After the formation of the Conference Group for Central European History in December, 1957, and the appointment by it of a Committee to promote Studies of the History of the Habsburg Monarchy, the present writer, in his capacity as executive secretary of this committee, made a survey of publications and research projects in the United States and Canada which dealt with the history of the Habsburg monarchy and of Austria and Hungary since 1918. A preliminary report of the results of this investigation was distributed in 1958 and a revised and enlarged one in January, 1960. Although this list, which was based largely on questionnaires, was by no means complete, the survey showed that by 1959 43 books and 183 articles had been published in Habsburg, Austrian, and Hungarian history by 63 different United States and Canadian scholars. Most of these writers indicated that they were also busily engaged in research activities which gave promise that an appreciable number of further studies would be published within the next decade or two.

Defining and writing the history of Austria from the Carolingian frontier marches to the Second Austrian Republic presents a unique problem. In this period, covering more than 1100 years, Austria formed neither a geographic nor an ethnic or national conceptual unit. In fact, except for the brief periods of 1804–1867, 1918–1938, and from 1945 on, there has been no political constitutional entity which could form the undisputed object of a Gesamtdarstellung of Austrian history. The only cohesive factor was provided by the existence of a politicogeographic center, whether one defines it as the Middle Danube or, perhaps better, as Vienna. No other great country possessed similarly ever changing frontiers; nor did the capital city of any other land play a similar formative role as one of the very few centripetal attraction-forces enduring over the centuries.

In 1826 Jan Herkel's Elementa universalis linguae slavonicae etc. was published in Buda. In it, the author, who was a Slovak by birth, demanded the establishment of a common Slav language as a prelude to the creation of some kind of Slav unit—a “unio in literatura inter omnes Slavos sive verus panslawismus.” To my knowledge, this was the first time that the expression “Pan-Slavism” was ever used. As the title of the book shows, the word had no political, but only a literary, meaning.

In a letter to Count Anton Prokesch von Osten, the great Austrian diplomat and scholar, Metternich expressed his conviction that “to ask the right questions is an essential element in establishing the truth in the historical field.”

Until the end of the second World War the statue of Ban Jelačič, his sword pointing towards Budapest, stood on the main square of Agram as a symbol, not only of Croatian national pride, but also as a reminder of the country's proverbial attachment to the Habsburg dynasty. The “man who saved Austria” and the prowess of the Croatian Military Border became the most cherished historical legends of the old Austro-Hungarian empire and have attracted the attention of many historians. It is not my purpose to restate the case for or against Jelačič or to give yet another account of the complicated relationships between Agram, Pest, and Vienna but to disentangle legends which have been all too widely accepted and which have obscured important aspects of the role played by the Military Border in the revolution of 1848. In general, writers have concentrated on the picturesque appearance of the frontier troops and on their ferocity and their allegedly unshakable loyalty to the imperial cause and have neglected the military and political considerations which must be taken into account if one wishes to make a more accurate evaluation of the Croatian intervention in the revolution and its failure and ultimate repercussions.

Professor Rothenberg writes that his purpose was not to restate the case for or against Jelačić or to give yet another account of the complicated relationship between Zagreb, Pest, and Vienna. But it is not at all clear what the precise thesis of his paper is. The paper, based largely on archival materials and other primary sources, makes two very worthwhile contributions. It presents an excellent discussion of the appointment of Jelačić (whom the author considers “more a political general than a first rate field commander”) to the office of ban and Jelačić military and political activities during the crucial months of 1848 and 1849. And it enables us to understand more easily some of the more complicated aspects of Croatia's political history at that time.

Few memoirs are as rich in detail as those of Field Marshal Count Francis Conrad von Hötzendorf, chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff from 1906 to 1911 and from 1912 until 1917. The numerous documents cited in the text and appended to each of the volumes make Conrad's memoirs an invaluable source for historians interested in Austro-Hungarian diplomatic, political, and military developments prior to and during the early months of the first World War.

The student of twentieth century European history who looks for a good example of the contrast and interplay of continuity and change will hardly find a better case than the story of the First and Second Austrian Republics. In the First Republic the various political camps operated in a potential and actual civil war atmosphere; in the Second Republic there has been genuine cooperation between the two major political parties. In the First Republic economic difficulties were so staggering that they proved insurmountable; the Second Republic has had remarkable economic stability and prosperity. The First Republic was to a considerable degree “ein Staat wider Willen”—a country whose sovereignty and independence were largely imposed upon the populace from the outside. Since they felt that their country could not stand on its own feet, the Austrians looked for salvation, first, in union with Germany or a Danubian federation and then in some kind of political combination with Italy and Hungary.

That Austria escaped permanent sovietization and achieved political stability in 1945 was the result of many factors, but none was more important than the political skill of the man whom the Red Army picked to play the role of Trojan horse, Dr. Karl Renner. By a combination of adroit political opportunism and stubborn adherence to a single goal, that of Austrian independence, Renner outmaneuvered his Soviet benefactors and acted as midwife to the birth of a new Austria which was independent, neutral, and politically viable. In order to achieve this goal, Renner had to harmonize the often conflicting interests of the Russians, the Austrian politicians, and the Western Allies.

Since World War II Hungarian historians have expressed great interest in the period between the revolution of 1848 and 1918. In studying this period, however, they have not been able to take advantage of an extensive heritage or of solid earlier works. Earlier Hungarian historians paid scarcely any attention at all to this era. Believing that the writing of contemporary history was a job for journalists and not for scholars, they kept away from it in most instances. Moreover, at that time it was ticklish for historians to touch upon the problems of the monarchy. As a consequence, they devoted their attention mostly to medieval history, which provided richer material for Hungarian nationalism.

Not many works have been published during the past decade that deal with Austrian history or with that of the states which once formed an integral part of the Habsburg empire.

The bibliography listed below is a continuation of the review of recent Czech and Slovak literature on the history of the Habsburg monarchy which appeared in the fourth issue (1963) of the Austrian History News Letter (pp. 77–90). It is based on the additions recently made to the collection in the J. G. Herder Institute at Marburg. It includes books and articles which deal with the period between 1815 and the present that were published up to June, 1964.