The legal discourse as to Israel’s right to use the Suez Canal centered on the issue of belligerency. Egypt argued that the 1949 Armistice Agreement with Israel did not end the state of war and, hence, Egypt was entitled to take acts of belligerency not prohibited by the Armistice Agreement. According to Egypt, the 1888 Constantinople Agreement allowed Egypt to take steps to defend the Canal, and prohibiting Israeli shipping was such a step. Israel argued that the Armistice Agreement prohibited all acts of belligerency. The UN Security Council supported Israel’s position. The Egypt Israel Peace Treaty has resolved the issue of Israel navigation through the Canal. The configuration of the Strait of Tiran differs from most other international straits, in that it connects high seas with an enclosed gulf. The Egyptians claimed that they had belligerent rights against Israeli shipping in Egyptian territorial waters. The issue has been finally settled in the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty that stipulates that the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran are “International waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation.”

The Palestinian Authority defines itself as the State of Palestine and has the outward organs of an independent State. The State of Palestine conducts foreign relations, albeit the Oslo accords prohibited the Palestinian authority from doing so. Some States will not recognise another State if it was created as a result of an illegal action. This may be relevant to the consideration of whether Palestine should be recognised as a State. It is a subject of controversy as to whether the State of Palestine has a sufficiently effective government and defined territory to be considered a State in accordance with classical international law definitions. It can be argued that the large number of States and international organisations that recognise and treat Palestine as a State overcomes such deficiencies. The issue of whether Palestine is, at present, a State remains controversial.

The award of the arbitrators in the Taba case has been subject to criticism on the grounds that the arbitrators based their decision on existing markers on the ground and refrained from examining when the markers had been placed and by whom and whether their siting was in accordance with the legal boundary. Nevertheless, it was a landmark case in that for the first, and so far only time, Israel and a neighbouring Arab State settled a border dispute by means of an international arbitration. States usually go to arbitration only on matters that they do not consider to be of fundamental importance and losing would not have far-reaching consequences. This is true of the Taba dispute, which involved a dispute of some 250 metres of shoreline.Professor Lapidoth summarises that for political and perhaps even psychological reasons the two parties attributed to this dispute much more weight than was objectively reasonable.

The 2002 Arab League Peace Plan calls for recognition of Israel and normalization of relations. This represents a sea change in the Arab consensus regarding the conflict. It is made conditional, however, on Israel affirming undertakings concerning borders and Palestinian refugees that are unacceptable to Israel. The agreements reached with Arab Gulf States are an extremely positive development. They represent increasing Arab acceptance of Israel as an existing State in the Middle East.There has however has been, as yet, no progress in negotiating with the Palestinians concerning the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.

There would appear to be no controversy that Israel as a belligerent occupier of Sinai was entitled to exploit existing State-owned oil wells, if it was a reasonable use. There does not seem to have been a claim that Israeli use of the wells was wanton or unreasonable. However, there is controversy over the legality of exploring for and exploiting new oil wells. The objection of the United States Department of State to the legality of such exploitation was based, apparently, on the apprehension that it would encourage the longevity of occupation. The issue of new oil wells has not been the subject of any authoritative legal decision and it could be argued that, as a general principle, the onus would be on those wishing to pronounce it as an illegal action. As part of the Egypt Israel Treaty of Peace, “The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.” This commission has never met and no claims have been submitted to it.

Given the deterrent effects of transnational repression and conflict transmission in the United States and Britain before 2011, what brought anti-regime Libyans, Syrians, and Yemenis together for the Arab Spring? Chapter 4 describes how the Arab Spring mobilized members of the anti-regime diaspora by upending the normative operation and effects of transnational repression and conflict transmission in the diaspora. The Arab Spring did so by reducing the costs of activism, making members willing to take risks, and creating new solidarities against common threats. The extent to which diaspora groups experienced these quotidian disruptions determined whether or not they converted preexisting organizations to the cause and maintained solidarity over time.

Chapter 3 demonstrates why Libyan, Syrian, and Yemeni mobilization was weak before the Arab Spring. The author shows how two transnational social forces--transnational repression and conflict transmission--depressed and deterred anti-regime mobilization by embedding diasporas in authoritarian systems of control and sociopolitical antagonisms through members' home-country ties.

Chapter 2 provides a brief historical background of Middle Eastern migration to the west and details how authoritarian-nationalist regimes in Libya, Syria, and Yemen pushed exiles and emigrants to the United States and Great Britain. By examining the state of diaspora mobilization from the 1960s to the eve of the Arab Spring in 2010, the author demonstrates anti-regime movements were small, atomized, and considered partisan by their conationals. Neither Libyan and Syrian exiles nor well-resourced white-collar professionals were able to forge public member-based associations or initiate large anti-regime protest events during this period. Yemeni movements, meanwhile, focused on supporting southern separation from the Yemeni state, rather than on the reform or liberalization of the Yemeni government.

Chapter 1 provides the theoretical justification for the book and proposes a new framework for explaining what scholar Albert Hirschman calls "voice" after "exit" against authoritarian regimes.

The Conclusion summarizes the book's contribution and details the implications of The Arab Spring Abroad for future studies of transnational activism, diaspora mobilization, and immigrant politics.

Chapter 6 demonstrates how the varied conversion of diaspora activists' resources—their home-country network ties, social capital, and fungible resources—mitigated their interventions in the Libyan, Syrian, and Yemeni revolutions from the United States and Great Britain.