I shall examine the Trust Territory from four overlapping perspectives: as part of the Pacific; in light of the concept of self-determination; in light of American “security interests”; and a final one I shall call epis-temology. This last has to do with what the people want and how we know.

Before the Peoples Republic of China [PRC] was officially proclaimed on September 21, 1949, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had proclaimed that the acts and foreign agreements of the Republic of China which resulted in the exploitation of China by foreigners were “completely contrary to the will of the Chinese people” and would not be honored. Although certain actions by the Chinese Communists indicated as early as February, 1949 that property owned by the U.S. Government and its nationals would be treated unfavorably by the new regime, no concerted steps were taken by the PRC against U.S. property until the United States had already placed an “embargo” on American trade with China. Only after Chinese troops had entered Korea and the U.S. Government had blocked and frozen all Chinese assets within its jurisdiction did the PRC freeze all public and private property of the United States in the PRC and order that an inventory of it be made. The PRC “assumed control of all U.S. property in China under a decree issued on December 29, 1950. ”

The agenda that faced the International Law Commission at the first meeting of the 24th session on May 2, 1972, was a formidable one. The 23rd session in 1971, despite an extension to fourteen weeks in place of the usual ten, had been able to complete work on the draft articles on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations only by concentrating on that subject to the substantial exclusion of other topics. As a consequence the Commission had not made any real progress on the other active subjects before it, which included State Succession in respect of treaties and in respect of matters other than treaties, as divide between two Special Rapporteurs, State Responsibility, the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause, and Treaty Law of International Organizations. In addition, the Commission had before it another piece of unfinished business, the review of its longterm program of work in light of the wide-ranging and thoughtful “Survey of International Law” which had been prepared in 1971 by the U.N. Secretariat at the Commission request.

There can be no doubt that the principle of self-determination is applicable to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The UN Charter applies it. The United States as administering authority under its 1947 trusteeship agreement with the Security Council has explicitly and repeatedly recognized its applicability. The real question is precisely what elements of the principle are applicable, how they are to be applied, and within what framework.

Salt deals with strategic objectives and doctrine, weapons systems, evolving technology, and is discussed in esoteric terminology. Decisions, however, are made by political leaders in the United States and the USSR in political contexts. Of the four agreements concluded at SALT I, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is clearly the most important. Odier agreements are the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Systems; the Accident Measures Agreement; and the revised Hot Line Agreement.

Pertinent Highlights of the SALT Agreements: The SALT I Agreements signed in Moscow May 26, 1972, were the result of more than three years of negotiation by the Nixon Administration. They provide the basis for a great improvement in national security. The ABM Treaty recognizes the technical reality that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can defend its population or industry against ballistic missile attack and that it is not simply wasteful but counterproductive to try to do so. The treaty limits each side to a negligible defense at two sites—the national capital and another at least 800 miles away. Furthermore, it limits the number of radar complexes around the national capital to six, at most, and the number of interceptors at each of the two sites to 100, with the clear implication that not only should these defenses against missiles be penetrable but also destroyable by those missiles.