Book contents
- Reflections on Monetary Policy after 25 Years of the MPC
- Macroeconomic Policy Making
- Reflections on Monetary Policy after 25 Years of the MPC
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- I Overview
- II Communication
- III Targets and Instruments
- IV MPC Process
- V Lessons for Central Bank Independence
- 13 The MPC
- 14 Outlines of a Reform Programme for the UK’s Monetary Regime
- Annex: Details on the methodology for the classification of level of disagreement
- Index
- References
14 - Outlines of a Reform Programme for the UK’s Monetary Regime
from V - Lessons for Central Bank Independence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 November 2024
By
Book contents
- Reflections on Monetary Policy after 25 Years of the MPC
- Macroeconomic Policy Making
- Reflections on Monetary Policy after 25 Years of the MPC
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- I Overview
- II Communication
- III Targets and Instruments
- IV MPC Process
- V Lessons for Central Bank Independence
- 13 The MPC
- 14 Outlines of a Reform Programme for the UK’s Monetary Regime
- Annex: Details on the methodology for the classification of level of disagreement
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter sets out a dozen propositions aimed at underpinning and, perhaps, revitalising Britain’s Monetary Policy Committee and the regime entrusted to it. It has not addressed the many reform proposals - such as merging the MPC and Financial Policy Committee, or having regional representatives on the MPC. Nor has it addressed the incentives of the regime’s parliamentary and other overseers.
Keywords
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Reflections on Monetary Policy after 25 Years of the MPC , pp. 169 - 186Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024
References
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