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I begin the analysis of oil-financed institutionalized practices with a focus on government transfers and subsidies, highlighting the variation in access to resources in Gulf monarchies. I describe various types of transfers: 1) universal – those, such as free health care and subsidized household utilities, which all citizens enjoy; 2) particularist – those which are extended to specific communities – as in allowances to members of tribes or royal families and contracts to business elites; 3) idiosyncratic – as in funds to men to assist with their marriage expenses. I note changes to government distributions from mid-2014 and the oil price downturn. I then explore matters of equity and exclusion, highlighting those social categories who are privileged and those who are discriminated against in access to distributions in these states. I argue that the hierarchization of society and the related variation in access to resources are both integral to the shaping of the national community and a means for the state to exercise control insofar as key social categories are appeased via the relative marginalization of others.
I consider how Gulf Arabs evaluate their government’s behavior relative to the circulation of wealth. On the basis of roughly 350 interviews in the four countries with scholars, economists, dissidents, bankers, members of government, representatives of public and private foundations and NGOs and official and independent ‘ulama, I summarize their views, quoting from their responses to a set of questions and sharing the evidence they provide. I note the extent to which my interlocutors criticize their rulers in ethical terms, especially insofar as their commitment to social justice, equity and inclusion is concerned. In short, they confirm that there is no genuine concern for equity in the distribution of resources, and no indication that religious norms are integrated into this domain of governance. Rather, fairly narrow political and material interests prevail. Then, I briefly describe episodes of resistance to Gulf rulers from religious forces in society. The aim is twofold: to demonstrate how they too instrumentalize Islam for political capital and how rulers respond to the challenge they face from the religious field.
Social integration in European countries seems increasingly dependent on the “we” that draws on tribal markers of identity. This type of belonging, in good times flatteringly called demos, tends to resurface in its far uglier exclusionary versions when times get more difficult and resources more scarce – and at the same time, the horrors of previous wars are either forgotten or strategically rehashed. The European Union (EU), however, still has a window to change these dynamics and reorient Europe towards prosperity. For Europe, this is both a task and a necessity: the EU cannot socially integrate but via the imaginaries of prosperity, all the while it emerged with a task to prevent the excesses of tribalism.
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework for the book. I articulate, first, why it is useful to think in terms of social imaginaries, rather than alternative sociological concepts (such as paradigms or ideologies), for analysing social integration in modern societies. I then explore why, in modernity, it was imaginaries of prosperity that provided the most stable foundations for social integration. These imaginaries can bridge, I argue, the plurality of worldviews and identities, while at the same time play into modernity’s strengths, namely democracy and knowledge governance. However, any particular imaginary of prosperity can provide only a temporary foundation, because it will sooner or later produce too many problems and contradictions to continue fulfilling its integrative role. When such problems mount, imaginaries of prosperity become subject to their own dialectics, having to shift eventually between privatised and collective routes to prosperity. If, however, the pressures for change cannot be institutionalised through democratic channels, we have seen in the past – and are seeing again today – that illiberal and undemocratic tribal imaginaries may take hold, making identity (rather than prosperity) the main vector of politics.
Chapter 6 develops an integrated framework of leader–subordinate dynamics in Chinese SOEs. How do leaders interact with subordinates to execute their agendas, and how do subordinates respond? Grounded in reward, coercion, and legitimate bases of power, the chapter identifies SOE leader tactics such as leveraging position authority, conducting personnel ploys, emphasizing material and status gains, invoking external threats, underscoring superiors’ directives and policies, and appealing to subordinates’ personal duty and morality. Subordinates may react by praising and supporting the leader or by expressing alternative views, delaying or subverting implementation, shirking, engaging in critical expression, or quitting. Leader–subordinate interactions are iterative and evolve over time.