The remedies for the recovery of confiscated goods outside of the confiscating state have been neither as fully utilized nor as fully developed as precedent, principle, and usefulness would seem to warrant. The possibility of recovering confiscated goods abroad after they have left the confiscating state is not, of course, a universally available response to the expropriation of an alien’s property. But it is available in many situations where the international movement of goods is involved and frequently affords the only means by which the victim of a confiscation can get a determination of rights under principles of international law and prevailing notions of public order.

Since Mr. MacCrate has traced the events in Chile which have lead Braden to institute legal proceedings in Europe to recover its allegedly confiscated copper and their proceeds, I think it important to state the legal theory upon which the company is basing its actions. Braden is asserting ownership rights in copper and other products derived from E1 Teniente mine on the ground that the constitutionally mandated procedures for valuating El Teniente’s assets, as applied, fell below the minimum standards required by international law and thereby resulted in the confiscation of Braden’s equity position in El Teniente. Accordingly, the Company argues that any rights acquired by Chile by virture of the nationalization are without legal effect.

I would like to center my remarks on the question of how the issue of sanctions should be dealt with in the Rhodesian case.

Rhodesia is a situation of outstanding importance. First, the rebel government of Salisbury is not recognized anywhere in the world in either a de jure or a de facto sense. Secondly, the British Government claims sovereignty over Rhodesia; therefore, constitutionally, the British Parliament can legislate for Rhodesia.

I would like to address myself to international outlaws and what domestic procedures are available to arrest their activities. While at first glance the nexus between domestic justice and international justice may seem tenuous, I wonder: Is it surprising that the same administration that is so insensate over the deprivation of the human rights of blacks in Southern Rhodesia is the same administration that proclaimed early in its tenure that if you have seen one slum you have pretty much seen them all, and hasn’t visited another since? Is it surprising that the same administration that evidences so little concern over the political rights of the majority in Rhodesia is the same administration that “bugs” and sabotages the political process within the United States?