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When unpacking the black box of motivation invites three forms of reductionism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2025

Agnes Moors Open the ORCID record for Agnes Moors [Opens in a new window]
Agnes Moors*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven – University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium [email protected] http://ppw.kuleuven.be/okp/people/Agnes_Moors/
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*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

In their proposal for unpacking the black box of motivation, Murayama and Jach (M&J) propose three types of reductions: From high-level to low-level motivational constructs, from motivation to cognition, and from contentful to contentless explanations. Although these reductions come with the promise of parsimony, they carry the risk of losing vital explanatory power.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 48 , 2025 , e37
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

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