different networks, both involving the anterior intraparietal area of the posterior parietal cortex.

Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience show that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I argue that while Block's thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of the second notion that is not touched by Block's argument.

Evidence favors the nested sets hypothesis, introduced by fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) in the 1990s to explain “class-inclusion” effects and extended to many tasks, including conjunction fallacy, syllogistic reasoning, and base-rate effects (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna 1990; Reyna 1991; 2004; Reyna & Adam 2003; Reyna & Brainerd 1995). Crucial differences in mechanisms distinguish the FTT and Barbey & Sloman (B&S) accounts, but both contrast with frequency predictions (see Reyna & Brainerd, in press).

A visual analogue, two-route model of somatosensory processing is advanced in this commentary. Touch for perception is seen as separate from, although interconnected with, touch for action. Separate modules are additionally proposed for internal (body) and external (object-related) somatosensation. Here we ask whether dissociation (divide) guarantees better efficiency (impera) in terms of the heuristic model within the somatosensory modality and across modalities.

Though Barbey & Sloman (B&S) distinguish various frequentist hypotheses, they opt rapidly for one specific dual-process model of base-rate facilitation. In this commentary, I maintain that there are many distinct but related versions of the dual-process theory, and suggest that there is currently little reason to favor B&S's formulation over the alternatives.

Inference-to-best-explanation from psychological evidence supports the view that phenomenal consciousness in perceptual exposures occurs before limited aspects of that consciousness are retained in working memory. Independently of specific neurological theory, psychological considerations indicate that machinery producing phenomenal consciousness is independent of machinery producing working memory, hence independent of access to higher cognitive capacities.

The adaptationist framework is necessary and sufficient for unifying the social and natural sciences. Gintis's “beliefs, preferences, and constraints” (BPC) model compares unfavorably to this framework because it lacks criteria for determining special design, incorrectly assumes that standard evolutionary theory predicts individual rationality maximisation, does not adequately recognize the impact of psychological mechanisms on culture, and is mute on the behavioural implications of intragenomic conflict.

For the authors of the target article, innovations are underdetermined by environmental inducement – but are still adopted in the future. For a productive technology to be adopted, the technology must also be efficient. To be efficient, it must be determined by constraints or environmental inducements. However, this contradicts the authors' notion of “underdetermination.” To make matters clear, we need to distinguish between two kinds of determination: the “source” of the innovation as opposed to “inducement” that makes the organism adopt it in the future.