Depuis son édition par Heiberg au XIXe s., on savait que le texte grec de La mesure du cercle d'Archimède qui nous est parvenu est fautif, altéré par l'intervention d'un compilateur. Pour certaines de ses parties au moins, il est donc d'une authenticité douteuse. Plus récemment, l'examen de la traduction latine (au IXe siècle) de la traduction arabe de ce texte a permis de conclure que le manuscrit grec traduit appartient à une tradition textuelle meilleure et plus ancienne que le texte édité par Heiberg. Dans cette étude, on trouve l'editio princeps de la traduction arabe de La mesure du cercle, sa première traduction et une analyse historique et mathématique. Les nombreuses lectures de cette traduction faites au cours des siècles ont inspiré plusieurs « rédactions ». Trois d'entre elles seront éditées, traduites et examinées dans une prochaine étude.

Les maqālāt d'Abū Qāsim al-Balḫī contiennent un certain nombre de passages consacrés aux questions de théorie juridique. La source la plus importante qu'on y trouve est un ensemble d'extraits de K. al-futyā, un traité juridique d'al-Ǧāḥiẓ dont il ne restait jusqu’à présent que des fragments renfermant les critiques adressées par al-Naẓẓām aux compagnons du Prophète. Dans cet article, je fournis une traduction de ces extraits précédée d'une étude du texte et de sa place dans l'histoire de la théorie juridique durant cette époque de formation de la pensée islamique.

This article brings to light a previously unedited short treatise, the Masʾalatān (Two Questions), attributed to Avicenna (d. 1037). While the earliest witness to the text is the Ayasofya 4853 manuscript, containing a substantial portion of Avicenna's Nachlass, some of which is integrated into the Mubāḥaṯāt and Taʿlīqāt, the Masʾalatān has remained a standalone work with limited circulation. Consequently, the primary concern revolves around the verification of its authenticity and its feasibility given the available data. This article presents a critical edition of the text alongside a parallel translation but it also serves as a case study on the possibilities of authorship verification. It also compiles information from codicology, nevertheless, it primarily focuses on the commentary that analyses and compares the arguments to Avicenna's unquestionably authentic solutions. The first question addresses whether every existent is spatially located, while the second explores the impossibility of an actual infinite body. The commentary endeavors to interpret the text against the cultural and theological background that may have inspired such inquiries, meanwhile also seeks to address its later influence. In addition to unveiling a hitherto unseen text to the scholarly community for further research, it also offers an insight into the limitations of authorship attribution.

La récente parution de l’édition complète des Maqālāt ahl al-qibla d'Abū l-Qāsim al-Balḫī (m. 319/931) ouvre de nouvelles perspectives sur l'histoire de la construction de la tradition doxographique musulmane. À travers une comparaison des Maqālāt d’al-Balḫī et des Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn wa-ḫtilāf al-muṣallīn d’Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī (m. 324/935-6), cet article démontre qu'al-Balḫī est la source directe d'al-Ašʿarī sur les šīʿites. Cette nouvelle donnée permet dès lors d'analyser l’évolution du genre des maqālāt aux IIIe/IXe-IVe/Xe siècles, notamment son rapprochement progressif avec une pratique spécifiquement hérésiographique.

Le présent article revient sur la polémique entre Abū Bakr al-Rāzī et Abū al-Qāsim al-Balḫī. En s'appuyant sur le témoignage du Kitāb taṯbīt dalāʾil al-nubuwwa du Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār, on montre que les deux philosophes ont dû s'affronter à la cour d'Aḥmad b. Sahl al-Marwazī, gouverneur de Balḫ, durant les années 910, et que la virulence du ton de leur échange s'explique surtout par ce contexte de rivalité professionnelle. Pour ce qui est de son contenu, leur entretien a dû porter sur la question de la justice divine et sur la meilleure manière de rendre compte de la prophétie et du message coranique. Dans un second temps, on passe à l’étude du chap. VIII, 4 de Al-maṭālib al-ʿāliya de Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī et l'on montre que, contrairement à une opinion récemment émise, ce chapitre constitue un écho non pas d'Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, mais du premier argument du Kitāb al-zumurrud d'Ibn al-Rāwandī, qui opposait l'autonomie de la raison à la nécessité de la prophétie pour conclure de la première à la négation de la seconde. On suggère pour finir que la doctrine de la prophétie d'Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, comme celle des grands théologiens de son temps, tant muʿtazilites qu'ašʿarites, vise à échapper au dilemme mis en place par Ibn al-Rāwandī quelques décennies plus tôt.

