What is the gap between scholars’ expectations of media-sourced data and the realities those data actually represent? This letter elucidates the data generation process (DGP) that undergirds media-sourced data: journalistic reporting. It uses semi-structured interviews with 15 journalists to analyze how media actors decide what and how to report—in other words, the “why” of reporting specific events to the exclusion of others—as well as how the larger professional, economic, and political contexts in which journalists operate shape the material scholars treat as data. The letter thus centers “unreported realities”: the fact that media-derived data reflect reporters’ locations, identities, capacities, and outlet priorities, rather than providing a representative sample of ongoing events. In doing so, it reveals variations in the consistency and constancy of reporting that produce unacknowledged, difficult-to-identify biases in media-sourced data that are not directionally predictable.

How does the representation of women in international organizations affect the implementation of gender mainstreaming policies? Many international organizations have adopted policies to prevent gender discrimination in their operations, but their implementation is often lackluster. We argue that these shortcomings appear due to a combination of institutional incentives and an underrepresentation of women in their staff. We test the argument in the case of the World Bank, drawing on highly disaggregated staffing data, an instrumental variable strategy, and an elite survey experiment. Our results show that most staff incorporate at least shallow gender mainstreaming in their projects. Deeper implementation of gender mainstreaming is more likely when women staff supervise projects, hold positions of authority, and are more represented as coworkers. These results contribute to understanding the disconnects between talk and action on mainstreaming policies and inform debates on representation in global governance.

This paper has been prepared primarily for the purpose of suggesting certain aspects of the teaching problem in political science upon which our attention at this round table may be focused with profit. At the same time, I believe that the issues raised are of more than passing concern and should be considered as among the most important for political scientists during the coming decade. Furthermore, although this round table discussion has been limited to the basic course in political science, I believe that the time has come for appraisal of the entire undergraduate political science curriculum. Such an appraisal should concern itself with the content of our courses (which has been growing like Topsy) and the quality of teaching (which has traditionally been ignored on the ground that the professional educators are alone concerned with teaching methods).

Turning now to the specific subject of this round table, I believe that any discussion of the basic course in political science must concern itself with the following questions: (1) the objective of the course; (2) the materials most conducive to the attainment of that objective; (3) the methods most suitable in the organization and presentation of these materials; and (4) the personnel for teaching the basic course. I should like to make certain brief observations in regard to each of these questions.

In Aristotle's treatise on the constitution of Athens we read of the great lawgiver, Solon, that “when he had completed his organization of the constitution … he found himself beset by people coming to him and harassing him concerning his laws, criticizing here and questioning there, till, as he wished neither to alter what he had decided on, nor yet to remain an object of ill-will to everyone by remaining at Athens, he set off on a journey to Egypt, … giving out that he would not return for ten years.” To the student of American history recalling the comparison with “that old constitution-monger Solon,” so often flung at the framers of the Constitution by the anti-Federalists, the hasty exodus from Athens for a decade after the attempt “to save the country and establish the best laws that were possible,” is full of interest. The actual result of the Solonic experiment in political science we also gather from Aristotle, for “in the fifth year after Solon's government they were unable to elect an archon on account of the dissensions,” and again, four years later they elected no archon for the same reason.

This article analyzes the influence of interest groups in the formation of British policy toward participation in European unity From the important theoretical literature bearing on the subject, it derives and tests two hypotheses relating group behavior to the political integration process. The hypothesis imputed to the group politics approach holds that if interest groups influence policy formation, then progress toward integration is likely to be impeded. The hypothesis suggested by an extension of the functionalist approach implies that if interest groups influence policy formation, then progress toward integration is likely to be facilitated. The data indicate a confirmation of the first hypothesis and a rejection of the second. Groups were unfavorable toward European unity for both organizational and economic reasons. They restrained Britain's movement toward participation in integrated European ventures until the onset of effective politicization. Then the introduction of broadly conceived national interest considerations displaced cost-benefit calculations as the criteria for judgment and diminished the groups' influence. At least in the task of enlarging a geographic area of integration, if not in expanding that integration once a grouping already exists, a conscious political decision was found to be essential.

