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Incomplete preferences and rational framing effects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

Shlomi Sher Open the ORCID record for Shlomi Sher [Opens in a new window]  and
Craig R. M. McKenzie
Shlomi Sher
Affiliation:
Department of Psychological Science, Pomona College, Claremont, CA 91711, USA [email protected], https://www.pomona.edu/directory/people/shlomi-sher
Craig R. M. McKenzie
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA [email protected], https://pages.ucsd.edu/~mckenzie/
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Abstract

The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing effects. In this commentary, we suggest that Bermúdez's insightful challenge to the standard normative view of framing can be clarified and extended by situating it within a broader critique of completeness.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e240
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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