The Introduction presents an overview of why diaspora mobilization matters, why the existing literature has not satisfactorily explained its causes and dynamics, and previews the author's key arguments. This chapter justifies the book's comparative framework and details the data collection strategies used to investigate the Arab Spring abroad.

Given the deterrent effects of transnational repression and conflict transmission in the United States and Britain before 2011, what brought anti-regime Libyans, Syrians, and Yemenis together for the Arab Spring? Chapter 4 describes how the Arab Spring mobilized members of the anti-regime diaspora by upending the normative operation and effects of transnational repression and conflict transmission in the diaspora. The Arab Spring did so by reducing the costs of activism, making members willing to take risks, and creating new solidarities against common threats. The extent to which diaspora groups experienced these quotidian disruptions determined whether or not they converted preexisting organizations to the cause and maintained solidarity over time.

Chapter 1 provides the theoretical justification for the book and proposes a new framework for explaining what scholar Albert Hirschman calls "voice" after "exit" against authoritarian regimes.

The Conclusion summarizes the book's contribution and details the implications of The Arab Spring Abroad for future studies of transnational activism, diaspora mobilization, and immigrant politics.

Chapter 7 shows how diaspora activists’ interventions in the Libyan, Syrian, and Yemeni Arab Spring were shaped by the relative degree of geopolitical support for the cause from their host-country governments and influential third parties, including states bordering the home-country, international institutions, and the media.

Chapter 3 demonstrates why Libyan, Syrian, and Yemeni mobilization was weak before the Arab Spring. The author shows how two transnational social forces--transnational repression and conflict transmission--depressed and deterred anti-regime mobilization by embedding diasporas in authoritarian systems of control and sociopolitical antagonisms through members' home-country ties.

Chapter 5 describes differences in activists’ collective interventions for rebellion and relief. Moss demonstrates how diaspora movements adopted a common transnational repretoire of (1) broadcasting their allies’ plight to the outside world, (2) representing the cause to the media and policymakers, (3) brokering between allies, (4) remitting tangible and intangible resources homeward, and (5) volunteering in person on the front lines and along border zones. However, not all diaspora movements played a congruent role in the uprisings. While Libyans in the United States and Britain played what the author calls a "full-spectrum" role in the revolution for its duration, Syrians and Yemenis did not. The chapters to follow explain how and why.

The growing use of drones is discussed in detail in this chapter. The chapter shows that their intensive use by both state and non-state actors is largely due to the fact that they provide a significant enhancement in aerial awareness at a relatively low cost and low risk. In the Middle East and North Africa, armed drones have been deployed in the Gaza Strip, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and other theaters. The roots of Iran’s drone program go back to the 1980–8 war with Iraq. Since the early 1980s, Iran has developed strong and diversified drone capabilities. Its arsenal today includes a broad and sophisticated range of non-weaponized surveillance and armed drones.

For millennia, Iranian leaders have perceived strong naval forces as crucial to securing foreign trade and cementing the country’s predominance in the strategic Persian Gulf. Furthermore, given Iran’s huge size, long history, and strong national identity, its leaders have seen themselves and their maritime presence as the guarantor of regional security and the presence of foreign troops in the region as its impediment. Iranian strategists learned important lessons from the direct confrontation with the technologically superior US Navy at the end of the war with Iraq. Based on these lessons, since the 1980s, Iran has maintained two naval forces – the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) – which are examined in detail in this chapter.

A close examination of Iran’s defense policy and its carefully crafted and developed asymmetric warfare doctrine since the early 1980s points to a great deal of pragmatism and flexibility and a willingness to adjust to the changing strategic environment. The strategy has pursued four major goals: To ensure regime survival, to protect the homeland, to deter potential enemies, and to project power. In pursuing these broad objectives, the republic’s core priorities have been influenced by a combination of geopolitical forces, ideological orientation, and the revolutionary elite’s definition of security and threat perceptions.

The chapter examines the recent changes in the nature of modern warfare. It argues that most recent military conflicts take the form of “low-intensity conflict,” “gray-zone competition,” “asymmetric warfare,” “fourth-generation warfare,” and “irregular warfare.” Given the huge military spending gap between Iran and its regional and global adversaries, Iranian leaders have articulated and adopted an asymmetric warfare doctrine since the 1979 revolution.