Even though they contain one of the most forceful critiques of liberalism in contemporary political thought, the political writings of Stanley Fish have been neglected by political theorists. Fish's critique of liberal claims of moral and religious neutrality points to the conclusion that the liberal separation of church and state lacks a coherent justification. I offer a qualified defense of liberalism by arguing that while Fish's critique of liberal neutrality is sound, he fails to do justice to liberalism's substantive basis. Moreover, by simply negating liberalism, Fish's thinking remains within the liberal horizon in a way he fails to recognize.

This paper argues for a conceptualization of political theory based upon a jurisprudential model of reasoning, rather than the more commonly accepted model of logical demonstration. The purpose of political theorizing is to persuade and convince, not to prove; consequently it is a form of argument necessarily directed at a particular audience or audiences. Hobbes is examined as a theorist who directed his argument at those audiences which were politically most significant. This paper explores that aspect of Hobbes's theory which was intended to persuade his Puritan audience. Hobbes attempted to persuade the Puritans by presenting his argument in a manner subtly similar to the style of reasoning they were familiar with in religious terms. This interpretation is supported by a comparison of the arguments of Hobbes and Calvin. This analysis of Hobbes is intended to illustrate both a general view of the nature of political theorizing, and the advantages of adopting an historical method in examining past political theorists.

On October 10, 1923, the permanent constitution of the republic of China was promulgated. The “Double Ten,” already a national commemoration day, becomes fittingly the date of the long-awaited culmination of the constitutional movement inaugurated by the revolution of 1911. Although the national assembly was the same legislature which, sitting as a constituent body, completed the first draft of the constitution in 1913 and passed the larger part of it through its second reading in 1916–17, the actual periods devoted to committee work and discussion were limited to the time, not amounting altogether to three years, during which the assembly was permitted by military and political exigencies to remain in session.

In any party system, it would seem of some importance to establish rules and qualifications for membership in the different party groups, in order to bring together those persons, and only those persons, who adhere to the respective party principles. That should be particularly important in a two-party system, where the principles and issues are presumably sharply defined and clearly distinguishable. This matter has received increasing attention during recent years, and the importance of the problem was well stated by the Chicago Tribune, in an editorial referring to the Illinois primary campaign of 1938:

“The advantages of party organization and party responsibility have been proved over a long range of political testing, and although the abuses at times seem substantial. If a party is to be recognized as having legal standing, and if it is to make its nominations under the direction of law, there should be, it would seem, some determined qualification of its voters…. There shouldn't be a pretence of one thing and a fact of another. If Democrats and Republicans are to have legal standing as such, then Democrats should not make Republican decisions and Republicans should not make Democratic decisions. To permit this is to commit a fraud against the citizens who are trying to make their organization and their decisions according to the prevailing theory of political action and party responsibility.”

In this Review in 1993, Skocpol, Howard, Lehmann, and Abend-Wein analyzed the rapid enactment of mothers'pension laws in the American states in the 1910s. They concluded that the widespread federations of women's voluntary groups exerted a powerful influence on these enactments even before most American women had the right to vote. Sparks and Walniuk challenge these conclusions, noting that all 10 equal-suffrage states are among the 29 that passed mothers' pensions before 1916, and presenting new measures of suffrage endorsement and suffrage pressures in regression analyses suggesting that women's votes—actual and potential—played a major role in leading some states to adopt mothers' pensions earlier than their normal patterns of legislative change would predict. In response, Skocpol defends the 1993 conclusions. She adduces that the aggregate pattern of enactment of mothers'pensions corresponds much more closely to endorsements by women's groups than to suffrage timing and puts forth reasons to doubt the validity and significance of Sparks and Walniuk's tests.

