As discussed in Chapter 8, while the exiled section of the Iranian Kurdish movement experienced massive decline in its activity and was forced to passivity (kampnshini), the Kurdish civil society has in the 1990s and more recent decades innovated and experienced a new trend, known as the era of flourishing NGOs and civil society associations. Though emergence of this trend has been argued to be a development that emerged as result of the reform era under Mohammad Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005), the evolution, politicisation and discourse of Kurdish civil society has been unique to this region and has cherished Kurdish nationalism, culture and language. However, as this chapter highlights, another aspect of this development is that through the latest two decades Kurdistan has entered into a new phase of securitisation, expressed through mass arrests, persecutions and executions of Kurdish journalists, civil society and human rights activists, etc. Securitisation of the Kurdish region has been a development intensified through Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s (2005-13) and Hasan Rouhani’s presidencies (2013-).

Chapter 5 presents the story of how Iran finally turned the tide, of how the revolution progressed to the point that it could help instead of hinder the war effort. What the IRGC authors term “the epic of Khorramshahr”—Iran’s retaking of that city after months of Iraqi occupation—marked the culmination of the reversal. For the Guards, the liberation of Khorramshahr represents a case in which faith could be used effectively against firepower. Though the Iraqi forces retained their advantage in firepower, the Iranians’ faithful determination gave them the ultimate edge in their fight to retake the city. The liberation of Khorramshahr signified a turning point both in the war and for the Revolutionary Guards. The campaign marked the IRGC’s most substantial participation in the war to that point and initiated its transformation into the powerful and professional military that experience has allowed it to become.

Among many other characteristics, Kurdish nationalism and the Kurdish question carry strong crossborder features. Crossborder interaction between the Kurds of different parts of Kurdistan has a long history, in which crossborder solidarity has worked as an invaluable source of movement mobilisation. In this chapter, light is shed on the KDPI leadership’s attempt to re-establish the Iranian Kurdish movement in the 1960s through reliance on crossborder interactions with the Iraqi Kurdish movement, under the leadership of the KDI and Mostafa Barzani. Through this chapter the Iranian Kurdish movement’s interaction with the Kurdish movement in Iraq, and the impact of this interaction on the content and direction of the Iranian Kurdish movement, are highlighted. In addition, in order to reflect on critical aspects of this interaction, minor and major events and episodes that contribute to understanding this crossborder Kurdish interaction are included in this chapter.

This chapter discusses the regional conditions that have shaped the framework, direction and content of different forms of mobilisation and conduct of the Iranian Kurdish movement from the 1990s to 2015. This analytical focus includes the activities of the political parties of Iranian Kurds based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). This chapter explains why, during this period, the exiled (KRI-based) Iranian Kurdish movement experienced massive decline in its military and political activities. Taking the early 1990s as the starting point for the latest stage of the Iranian Kurdish movement, it is claimed that this phase was a product of comprehensive regional shifts with impacts on Iran’s domestic and regional policy. In addition it is highlighted that movement decline, misconducted crossborder interaction, thickening and diversification within the movement are among some features and hallmarks of this era’s Iranian Kurdish movement.

The main focus and argument of this chapter is that the Kurdish movement in this period experienced the emergence of several new tendencies that distinguish this era from the previous period (the 1960s). The trends and tendencies which occurred through this era allow us to classify this period as an era of diversification and thickening of the numbers and the spectrum of ideologies of the actors and organisations that participated in this period’s movement. The most eye-catching trend is related to Komala’s announcement of its official activity and its focus on the class problematic in Kurdistan. In line with Komala’s emergence as a new actor within the Kurdish movement, different examples of challenge and difficulties occurred in the relation between this organisation and the KDPI, which resulted in half a decade of war between these major organisations of the Iranian Kurdish movement. These factors and their impact on the post-revolutionary Kurdish movement are discussed in this chapter.

This chapter investigates the socio-political and ideological aspects of an event named in the lexicon of the Iranian Kurdish movement as the Kurdish Peasant Uprising of 1952-3 (Rapêr̄ini Werzeran u Cûtyarani Kurdistan 1331-2). This event took place in a period when kurdayêti was the only ideological force behind mobilising the Kurdish people to conduct collective political action. However, throughout this chapter I argue that this uprising highlighted the issue of class conflict in the rural areas of Kurdistan, and challenged the authority of the Kurdish feudal class. In addition, the KDPI’s role, as the only and major ethnonationalist political organisation is assessed and discussed. Due to the way this uprising was conducted, it has been argued to be the first collective class-inspired rebellion in Iranian Kurdistan.

The Kurdish national movement in Iran following the Iranian Revolution and regime change in 1979 entered into a new era of mobilisation and challenge to the newly established Islamic Republic. The post-Revolution relations between Kurds and the regime resulted in a period of unpredictability and instability, conceptualised in this chapter as the ‘no war yet no peace’ Kurdish Condition. In this period the Kurdish claim for khodmokhtari (autonomy) and Tehran’s rejection of this claim was the focus of conflict with the regime. Through this period the Kurdish region witnessed some of the fiercest examples of regime brutality in Kurdistan, resulting in many massacres, executions and considerable internal displacement, with the Bloody Newroz of Sanandaj (March 1979) as an example among many others. On the other hand, Kurdish civil society has through this short era expanded drastically, resulting in the establishment of many civil society associations and organisations.

Chapter 1 introduces the book’s main protagonists, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or Sepah, Corps. It examines the Sepah’s emergence, formal establishment, mission and duties, early institutionalization, and role in fighting counter-revolutionary and ethnic separatist groups. It traces how the Sepah formed from groups brought together by the shared goal of protecting what they saw as the revolution’s most important principles. It emerged in the days after Ayatollah Khomeini’s return to Iran on February 1, 1979 and in the midst of the Islamic Revolution’s turbulent and precarious transitory phase, which was characterized by political and violent struggles over the nature of the new regime. A particularly contentious issue, and one especially critical in the Sepah’s formation, was the fate of the Artesh, Iran’s regular military, and the nature of military power in the new regime.

Chapter 12 ties together the book’s central themes and highlights its main contributions. It argues that the Revolutionary Guards have endeavored to write the history of the Iran-Iraq War because of the way the Guards view the importance and meaning of the conflict in Iran today, the way they understand the nature and dynamism of history, and their commitment to what they view as the historical imperative of keeping the war alive.