² von Hötzendorf, Franz Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1906–1918 (5 vols., Vienna: Rikola, 1921-1925).Google Scholar

³ Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 27 and 59; and Vol. II, pp. 378–379.

⁴ Ibid., Vol. I, p. 27. While Conrad was justified in regarding irredentism and Serbia's nationalist aspirations as threats to Austria-Hungary, what is open to criticism is his analysis of the two problems and his proposals for solving them.

⁵ Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 27, 60, and 503–510; Vol. II, pp. 15 and 378; and Vol. IV, pp. 117–122. See also Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914, edited by Ludwig, Bittner et al. . (8 vols., Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1930) (hereafter cited as “Osterreich- Ungarns Aussenpolitik”), Vol. II, No. 1660.Google Scholar

⁶ Conrad, , Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Vol. I, p. 42; and Vol. II, pp. 218–245Google Scholar. See also Pribram, Alfred F., “Der Konflikt Conrad-Aehrenthal,” Österreichische Rundschau, Vol. LXIV (1920), pp. 93–118Google Scholar; and Luigi, Albertini. The Origins of the War of 1914 (3 vols., London: Oxford University Press, 1952-1957), Vol. I, pp. 349–352.Google Scholar

⁷ Conrad, , Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Vol. I, pp. 58, 65, and 173; Vol. II, p. 375; and Vol. IV, pp. 9, 171, and 383.Google Scholar

⁸ In part, this was the result of a conscious effort on the author's part. In a note at the end of Volume III (p. 704) Conrad stated that his purpose was only to present factual evidence and to let the reader draw his own conclusions.

⁹ See, for example, von Urbanski, August, Conrad von Hötzendorf: Soldat und Mensch (Vienna: Ulrich Moser, 1938)Google Scholar, and the following articles: von Wittlich, Alfred, “Feldmarschall Conrad und die Aussenpolitik Österreich-Ungarns,” Berliner Monatshefte, Vol. X (February, 1932), pp. 116–136Google Scholar; and Moritz, Auffenberg-Komarow, “Conrad von Hötzendorf,” Neue Österreichische Biographie, Vol. III (Vienna: Amalthea, 1926), pp. 34–42.Google Scholar

¹⁰ See Oskar, Regele, Feldmarschall Conrad: Auftrag und Erfiillung, 1906–1918 (Vienna: Herold. 1955).Google Scholar

¹¹ May, Arthur J., The Hapsburg Monarchy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 458Google Scholar; Hans, Uebersberger, Österreich zwischen Russland und Serbien (Graz. Böhlau, 1958), p. 40Google Scholar; von Wegerer, Alfred, Der Ausbruch des Weltkrieges (2 vols., Berlin: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1939), Vol. I, p. 51Google Scholar; von Sosnosky, Theodor, “The Memoirs of Conrad von Hötzendorf,” Contemporary Review, Vol. CXXTV (1923), pp. 60–66.Google Scholar

¹² In the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 Austria-Hungary acquired the right to occupy and administer the two Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The annexation of these two largely Serb-inhabited provinces by Austria-Hungary in October, 1908, touched off a serious diplomatic crisis which lasted until the end of April, 1909. Serbia especially objected to the incorporation of the two provinces into the monarchy and, for a short time, an Austro-Hungarian- Serbian war appeared likely. See Schmitt, Bernadotte E., The Annexation of Bosnia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938).Google Scholar

¹³ The Italo-Turkish war arose out of Italian imperialistic ambitions in North Africa and as a consequence of Italy's desire to acquire Tripoli. See Albertini, , The Origins of the War of 1914, Vol. I, pp. 340–363.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Conrad believed that since relations between states were based on unceasing conflict, war was inevitable. Since every state was a potential aggressor, the aim of military and diplomatic policy was to prevent an enemy from determining when and where the war should be fought. Any war or any diplomatic policy was preventive in that it sought to prevent an enemy from gaining an advantage. Hence, the classification of wars into offensive and defensive categories was illogical. In Conrad's opinion, all wars were defensive. Conrad, , Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Vol. IV, pp. 125–130Google Scholar. See also Regele, , Feldmarschall Conrad, pp. 108–123Google Scholar, for a discussion of Conrad's views concerning a preventive war.

¹⁵ Baemreither, Joseph M., Fragments of a Political Diary, edited by Joseph, Redlich (New York: Macmillan, 1930), pp. 149–150.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. III, No. 2644. See also ante, n. 12.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. III, No. 2809.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See, for example, “Graf Aehrenthal und der Krieg,” Die Reichspost, October 12, 1911.Google Scholar

¹⁹ On the Conrad-Aehrenthal dispute see ante. n. 6.

