In July 2015, Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Pursuant to that agreement, Iran committed to limiting the scope and content of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories. By law, the U.S. State Department is required to certify Iran's compliance with the agreement every ninety days. The Trump administration first certified Iran's compliance with the agreement in April 2017, albeit reluctantly. In its first certification, the Trump administration expressed ongoing concern about Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, and repeated previous criticism of the JCPOA as “fail[ing] to achieve the objective of a non-nuclear Iran.”

In its August 2016 decision in Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a $655 million jury verdict against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs were individuals whose family members had been killed in terrorist attacks that took place in Jerusalem; defendants were alleged to have coordinated and carried out these attacks. While the United States government took no position on the merits of the dispute, it filed a Statement of Interest in the district court “[o]n the limited issue of setting a bond amount in [the] case.”

On December 16, 2016, President Obama signed into law the Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act (FCEJICA). This act amends the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) in order to confirm the jurisdictional immunity of foreign states in connection with lending artwork to the United States for temporary exhibit. The FCEJICA contains two exceptions, described below, that introduce some uncertainty about the extent of protection the statute provides to foreign states.

The United States is more than fifteen years into a fight against terrorism that shows no sign of abating and, with the change in administration, appears to be intensifying. Other Western democracies that have historically been uneasy about U.S. counterterrorism policies have, in recent years, shifted toward those policies. And armed nonstate groups continue to commit large-scale acts of violence in multiple distinct theaters. The legal issues that these situations present are not entirely new, but neither are they going away. Recent publications, like the three works under review, thus provide useful opportunities to reflect on and refine our thinking on them.

On December 15, 2016, China seized an American unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) in the South China Sea. The drone had been launched by an American naval vessel, the USNS Bowditch. According to press reports, “[t]he American crew was in the process of retrieving the device when a small boat dispatched from the Chinese vessel took it as the American sailors looked on.” China has made extensive—and contested—maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea, including within an area delimited by the “nine-dash line.” The incident occurred outside of this area, and none of the Chinese government's statements related to the seizure suggest any assertion of Chinese jurisdiction over the waters where the drone was seized. After an exchange of diplomatic statements, China returned the drone to the U.S. Navy.

On November 14, 2016, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) released its annual Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (the Report). The Report contained the OTP's updates on preliminary examinations of several situations, including in Afghanistan. Of particular note, the OTP announced that it had identified a reasonable basis to seek Pre-Trial Chamber authorization for an investigation into allegations of war crimes committed by the United States—primarily from 2003 to 2004, but in some cases as recently as December 2014.

Since March 2015, the United States has supported a Saudi-led military coalition fighting a Houthi insurgency that seized control of Yemen's capital and governmental institutions in 2014. At the request of ousted Yemeni President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the Saudi-led coalition launched an air campaign in Yemen to “defend Saudi Arabia's border and to protect Yemen's legitimate government.” To support these efforts, President Obama authorized the “provision of logistical and intelligence support to [coalition] military operations” and the establishment of a “Joint Planning Cell with Saudi Arabia to coordinate U.S. military and intelligence support.” The United States has disclaimed any direct offensive role in the conflict while acknowledging that it has provided support by refueling coalition warplanes, supplying targeting intelligence, and sending U.S. military personnel to assist the planners of the coalition's air campaign.