The conclusion returns to the general questions raised in the first two chapters of the book. Reiterating and summarising the argument about counter-revolution from above, below and without, the chapter turns to the transformation in revolutions that occurred after 1975 – initially towards political revolutions and transitions towards liberal democracy, and then towards mass, urban-based uprisings frustrated by counter-revolutions. Drawing on the work of Mark Beissinger, the chapter shows that, far from being regionally unique, the Arab uprisings were the beginning of a decade of increasing mass protest that did not bring forth profound social – or in many cases, political – transformation. Nonetheless, as the example of the return of the slogans and tactics of 2011 with new forms of learning in uprisings in the region before the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate, the success of counter-revolution cannot be assumed.

This chapter focuses on Syria and Bahrain, states in which the ruling regimes of 2011 managed to retain power: albeit in the case of Syria at the cost of more than a decade of civil war. Acknowledging the great differences between the two states, the chapter highlights the similarity in the role of sectarianism and external intervention: binding the counter-revolutions from above, below and without. The chapter presents a materialist understanding of sectarianism, however, as the product of both particular forms of political economy and counter-revolutionary strategy. In Syria, this produced a cross-sectarian ruling elite, albeit with an Alawi core, that nonetheless had profoundly sectarian effects: whereas in Bahrain, sectarianism served more straightforwardly as a prop of the Khalifa ruling house. The Syrian counter-revolution could also rely, albeit to a lesser degree, on the inheritance of the previous revolution from above and the promotion of an ideology of development and modernisation. In both states, narratives of external intervention – Western, Zionist or Iranian – served to strengthen the counter-revolutionary cause, while extensive outside support for counter-revolution – mainly Russian and Iranian in Syria, Saudi and Emirati in Bahrain – made up for the limited appeal of the counter-revolution from below. This chapter focuses on Syria and Bahrain, states in which the ruling regimes of 2011 managed to retain power: albeit in the case of Syria at the cost of more than a decade of civil war. Acknowledging the great differences between the two states, the chapter highlights the similarity in the role of sectarianism and external intervention: binding the counter-revolutions from above, below and without. The chapter presents a materialist understanding of sectarianism, however, as the product of both particular forms of political economy and counter-revolutionary strategy. In Syria, this produced a cross-sectarian ruling elite, albeit with an Alawi core, that nonetheless had profoundly sectarian effects: whereas in Bahrain, sectarianism served more straightforwardly as a prop of the Khalifa ruling house. The Syrian counter-revolution could also rely, albeit to a lesser degree, on the inheritance of the previous revolution from above and the promotion of an ideology of development and modernisation. In both states, narratives of external intervention – Western, Zionist or Iranian – served to strengthen the counter-revolutionary cause, while extensive outside support for counter-revolution – mainly Russian and Iranian in Syria, Saudi and Emirati in Bahrain – made up for the limited appeal of the counter-revolution from below.

This chapter describes Palestine at the very end of the nineteenth century. It is a pastoral country with an emerging middle class and a strong urban notable society able to cope with the political changes in Istanbul and the region. It is also the time Zionism appears but at that stage does not make much of an impression.

The war fragmented the Palestinians into three different groups: the Palestinians in Israel,in the Jordanian West Bank and in the Egyptian Gaza Strip. The rest were refugees scattered in refugee camps in the Arab world and exilic communities around the globe.

The period of the British mandate can be divided into two. Until 1929, there were relatively few clashes between the settlers and the local community and were even areas of joint living based on one’s socio-economic class or interest and not just national identity. However, the Zionist plan of turning Palestine into a Jewish state led to an aggressive policy of taking over the labour market and as much of the land as possible. This led to a Palestinian revolt in the 1930s and double pressure on Britain that decided eventually to leave Palestine in 1947

In the 1990s, a cultural movement of Israeli Jews began questioning the basic truisms of Zionism and revisited Israel’s history. The narrative they spun was very close to the Palestinian one. But the shift of the Israeli society to the right and the outbreak of the second Intifada have marginalized this critical impulse.

In the 1990s, a cultural movement of Israeli Jews began questioning the basic truisms of Zionism and revisited Israel’s history. The narrative they spun was very close to the Palestinian one. But the shift of the Israeli society to the right and the outbreak of the second Intifada have marginalized this critical impulse.