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The logic of natural sampling

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

David E. Over
David E. Over
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Durham University, Science Laboratories, South Road, Durham City DH1 3LE, United Kingdom. [email protected]
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Abstract

Barbey & Sloman (B&S) relegate the logical rule of the excluded middle to a footnote. But this logical rule is necessary for natural sampling. Making the rule explicit in a logical tree can make a problem easier to solve. Examples are given of uses of the rule that are non-constructive and not reducible to a domain-specific module.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 277
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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