This article examines the implications for a change in framework from sustainable development to degrowth in the environmental and social discourse of International Economic Law (I.Econ.L.). It argues that the framework of sustainable development accommodates the Global North's inaction in assuaging environmental degradation and alleviating global inequality by remaining embedded in a capitalist, growth-oriented political economy. Degrowth would provide a strategy to move past such an impasse by encouraging actors to grapple with the role growth plays in the rationale behind I.Econ.L. Degrowth advocates a planned economic contraction to reconcile human's relationship with the environment. This project serves as the first effort to link ideas of degrowth with I.Econ.L. and seeks to identify some of the areas in I.Econ.L.'s scholarship where degrowth would serve as an alternative to sustainable development and what such an alternative would mean for the norms in the different areas of I.Econ.L.

Given the global contestation against BITs and ISDS, the outcome of the Philip Morris v. Uruguay case upholding Uruguay’s right to regulate for public health is important for the international investment law community. However, it is not just the outcome of a case but also the quality of legal reasoning that is significant in building the legitimacy of the ISDS system. This paper focuses on the reasoning adopted by the tribunal in deciding whether Uruguay’s regulatory measures resulted in the expropriation of Philip Morris’s investment. The paper critiques the tribunal’s use of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to invoke the police powers rule in interpreting the expropriation provision of the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT. The tribunal’s reasoning was internally inconsistent and based on abuse of arbitral precedents. Clarity in legal reasoning by ISDS tribunals is imperative to boost the legitimacy of the ISDS system for all stakeholders.

Mainstream international law is Eurocentric. Throughout the past half millennia, no territory beyond Europe was safe from jus gentium's striking capability to legitimize the intrusion of European civilizational precepts. Beginning with the Americas but quickly shifting to Africa and Asia, each continent was a battleground for the penetration of a provincial knowledge system. In this paper, I explore the implications of Eurocentrism for international legal pedagogy. While textbook authors now pay homage to other civilizations, their effusions are ornamental only. Instead of supporting epistemological equivalency, they centre European international law throughout their works, exorcising the brutalities of European history that generated the law in question. After setting out the dilemma, I outline three approaches towards transforming international legal pedagogy that capitalize on the decolonization movement. Each method builds on the premise that, without epistemic diversity, legal pedagogy will continue to rationalize European international law's predatory impulse.

This paper exposes the limited perspective that we have over the problem of jurisdiction in emergencies. In the classic theory of emergency powers, sovereign control over borders is assumed, and jurisdictional problems are acknowledged when threats come from outside those borders or when they are handled outside. However, what characterizes many emergencies is not the exercise of sovereign jurisdiction but rather contestations over problems of jurisdiction and competing jurisdictional claims. To illustrate the need for a broader perspective over emergencies’ jurisdictional politics, this paper tells a multilayered story about a successful intervention by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in one of Myanmar's natural disasters (Nargis 2008). ASEAN's role in its Member State's disaster should be understood in view of its unique regional solution to the jurisdictional problem that this disaster raised—the problem of access by foreign aid to a domestic area affected by a natural disaster.

After protracted conflicts, Afghanistan and Iran agreed on a treaty in 1973 to share the waters of the Helmand River. However, this legal arrangement became a source of controversy over its equitable and reasonable utilization principle. The 1973 Helmand River Water Treaty reflects a history of legal and political controversy and strongly contrasting views, with some labelling it the “worst” treaty and others the “best”. This paper scrutinizes the history of legal arrangements of the Helmand River within its underlying political context to search for evidence of the aforementioned equitable and reasonable utilization principle. The findings indicate that the 1973 Treaty provides a grey space for legality and illegality, being a greatly restricted instrument to uphold the principle of equity. Examination of the principle of equity in the 1973 Treaty contributes to developing constructive controversy over the Helmand River and offers valuable lessons for other international watercourses facing similar challenges.

I argue that contextually reading two disputes involving Siam—Cheek v. Siam (1898) and the Temple of Preah Vihear (1962)—proves that both private law and public international law are structurally rigged against ex-semi-colonial nations. Nineteenth-century Siam was a political ferment known variously as a semi-colonial, semi-peripheral, non-colonial, or uncolonized polity. Siam bargained under imperial shadows her political independence by the tactical grants of concession contracts, as well as by negotiating treaties with competing European powers. In the post-colonial Temple of Preah Vihear case, colonial stationery—maps, photographs, and communiqués—as well as imperial customs offered evidentiary support to Cambodia, an ex-colonial state, against Thailand. In the early twentieth century, while authors picked Cheek v. Siam as a precedent for the law of international claims, textbooks offer the Temple of Preah Vihear case as a precedent on the form of treaties and estoppel. Conclusively, these two cases allow us to locate, if not exorcise, the ghosts of empires in Asian legal history, exposing, at the same time, Judge Koo’s Orientalization of customary international law.

