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At the time of the Spanish conquest Nicaragua was inhabited by tribes and chiefdoms whose total population ran into hundreds of thousands: today only 4 per cent of the population is classified as Indian. With the exception of a short period in the eighteenth century, the Indian population has declined continuously since the sixteenth century, with the greatest losses being sustained during the first few decades of Spanish rule. Reconstructing the demographic history of Nicaragua is not an easy task since much of the documentary record has been lost as the result of natural disasters and political upheavals.
The assertion that a country is rich, or a government is powerful, is usually followed by some description of what that entails. Conversely, poverty and weakness are not so often explored in all their detail, though they too are complicated matters. Public finance is one point of entry.1 According to Joseph Schumpeter, it is ‘one of the best starting points for an investigation of society, especially though not exclusively of its political life. The spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its policy may prepare – all this and more is written in its fiscal history, stripped of all phrases’.
During the first four decades of this century a profound change took place in eastern Cuba, especially in the province of Oriente. Its most obvious indicators are demographic: at the turn of the century, Oriente was only the third- largest of the six provinces in population, yet by 1919 it already occupied the number one position. Between 1899 and 1943 the province grew 313.9 per cent, much faster than either the national population (203.8) or the population of the province in which the capital city is located (Havana, 190.9).
Nineteenth-century Peru is customarily taken as a hyperbolic example of how the triumph of economic liberalism in Latin America hindered prospects for sustained economic development. While historians now agree that guano-age liberalism triggered adverse economic and social consequences, the roots of Peruvian free trade policy remain shrouded in mystery. Most recently, dependency writers elevated free trade into a major component of their posited transition to ‘neocolonialism’ after Independence. However, this new periodization is not convincing for it fails to explain how liberal policies actually took hold, symptomatic of the insufficient attention given to internal dynamics of change.
Few thinly populated regions of the world represent genuine frontiers of settlement. The tendency to describe almost any area of sparse population as a settlement ‘frontier’ is not uncommon, especially in studies of Latin America. What matters, however, is what is going on within such sparsely populated zones, or indeed within more densely populated zones which are in an active frontier stage.
Despite the recent development of a broad literature on urbanization in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Latin America, the topics of public order and crime have eluded careful study.1 The historiography of Argentine urbanization evokes questions about social control, but we know little more about changing patterns of crime and policing than did contemporary observers. Immigration, labor organization, class struggle, and political violence have all been the subjects of scholarly inquiries that suggest both high levels of disorder and the necessity of official responses.2
Much of the economic history of the twentieth century could be written around the oil industry. In 1896 the world produced 114.2 million barrels of oil; in 1974 the figure was 20,338 million. Apart from the major changes in the industrial and political geography of oil extraction, the availability of oil has been essential to the development of aviation, automobiles and the vast chemical industry. The century has also seen major technical changes within the oil industry itself. To mention only the more striking developments, drilling techniques were revolutionised during the 1920s, catalytic cracking was introduced into refining in the 1930s and the natural gas industry was developed within the USA. Petrochemical and pipeline developments followed the Second World War, as did the increasing sophistication of crude oil recovery techniques, while serious offshore exploration began in the 1960s.
It is worth mentioning all of this in order to make the point that oil wealth and the value of crude oil reserves did not simply exist but had to be created by the development of oil-consuming industry, by world economic growth and by the development of increasingly sophisticated techniques to extract and transport oil and gas. These developments created the conditions which allowed the oil-producing countries to transform the international market to such an extent after 1970.
Thus, in the years before 1928 the oil companies were clearly engines of growth and were welcomed throughout Latin America, despite their occasional barbarities and general lack of sympathy for the aspirations of poor countries.
The history of the International Petroleum Company in Peru was so varied and dramatic that it provided at one time or another a case study of nearly every conceivable permutation of host government – oil company relations. Essentially, the IPC took over a dubious legal title in 1913, used force and bribery to establish itself in the country and earned fabulous profits in the 1920s and 1930s. Subsequently its fortunes changed and IPC spent nearly a decade under economic pressure and political attack before its final expropriation in 1968. The expropriation was dramatic and the refusal of compensation led to serious conflict between Peru and the USA which, as we have seen, ended in 1973 with a compromise agreement which gave IPC only a fraction of the market value of its holdings.
The IPC in Peru: from exporter to supplier of the domestic market
The periods before and after about 1952 were very distinct. In the first period IPC, as an exporting company, was able to buy political support and retain extremely high profits for itself. Between 1913 and 1922 it was able to establish for itself an exceptionally favourable long-term position in Peru by its willingness to offer ready cash to governments with immediate financial problems. The pattern of offering short-term loans in return for favours was established early and continued until late. In 1938 the British Minister remarked that ‘the demand for a loan from this company is nothing new. Indeed, the International and the Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation have for years been the cows supplying milk for the government's necessitous children.’