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Explaining bias with bias

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

Krzysztof Przybyszewski Open the ORCID record for Krzysztof Przybyszewski [Opens in a new window] ,
Dorota Rutkowska Open the ORCID record for Dorota Rutkowska [Opens in a new window]  and
Michał Białek Open the ORCID record for Michał Białek [Opens in a new window]
Krzysztof Przybyszewski
Affiliation:
Department of Economic Psychology, Kozminski University, 03-301 Warsaw, [email protected]
Dorota Rutkowska
Affiliation:
Faculty of Psychology, Warsaw University, 00-183 Warsaw, [email protected]
Michał Białek
Affiliation:
Faculty of Historical and Pedagogical Sciences, Institute of Psychology, University of Wroclaw, 50-527 Wrocław, [email protected]
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Abstract

Bermúdez argues that a framing effect is rational, which will be true if one accepts that the biased editing phase is rational. This type of rationality was called procedural by Simon. Despite being procedurally rational in the evaluation phase framing effect stems from biased way we set a reference point against which outcomes are compared.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e237
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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