This paper analyzes one of the key factors for understanding the region of Central Asia: its distinctive relationship to water resources and how states in the region co-operate—or should do so—in order to achieve better management of this valuable resource. Section I introduces the general legal context and, after the presentation of factual data, examines the management of water resources in the region from the viewpoint of the obligation of co-operation established under general international law, including the realization of the right of access to water and sanitation by all citizens. Subsequently, we analyze how and to what extent current international co-operation tools might contribute to solving existing challenges. To this end, we explore both co-operation in the generation and distribution of hydroelectric power in the region, and regional co-operation in the management, conservation, and sustainable development of the inland fisheries of Central Asia.

Over the last decade, public-private partnerships between states and a variety of non-state actors have proliferated as vehicles for functional co-operation at the global level. In parallel, there has been an emerging trend to accord such partnerships the privileges and immunities normally reserved for intergovernmental organizations (“IO-type privileges and immunities”). After identifying the legal and normative issues associated with this trend, this article argues that IO-type privileges and immunities should be restricted to entities that are clearly established under and governed by international law, and that any approach to IO-type privileges and immunities as a uniform package deal, regardless of the precise functional requirements of the global public-private partnership and its different categories of staff, or the specific conditions in the relevant national jurisdiction where a given privilege or immunity is sought, should be avoided.

This essay examines the 2013 Decision by the International Court of Justice interpreting its 1962 Judgment in the Temple of Preah Vihear case between Cambodia and Thailand, situating the more recent decision in the context of the Court's evolving role in Asia. Only eight Asian states have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court; only nine have ever appeared before it. The narrowness of the recent decision is of interest in part because of the modest role it ascribes to judicial institutions, but also for what this modesty heralds for the Court's status in Asia. A key conclusion is that Asian states are likely to retain a general preference for bilateral resolution of disputes. For smaller disputes, however, especially those concerning subjects that cannot be divided or traded—such as a temple (and, as we shall see, an island)—the ICJ may play an important role.

The historic Award in the South China Sea Arbitration gave much-needed clarity to many of the complex legal issues lying at the heart of the Philippines-China maritime dispute. Often overlooked, however, is the procedural significance of the case. This Comment submits that the South China Sea Arbitration represents a shift towards the use of judicial fact-finding initiatives as a means to overcome the adjudicatory challenges inherent to highly technical and scientific cases where one Party fails or refuses to participate. Even more striking, the Tribunal’s independently acquired facts appear to be the basis for the majority of its conclusions in the Award. This Comment highlights the appropriateness and practicality of the Tribunal’s actions in view of its extraordinary obligation under Article 9 of Annex VII of the UNCLOS to “satisfy itself” that the Philippines’ claims are “well-founded in fact and law”.

Internal self-determination is a popular dimension of self-determination in international law. Often regarded as a right to democratic governance, its early promoters were largely Western states and international lawyers. A central observation made by such promoters was that the West favoured internal self-determination while the Third World did not. The present article will argue why this is a misconception and an outdated observation today. However, having argued so, the article proceeds to develop a Third World-oriented constructive critique of internal self-determination, suggesting why the Third World should nevertheless be more critically cautious and vigilant about the promotion of internal self-determination by Western actors as a distinct and concrete right in international law.

The conventional wisdom has been that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] Part XV dispute settlement system is narrowly restricted and this reflects the drafters’ intent. Thus, tribunals should cautiously interpret Part XV, giving broad effect to its jurisdictional limitations. The unanimous award in South China Sea deals this approach a blow. Indeed, it assumes a fundamentally different orientation to interpreting UNCLOS: one which implicitly takes the foremost principle of Part XV as being its compulsory and comprehensive character. This approach is rooted in a very different understanding of UNCLOS as a “package deal” and the consensus it reflects. Indeed, I argue that any interpretation of ambiguous provisions of UNLCOS is necessarily coloured by one’s view of the struggles involved in its negotiation. Further evidence of this difference of approach in South China Sea is found, in particular, in its treatment of the regime of islands.

Like the apocryphal elephant defined by the blind men touching different parts of its anatomy, the content of the phrase “human security” varies with its users. In this sense it is rather like the phrase “self-determination”, which is widely employed by and for diverse interests.1 The lack of uniform definition or use stems in both cases not from intrinsic incoherence but from the way in which, from their first appearance, the phrases seemed to challenge the views, values, and interests of the practitioners of traditional diplomacy, powerful actors who then had a choice: resist them absolutely as rogue concepts threatening the very structure of international relations or neuter their revolutionary potential through an interpretation rendering them compatible with, even a reinforcement of, the basic structure of the status quo.

This article addresses the need for clarity as regards the sources of public international law, or at least as much clarity as possible. Questions relating to sources lie at the heart of international law. Of particular concern is the lack of rigour shown by some domestic judges when it comes to determining the rules of customary international law.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has, on various occasions, concluded treaties on behalf of its Member States. This raises some interesting questions: is ASEAN entitled to enter into treaties on behalf of its Member States; and if so, what should be the status of ASEAN and its Member States vis-à-vis the other party to the treaty? The issue is not one of whether the ASEAN Member States have consented to such a practice—it must be assumed that they have. Instead, the real issue is whether such treaty-making practice can and should be valid under international law, even if the Member States have consented for ASEAN to conclude these treaties on their behalf. This paper will argue that, under international law, ASEAN is entitled to conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States.

Agrobiodiversity conservation is vital for food security, maintaining ecological balance, and preserving socio-cultural norms. There is substantial evidence to support that agrobiodiversity hotspots coincide with localized, small-scale peasant food systems. Preserving such food systems is necessary for protecting agrobiodiversity. The current legal framework over agrobiodiversity is fragmented and inadequate. A major portion of this framework is situated within intellectual property law and farmers’ rights law, neither of which are designed to foster sustainable management of agrobiodiversity. In this context, the 2018 Peasants’ Rights Declaration has the potential to fill the gaps in the existing framework. The paper critically analyses the Declaration by exploring some of its legal innovations in improving agrobiodiversity conservation. While some of these innovations are commendable, they are unlikely to be adopted by states owing to their radical nature. Their adoption would require a massive overhaul of the existing agricultural model and power structures embedded within it.

The exploitation of natural resources in times of conflict has been the object of a prolific literature due to the extremely laconic character of the standards of conduct prescribed by the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Such laconicism has led scholars to be creative in ensuring that this central aspect of modern conflicts falls within the scope of existing legal instruments. This article starts by depicting the rich argumentative creativity developed by scholars and experts to ensure a more comprehensive regulation of what has often been perceived as a form of international brigandage. Subsequently it reflects on the biases of the professional community that has dedicated its efforts to the elaboration of a fairer framework of natural resources exploitation in times of conflict. In particular, it formulates some critical remark on the “just world business” that has dictated the methodology behind most of the interpretative engineering to be found.

The development of uncrewed maritime vehicles [UMVs] has the potential to increase the scale of military maritime surveillance in the exclusive economic zones of foreign coastal states. This paper considers the legal implications of the expanded use of UMVs for this purpose. It shows how features of the legal regime—namely how its application depends on determining the intent of a vessel's operation (to distinguish marine scientific research from military surveillance), as well the obligation to have due regard—have a “dynamic” quality that will pose a challenge to UMVs operated by autonomous technology. The legal obligations will require equipping UMVs with the capacity to communicate something about their identity, the purpose of their mission, and to be able to have some capacity to be responsive to the economic and environmental interests of the coastal state.

The development of post-colonial states through the operation of the uti possidetis principle in international law is intrinsically connected to the suppression of ethnic minorities and the ensuing humanitarian catastrophes in these states. With the continuation of colonial boundaries in post-colonial states due to the uti possidetis principle, international law facilitates many of these catastrophes. Accordingly, through exploring the questionable legal status of the uti possidetis principle and the fallacy of its conflict-preventing potential, I argue that uti possidetis itself is a key problem. The continuation of arbitrarily drawn colonial boundaries undermines the legitimate right to self-determination of numerous ethnic minorities. This paper specifically explores the application of uti possidetis to Myanmar and how it contributed to the Rohingya crisis. In the process, the paper also highlights the inherent relationship between colonialism and international law and how it has shaped the development of post-colonial states.

Despite the existence of almost eighty international agreements and legal instruments, there has not been a marked development in the transfer of climate change technologies to poor and the least developing countries. This article investigates the role of intellectual property rights (IPDs) and scrutinizes the effects of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) on the transfer of these technologies. It explores the TRIPS patent protection provisions and examines the associated flexibilities like compulsory licensing and parallel import options in the context of the transfer of climate change technologies. It finally concludes that the TRIPS patent protection rules, including the existing flexibilities, are one of the biggest impediments to the transfer of these technologies to poor and least developed countries. New agreements or promises on the transfer of green technologies would be fruitless if these TRIPS rules are not amended.