²⁰ Albertini, , The Origins of the War of 1914, Vol. I, p. 351.Google Scholar

²¹ Mérey, to his father, December 26, 1911, Staats-Archiv, Nachlast Mérey. Access to the Mérey Nachlass is unrestricted.Google Scholar

²² Conrnd, , Aus meiner Dienstzeit. Vol. I, pp. 66–68.Google Scholar

²³ It is significant that during the course of the Sanjak railroad project dispute in January, 1908, Aehrenthal asked Italy only for benevolent neutrality, while he requested direct diplomatic support in Constantinople from England and France. It is obvious that he did not want to test the durability of the Italian alliance by asking for direct support. Since Austria-Hungary had no direct connection with England and France, he felt that he had nothing to lose in asking for their active diplomatic support. See Wilhelm, Carlgren, Iwolsky und Aehrenthal vor der bosnischen Annexionskrise (Uppsala: Almquist, 1955), pp. 212–215Google Scholar. In contrast, Conrad insisted on binding Italy to the Triple Alliance by putting pressure on her to accept concrete political and military agreements. See Conrad, , Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Vol. III, pp. 85–86Google Scholar. On the Sanjak railroad project, see May, Arthur J., “The Novibazar Railroad Project,” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. X (1938), pp. 496–527CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Solomon, Wank, Aehrenthal W the Policy of Action (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia University, 961), pp. 216–246.Google Scholar

²⁴ Aehrenthal, to Mérey, , May 16, 1910, Staats-Archiv, Politisches Archiv, lasz. X (Italien), Karton 145, Instructions 1231.Google Scholar

²⁵ While the archduke and many members of his entourage were pronounced Italophobes, Francis Ferdinand was opposed to a preventive war against Italy. See Rudolf, Kiszling, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von Österreich-Este (Vienna: Böhlau, 1955), p. 323.Google Scholar

²⁶ Mérey to his father, June 11, 1912, Staats-Archiv, Nachlass Mérey. Mérey's letter also contains an incisive critique of Berchtold, as well as a comparison between Berchtold and Aehrenthal. For an almost complete text of Mérey's letter, see Solomon, Wank, “The Appointment of Count Berchtold as Austro- Hungarian Foreign Minister,” Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. XXIII (July, 1963), pp. 147–148.Google Scholar

²⁷ For a remarkably disinterested and penetrating interpretative study of the origins, development, and disruption of the Triple Alliance and of Austro- Hungarian-Italian relations since 1882 by an Austrian historian, see Fritz, Fellner, Der Dreibund: Europäische Diplomatie vor dem ersten Weltkrieg (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1960).Google Scholar

²⁸ For the text of the Triple Alliance, see Pribram, Alfred F., The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879–1914 (2 vols., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920-1921), Vol. I, pp. 65 f.Google Scholar

²⁹ In Article 7 Austria-Hungary and Italy pledged themselves to uphold the status quo in the Balkans, the Ottoman coasts, and the Aegean Sea. A modification of the status quo by a permanent or temporary occupation of any part of this region was to take place only after a previous agreement based upon the principle of reciprocal compensation for any advantages, territorial or otherwise, had been made. See ibid., Vol. I. pp. 108–109. During the Italo-Turkish war, Aehrenthal informed Italy that military operations alone in the areas specified in Article 7 would be considered a modification of the status quo and justify Austro-Hungarian claims for compensation. See ante, n. 12. This established a precedent which was used by Italy in 1914. Such an interpretation of Article 7 would seem to have been shortsighted in view of the possibility of war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Fellner maintains that Aehrenthal's move was related to the concurrent negotiations for the renewal of the Triple Alliance and that he was really putting pressure on Italy to persuade her to agree to the removal of Article 7 from the alliance treaty, thereby regaining freedom of action for his own Balkan policv. The negotiations were interrupted before Aehrenthal died. When they were resumed, Berchtold adhered to a narrow interpretation of the article, neither making nor accepting any proposals for a revision of the Triple Alliance agreement. See Fellner, , Der Dreibund, pp. 77–79 and 81–83.Google Scholar

³⁰ Conrad, , Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Vol. IV, pp. 170 and 183.Google Scholar

³¹ Josef, Redlich, Schickalsjahre Österreich, 1908–1919. Das politische Tagebuch Josef Redlichs, edited by Fritz, Fellner (2 vols., Graz: Böhlau, 1953-1954) (hereafter cited as “Redlich, Das politische Tagebuch”), Vol. I, entry of December 5, 1911.Google Scholar

³² Ibid., Vol. I, December 23, 1912, p. 186.

³³ Ibid., September 9, 1914, p. 271.

³⁴ Conrad, , Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Vol. I, p. 510.Google Scholar

³⁵ Redlich, , Das politische Tagebuch, Vol. I, December 5, 1911Google Scholar. See also Conrad's letter to Aehrenthal on October 13, 1908, in Conrad, , Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Vol. I, p. 602Google Scholar, and also Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 122 and 126.