On May 8, 1949—the fourth anniversary of unconditional surrender—the Parliamentary Council adopted at Bonn the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. This date was chosen intentionally to remind the German people that this provisional constitution is a way-station on the road out of the chaos which the collapsing Hitler régime left behind it. Any consideration of this Basic Law should start from the fact that the charter is not the creation of a free people, and that it will have to function within limits, both territorial and functional, which severely handicap its chance of becoming a genuine constitution, securely anchored in the basic convictions of the people. Its limits territorially are imposed by the refusal of the Soviet Union to permit the Germans living in their Zone of Occupation to express themselves freely concerning the charter. This raises the presumption, confirmed by other evidence, that these Germans would, by a considerable majority, accept the Basic Law if given a chance to do so. The charter's functional limits are imposed by the Western Allies, who decreed three basic limitations upon the German people's autonomy and independence: (1) the Occupation Statute, (2) the Ruhr Statute, and (3) the Inter-Allied Security Board. Of these, the Occupation Statute is much the most important, and encompasses the other two by its provisions. This is shown by the fact that the Letter of Approval, issued by the Military Governors on May 12, 1949, notes that acceptance of the constitution is premised upon the understanding that all governmental power in Germany, federal, state, and local, is “subject to the provisions of the Occupation Statute.”

What happens when there is a change in leadership in the Soviet Union? Does the period of leadership succession present unusual opportunities for domestic policy concerns to be vented? Or, are major issues on the Soviet domestic policy agenda addressed mainly after a succession of leadership is completed? Answers to such questions have a bearing on how the Soviet elite is replenished, and more generally help to improve understanding of Soviet politics. Two specialists on Soviet and East European politics, Valerie Bunce and Philip Roeder, have been drawn to different conclusions about these issues.

The Japanese constitution of 1889 is not, as is frequently assumed, chiefly the product of the labors of Hirobumi Ito and his secretaries who, in 1882–1883, studied constitutional systems in Europe preparatory to drafting the text of the fundamental law which the Emperor had promised in the celebrated rescript of 1881. Discussion of constitutional progress had begun as far back as 1867 and, immediately following the restoration, Meiji statesmen began the task of drafting projects of a constitution. Okubo, Goto, Kido, and Itagaki played leading rôles in urging the adoption of a national charter, and when Okubo and Kido relaxed their efforts, Itagaki initiated a popular campaign. Finally, in 1876, a formal commission of the Genro-in (Senate) was appointed to draft a constitution, while in 1880, its completed project was laid before the Emperor. This draft proposed a form of government having many features of the British parliamentary system.

Economic determinist attempts to deduce specific political conclusions or strategies from Marx's general theory do not jibe with Marx's own extensive political activity. Instead, Marx's development as a political theorist and organizer passed from observation of (French Revolution, Chartism) or participation in (1848, the International Workingmen's Association) existing radical movements to formulation of new theories and strategies, and then to application of these strategies in subsequent movements. In applying his general theory to formulating strategies and historical explanations, Marx utilized a framework of mainly political auxiliary statements to define the specific international and national historical setting. Faced with the defeat of a strategy or a tension between the strategy and an older theory, Marx reformulated his theory in different ways, sometimes altering these auxiliary statements rather than the general theory to explain unexpected events, more rarely changing the general theory itself. These new explanations reinforced his strategies. This impact of political experience on Marx's thinking illustrates his famous definition, drawn from Theses on Feuerbach, of revolution as a “practical-critical” activity. Taken as a whole, Marx's new explanations underline the role of politics in historical materialism and conflict with Marx's general expectation that economic oppression alone would ultimately drive the proletariat to make socialist revolution.

I examine the search for a “tie that binds, “ or “core” values, in liberal political theory, specifically Rawls's recent arguments, and in proposals concerning moral education in the public schools. Both Rawls and the proponents of moral education appeal to consensus or shared values, but the search for core values in both theory and practice is only partly successful. Specifically, this search is misguided insofar as it does not reflect how values are embedded in specific institutions and practices. The various forms of moral education in the public schools, both implicit and explicit, illustrate a consensus about a range of moral and intellectual virtues that is broader and more complex than arguments for core values allow. Comparing arguments concerning core values in political theory and moral education suggests how liberal political theory might deal with questions of consensus, justification, and the task of political theory generally.