Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2brh9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T01:44:21.613Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Why framing effects can be rational

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

Anton Kühberger*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, 5020 Salzburg, Austria [email protected]://ccns.sbg.ac.at/people/kuehberger/

Abstract

When communication is not disinterested, seemingly inconsistent preferences are predictable from language pragmatics and information non-equivalence. In addition, the classic risky choice framing effect found in the Asian disease task – risk-aversion with gains and risk-seeking with losses – applies to gambles, but tends to be overgeneralized to non-gambling situations.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Kühberger, A. (1995). The framing of decisions: A new look at old problems. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 62, 230240. https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1995.1046CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kühberger, A., Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., & Perner, J. (2002). Framing decisions: Real and hypothetical. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 89, 11621175. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0749-5978(02)00021-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mandel, D. R. (2014). Do framing effects reveal irrational choice? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 11851198. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034207CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Sher, S., & McKenzie, C. R. M. (2006). Information leakage from logically equivalent frames. Cognition, 101, 467494. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.11.001CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed