Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-94fs2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-03T00:37:57.320Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Future Forces and Future Policies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2017

Abstract

Pertinent Highlights of the SALT Agreements: The SALT I Agreements signed in Moscow May 26, 1972, were the result of more than three years of negotiation by the Nixon Administration. They provide the basis for a great improvement in national security. The ABM Treaty recognizes the technical reality that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can defend its population or industry against ballistic missile attack and that it is not simply wasteful but counterproductive to try to do so. The treaty limits each side to a negligible defense at two sites—the national capital and another at least 800 miles away. Furthermore, it limits the number of radar complexes around the national capital to six, at most, and the number of interceptors at each of the two sites to 100, with the clear implication that not only should these defenses against missiles be penetrable but also destroyable by those missiles.

Type
Towards Salt II: Interpretation and Policy Implications of the Salt Agreements
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1973

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

International Business Machines Corporation.

References

1 A more complete statement of this position can be found in Garwin, R. L., Superpower postures in SALT, An American View in Salt: Problems and Prospects (Kaplan, M., ed.) 96118.Google Scholar