Ibn Sīnā famously opens The Metaphysics (Al-ilāhiyyāt) of The Healing (Al-šifāʾ) with a discussion of what constitutes the subject matter of that science. Several candidates are introduced and subsequently dismissed, before “the existent qua existent” is identified as its subject matter. Among the candidates dismissed, he mentions “the ultimate causes for all existents, the four of them” (which are, however, things investigated [maṭālib] in this science). Here, Ibn Sīnā comes to problematise the notion of causality itself. He is adamant that “the existence of causes for things which are effects” is not self-evident, but needs to be proven by the metaphysician by means of a “demonstrative clarification” (bayān burhānī). He explains why sensation (ḥiss) and experience (taǧriba) cannot prove causality, before turning to its metaphysical proof. In this article, I investigate what Ibn Sīnā thought this “demonstrative clarification” of causality is. I present an analysis of his train of thought and a commentary on the various points he makes, leading up to his proof of causality. These points touch on problems of psychology, scientific method, and scientific proof, and can be unpacked by taking into account explanations he offers elsewhere.

This paper aims to introduce and discuss al-Fārābī's (d. 950–1 CE) fallacy from transfer and substitution in his little-studied “On Deceptive Topoi” (Kitāb al-amkina al-muġalliṭa) and the criticism leveled at him by Averroes (d. 1198 CE) for violating Aristotle's claim of the exhaustiveness of his list of fallacies. The first and larger half of this paper introduces al-Fārābī's treatise and its innovations upon Aristotle's Sophistici elenchi. The second half focuses on Averroes’ criticism in his so-called middle commentary (talḫīṣ) on Aristotle's SE and discusses the validity of his arguments against al-Fārābī. As the final analysis will show, Averroes’ criticism does not sufficiently take into account the independence of al-Fārābī's treatise from Aristotle's SE, its disregard for the study of dialectical deception and counter-deception, and its particular focus on the demonstrative sciences. In light of al-Fārābī's innovation his “On Deceptive Topoi” turns out to be a work of great originality drawing on a broad range of source texts.

In this article, I will argue that various scholars of kalām unanimously agree that sense-perception is something beyond the physical processes in the sense organs. There may be something happening in our eyes when we see a red apple, but seeing a red apple is not tantamount to it. We will see that some scholars of kalām argue that sense-perception is akin to being aware or conscious of the object of perception, and, hence, distinct from the physical process in the sense organs. One group will go so far as to accept that sense-perception is not even dependent on any physical processes in the body. Another group will accept that sense-perception presupposes that various physical conditions obtain, yet still regard sense-perception as something distinct from the occurrence of those conditions. I am suggesting that these nonreductive theories of sense-perception are the reason why Arabic-Islamic philosophers, starting from the eleventh century CE, consistently reject the Aristotelian-Avicennian theory of sense-perception.

Averroes’ “Epistle on Divine Knowledge” presents four different dialogues on two textual levels. These dialogues, the syllogistic structure of the arguments in them, and their use of contradictories indicate that the “Epistle on Divine Knowledge” is structured nearly entirely in accordance with the descriptions of dialectic we find in Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle's Topica. Accordingly, Averroes’ solution to the question of how God can have universal knowledge of particular things is a dialectical account of the distinction between Divine and human knowledge. Moreover, at a crucial point in the “Epistle on Divine Knowledge” Averroes refers to Aristotle, Metaphysics Β, which he considers to a dialectical exposition of questions on metaphysics. This reference suggests that Averroes sees the “Epistle on Divine Knowledge” as a kind of dialectical inquiry aimed at answering questions that arise at the outset of studying metaphysics. So, while it is possible to view the “Epistle on Divine Knowledge” as a dialectical interpretation of Quran 67:14, its primary purpose is to introduce its readers to metaphysical speculation. Thus it does not violate Averroes’ legal prohibition given in the Decisive Treatise against declaring dialectical interpretations in books available to the general public.

When in 1868, Alfred von Kremer (1828–89) in his Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islams (“History of the Ruling Ideas of Islam”) introduced al-Suhrawardī for the first time to a Western readership, he presented him as a freethinking Sufi devoted to “theosophy.” In a long chapter on Sufism, al-Suhrawardī appears under the heading “anti-Islamic tendencies.” Von Kremer characterized al-Suhrawardī's thought as a balanced mixture of three sources: Neoplatonic philosophy, a Zoroastrian theory of light, plus Islamic monotheism. “According to the Arab biographers, his teaching was aimed at the destruction of the existing religion, which, however, they say of anyone who dared to oppose the ruling orthodox party.” Expressing views that openly contradict the ruling religion, von Kremer wrote, meant putting one's life in danger. In accordance with that explanation, al-Suhrawardī died as “a martyr for his convictions” after the all too powerful group of orthodox scholars obtained his death sentence from Saladin.