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Consistent preferences, conflicting reasons, and rational evaluations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

Francesco Guala Open the ORCID record for Francesco Guala [Opens in a new window]
Francesco Guala*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Milan, 20122 Milano, Italy [email protected]://users.unimi.it/guala/
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Abstract

Bermúdez's arguments in favour of the rationality of quasi-cyclical preferences conflate reasons, desires, emotions, and responses with genuine preferences. Rational preference formation requires that the decision-makers not only identify reasons, but also weigh them in a coherent way.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e229
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Angner, E. (2018). What preferences really are. Philosophy of Science, 85(4), 660–681.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hausman, D. M. (2011). Preference, value, choice, and welfare. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar