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Higher-order motivational constructs as personal-level fictions: A solution in search of a problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2025

Marko Jurjako Open the ORCID record for Marko Jurjako [Opens in a new window]
Marko Jurjako*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy and Division of Cognitive Sciences, University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia [email protected] https://cogsci.uniri.hr/people/marko-jurjako/
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*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

I argue that Murayama and Jach's claim that higher-order motivational constructs face the “black-box” problem is misconceived because it doesn't clearly distinguish between personal and subpersonal explanations. To solve it they propose interpreting motivations as causal effects of mental computational processes. I suggest that their solution might be more compellingly presented as providing a fictionalist perspective on some personal-level constructs.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 48 , 2025 , e36
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

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