Why did the United States establish an early American Empire in the Pacific (1856-1898)? This chapter first discusses the conventional wisdom that focuses on the role of naval power, trade with China, and missionaries. It shows that these explanations are unable to explain patterns of American imperialism in the Pacific. It then introduces a theory of entrepreneurs and highlights the contributions that an entrepreneurial theory makes to International Relations scholarship, including to theories of empire, territorial expansion, and contemporary struggles for recognition for indigenous peoples in the Asia-Pacific.

Whereas most books emphasize cases of expansion, this chapter focuses on cases in which the United States does not expand. These cases - Fiji, Kiribati, Tahiti, Tokelau, and Tuvalu- challenge grand narratives of America’s path in the Pacific. The islands had strategic value, large markets, and souls to save. Yet, there was little if any interest from the US government in annexation. Using a structured, focused comparison, we attribute these instances of non-expansion to three causes: an island lacks commodities or labor for the entrepreneur to exploit; the entrepreneur dies or is arrested before the imperial lobby matures; or the entrepreneur establishes themselves in territories already controlled by foreign empires who can offer protection from local threats. These cases are interesting, brief stories about the American commercial experience abroad that have been ignored by scholars of American imperialism.

In 1889, almost a decade before the Spanish-American War, the United States, Germany, and Great Britain agreed to enter into an imperial condominium in Samoa. Conventional wisdom credits American imperialism in Samoa to security motives and major economic interest groups within the United States. This chapter argues that American entrepreneurs shaped American imperialism in Samoa. It presents novel evidence that American entrepreneurs - especially H.J. Moors - entered the islands in pursuit of high copra prices and turned to lobbyists after facing threats from German competitors. They pressured officials in Washington and naval captains who visited the islands for action.

INTRODUCTIONAn energy transition is underway in Southeast Asia. This process is dependent on an uninterrupted supply of the minerals and metals that are essential to produce low-carbon technologies. These raw materials are termed ‘critical minerals’ (CMs), owing to three broad features: their necessity as inputs in low-carbon technology, the lack of viable substitutes, and significant supply constraints. The demand for CMs such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, rare earth elements (REEs), copper, and silicon3 is expected to increase exponentially in the coming decades. To meet the global net zero target by 2050, mineral inputs will need to increase sixfold by 2040, compared to current levels. According to scenarios developed by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the demand for minerals used in electric vehicles (EVs) will increase thirty times compared to current levels, while mineral requirements for low-carbon energy generation will triple by 2040.

The development of CMs is impeded by several supply constraints. Currently, a handful of countries dominate the CMs market, with China playing an outsized role in both the upstream and downstream parts of the supply chain. For example, China currently extracts 65 per cent and processes 85 per cent of the world's REEs. The largest amount of copper, nickel and cobalt are extracted in Chile, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), respectively. Yet, as shown in Figure 1, China dominates the processing of all three minerals, as well as alumina and lithium.

There is growing academic and policy consensus on the need to develop sustainable and reliable supply chains for CMs, which is of great relevance to Southeast Asia. On the one hand, the region can become a major supplier of critical minerals, due to the existence of substantial deposits of bauxite, nickel, tin, REEs, cobalt, manganese and graphite. On the other hand, Southeast Asia is likely to become a significant consumer of critical minerals, owing to the region’s growing solar photovoltaic (PV) and electric vehicle industries. Malaysia and Vietnam are the world’s second and third-largest solar PV manufacturers and accounted for one-fifth of global shipments in 2020.9 Thailand has become the region’s leading producer of EVs, while the Philippines and Indonesia have undertaken initial steps to develop integrated battery and EV supply chains.10

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The clean energy transition momentum is gathering pace globally, and in Southeast Asia as well. The transition is dependent on an uninterrupted supply of critical minerals and metals that are essential for the production of low-carbon technologies.

• The supply of critical minerals is impeded by several constraints. First is the dominance of a handful of countries in both the upstream and downstream parts of the supply chain. Second is the current geopolitical race to secure supplies leading to greater protectionist behaviours, exhibited through export bans and trade impediments.

• This study focuses on four selected critical minerals which are important to the region. Two criteria are used in determining a mineral having high significance: (1) There are significant deposits of it which can be tapped on to bolster Southeast Asia’s strategic position in the supply chains; and (2) It is an essential input in industries and sectors of importance in Southeast Asia. The four critical minerals examined in this study are: copper, nickel, bauxite (alumina), and rare earth elements (REEs).

• The study makes three recommendations to enhance ASEAN’s role in the critical minerals supply chains. The first addresses the insufficiency of investments in early-stage exploration and exploitation of critical minerals and, in the process, calls for an embracing of circular economy principles. The second appeals for investments at all stages, including in technology to tap into downstream activities beyond refining and purification, and in the manufacturing of component parts such as battery cell storage and permanent magnets. The third calls for improvements in sustainability management in the mining sector, which is generally extremely environmentally and socially damaging to communities.

Keynes began actively trading in currencies almost as soon as he had published The Economic Consequences. Despite the advantages of being the leading economic thinker of his generation and possessing an enviable network of contacts with policymakers, his speculation met with mixed results. This chapter examines two issues: first, the influence which Keynes’ understanding of the post-war international economic and political situation had on his foreign exchange speculation strategy; and, second, the influence his experience as a speculator had on his political-economic theory in the years following the publication of his book.