³⁶ Redlich, , Das politische Tagebuch, Vol. I, December 14, 1912.Google Scholar

³⁷ Conrad, , Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Vol. IV, pp. 33 and 132–133.Google Scholar

³⁸ Staats-Archiv, Politisches Archiv, Fasz. XL/Interna, Gemeinsame Ministerratsprotokolle, No. 515. The meeting was called by Berchtold to discuss Italian demands for compensation in accordance with Article 7 of the Triple Alliance treaty. See ante, n. 30. In a meeting held on July 31. 1914, it had been decided that an attempt should be made to satisfy Italian claims and to obtain Italian cooperation by ceding to her some Italian-populated territories of the monarchy. Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. VIII, No. 11,203.

³⁹ Conrad, , Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Vol. I, p. 115.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 185–186 and 190.

⁴¹ Although Conrad believed that an Austro-Serbian war was inevitable and although he realized the importance of Serbia for Russia's Balkan position, he still did not believe that a two-front war was unavoidable on the Eastern front. At times he hoped that Russia's opposition to Austria-Hungary in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula would be removed through diplomacy, i.e., by striking a bargain with Russia over the Straits. More crucial is the fact that Conrad counted on German power to hold the Russians in check, thereby allowing Austria-Hungary to conduct a localized war against Serbia. Conrad never seriously planned for a two-front war in the East, and he did not believe that Austria-Hungary was strong enough to fight such a war. See Conrad, , Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Vol. II, pp. 438–439 and 446; Vol. III, p. 777; and Vol. IV, pp. 111, 131–132, and 137–139.Google Scholar

⁴² Ibid., pp. 154 and 185–186. When Berchtold informed Conrad on August 6 that Germany was pressing Austria-Hungary to satisfy Italian compensation claims, Conrad reluctantly agreed that Italy might be given the Trentino but only if she entered the war on the side of Austria-Hungary. Somewhat cynically, Conrad remarked to fellow officers on August 7 that after the successful conclusion of the war then being waged “one perfidy could be repaid by another and the Trentino could be retaken from the Italian blackmailers.” On the same day, however, he changed his mind and declared that any cession of territory to Italy was impossible even to obtain her active military support. Conrad advised Berchtold to do everything possible to stall Italy. See Ibid., pp. 182–186. Regele maintains that Conrad opposed the cession of any Austro-Hungarian territory to Italy. See his Feldmarschall Conrad, p. 405. Neither Conrad nor Regele mentions the meeting of the ministerial council on August 8.

⁴³ Conrad, , Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Vol. II, pp. 436–452; and Vol. III, pp. 582- 585 and 775–780.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See, for instance, Regele, , Feldmarschall Conrad, p. 571.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Colonel Maximilian von Hoen (1867–1940) was head of the literary bureau of the ministry of war from 1911 until 1914 and chief of the Kriegspressequartiers from 1914 until 1917. In 1916 he became director of the Kriegsarchiv and was promoted to the rank of major general. He was appointed lieutenant field marshal in 1918.

⁴⁶ Redlich, , Das politische Tagebuch, Vol. I, August 28, 1914, p. 259Google Scholar. Conrad carried on an affair with Gina von Reininghaus, the wife of a wealthy Austrian industrialist, from 1907 until he finally married her in October, 1915. Very little has been said about the Conrad-Gina affair in the published literature on Conrad. However, the numerous critical comments about the affair by Redlich and others in the Redlich diary suggest that the affair deserves more attention than it has received. According to Redlich, Conrad's relationship with Gina von Reininghaus was “a completely unhealthy one” which for years “has completely absorbed [him].” The impression conveyed by the Redlich diary is that Conrad's involvement with Gina seriously distracted him in the performance of his duties and deflected his thinking into “pessimistically sentimental” and fatalistic channels of thought. Ibid., August 26, 1914, pp. 253–254. See also Ibid., Vol. II, August 1, 1915, p. 52, and September 30, 1915, pp. 62–63. For Gina's idealized and romanticized, yet revealing, account of her relationship with Conrad, see von Hötzendorf, Gina Conrad, Mem Leben mit Conrad von Hötzendorf (Leipzig: Grethlein & Co., 1935)Google Scholar. For a defense of Conrad against what might easily be construed as a breach of conventional social morality, see Urbanski, , Conrad von Hötzendorf, pp. 322–324.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Probably a reference to Emperor Francis Joseph.

⁴⁸ Redlich, , Das politische Tagebuch, Vol. I, September 9, 1914, pp. 271–272.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Ibid., August 26, 1914, p. 254.

⁵⁰ According to Alfred von Wittlich, an admirer of the chief of staff, Conrad belonged to the world of ideas of Frederick the Great. See his “Feldmarschall Conrad und die Aussenpolitik Österreich-Ungarns,” p. 135.

⁵¹ Conrad, , Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Vol. I, pp. 20 f., 40 f., and 53 f.; and Vol. II, p. 378 f.Google Scholar; Redlich, , Das politische Tagehuch, Vol. II, January 27, 1916Google Scholar; Baemreither, , Fragments of a Political Diary, p. 144.Google Scholar

⁵² Regele, , Feldmarschall Conrad, p. 571.Google Scholar

⁵³ Auffenberg-Komarow, , “Franz Graf Conrad von Hotzendorf,” p. 41.Google Scholar