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The institutionalization of community participation in the context of policing has become increasingly common in Latin America as a means of addressing the seemingly intractable increase in crime and insecurity. The creation of formal spaces for community participation in security differs markedly from how police forces have historically operated. Moreover, opening spaces for citizen input and oversight could potentially limit an executive’s control over the police, an important political tool. Why, then, do politicians sometimes turn to “participatory security” when reforming the police? This article argues that politicians choose participation as a safety valve to disaggregate societal discontent, particularly when police-society relations are fractious and police capacity and resources are low. Drawing on qualitative evidence from Buenos Aires Province, São Paulo State, and Colombia, this study demonstrates that participation can serve a range of strategic purposes, which, in turn, shape the institutional design of the participatory mechanism.
Chapter 7 brings together the previous two chapters by showing how the ultimate outcome of support from bureaucrats was a new type of social movement in Brazil. In contrast to the urban labor movements of the 20th Century, Brazil’s AIDS movement was a diverse movement that cut across class, ethnic, and geographic cleavages. In contrast to the protest-based social movements that mobilized at the start of the 21st Century, the AIDS movement employed a hybrid strategy for influencing policy, relying in equal measure on inside collaboration with government policymakers and contentious behavior. This pattern of demand-making among AIDS associations in Brazil does not fit existing models of corporatism, pluralism, or social movements—neither in the basic attributes of the organizations that have mobilized nor in the strategies they employ to influence policy. Brazil’s AIDS movement represents instead a new form of civic organization and mobilization in Latin America, in which social movements are sustained by their connections to the state, even while they make aggressive demands on the state.
Costa Rica and Colombia, two of the earliest Latin American countries to protect many LGBT rights, attempted to amplify those rights and litigate same-sex marriage (SSM) in mid-2000s; however, these attempts sparked a major anti-LGBT backlash by religious and conservative organizations. Yet a decade later, Colombia legalized SSM while Costa Rica still lacks the right to SSM. Using a most-similar systems comparative case study, this study engages the judicial politics literature to explain this divergent outcome. It details how courts, while staying receptive to many individual LGBT rights claims, deferred SSM legalization to popularly elected branches. In spite of the lack of legislative success in both countries, in Colombia a new litigation strategy harnessed that deference to craft a litigated route to legalized SSM. In Costa Rica, the courts’ lack of conditions or deadlines has left SSM foundering in the congress.
In State-Sponsored Activism, Rich explores AIDS policy in Brazil as a lens to offer new insight into state-society relations in democratic and post-neoliberal Latin America. In contrast to the dominant view that these dual transitions produced an atomized civil society and an impenetrable technocratic state, Rich finds a new model of interest politics, driven by previously marginalized state and societal actors. Through a rich examination of the Brazilian AIDS movement, one of the most influential movements in twenty-first century Latin America, this book traces the construction of a powerful new advocacy coalition between activist bureaucrats and bureaucratized activists. In so doing, State-Sponsored Activism illustrates a model whereby corporatism - active government involvement in civic mobilization - has persisted in contemporary Latin America, with important implications for representation and policymaking.
This chapter focuses on the determinants of vote choice, which are crucial to assessing the heterogeneity on voters’ sensitivity to parties’ policy and non-policy offers. We provide evidence that ideological proximity, competence for managing the economy, distributive expectations, and connections to partisan networks shape electoral behavior in both countries. Subsequently, we introduce a utility function that models the weight that voters attach to the policy and non-policy determinants of their vote choice. We then present a model that estimate separate parameters for voters in each socioeconomic category. We show that richer voters care more about ideological distance in both countries, although Chilean voters allot more weight to this dimension than their Argentine counterparts. Whereas Chilean better-off voters value macroeconomic competence more than poorer voters, poorer Argentine voters care more about parties’ ability to manage the economy than their richer counterparts. Even for distributive expectations, we show different patterns across countries in terms of the weight assigned by poorer and richer voters to public-sector job expectations in their electoral decision, which are more salient for poorer Argentine voters and middle-class Chilean voters.
This chapter describes the political attitudes of Argentine and Chilean voters based on the data collected in our original surveys. We provide evidence here of socioeconomic heterogeneity in voters’ policy views and perceptions of parties’ ideological positions, managerial competence, and capacity to generate expectations of targeted distribution in each country. Our survey results provide evidence of large asymmetries in the perceived non-policy endowments of Argentine parties. Argentine voters perceive the Peronists as having significant non-policy advantages in terms of macroeconomic competence and capacity to deliver selective incentives, which provides the party with opportunities not available to its rivals. More importantly, these non-policy endowments are perceived in a similar fashion irrespective of voters’ ideological position. By contrast, Chilean voters perceived the policy location and non-policy endowments of parties as intertwined, with voters on the left and right of the political spectrum perceiving parties that are ideologically closer as more competent managers of the economy, but without significant cross-party differences in non-policy endowments.
Non-policy politics is critical for electoral success. Parties routinely signal managerial competence, mobilize their activists, and deliver selective incentives to win elections. Here, we illuminate our conceptualization of electoral responsiveness with empirical information about voter preferences and politicians’ strategies in Argentina and Chile to show that voters’ demands constrained politicians in the short term but that supply politics matters as well in the long term. We assume that democracies with working political parties, which allow free flows of information, generate the incentives that make vote-seeking politicians operate as our framework suggests: combining distinct strategies to attract diverse groups of voters. In doing so, we seek to bridge the divide between the literature on advanced democracies, more focused on policy and competence, and the scholarship on new democracies, more centered on targeted distribution. Our broader conceptualization of electoral responsiveness can be extended to widely different democracies, adapting the dimensions of non-policy politics used to explain the incentives generated by electoral competition on politicians as well as the categories of voters they identify for targeting their offers. We conclude by discussing the normative implications of this broader conceptualization of electoral responsiveness.
This chapter test implications of our theory regarding the allocation of non-policy benefits. Partisan activists persuade voters and deliver targeted benefits providing parties with crucial resources to target individual voters with distinct policy and non-policy offers. The deployment of activists is heavily influenced by prior legacies of recruitment and specialization, since party organizations—and social relationships—take time to build and time to change. Partisan networks operate differently in Argentina than in Chile, with the former specializing on territorial activists and the latter on ideological ones. Here we focus on the conditional effect of partisan networks on both distributive expectations and ideological preferences and how these effects influence the electoral behavior of poorer and richer voters in the two countries we study. Extending the models from chapter 6, we measure the electoral benefits of expectations about targeted distribution and ideological distance conditional on network proximity, distinguishing the effects for poorer and richer voters. Our results also contribute to core-swing debate in the literature on clientelism showing that parties target distribution at core voters when they have informative partisan networks and otherwise seek to deliver to swing voters.
Partisan networks are a crucial non-policy resource granting political parties the capacity to connect with voters. Party activists serve a variety of important party functions. Party activists provide a mechanism for reaching voters and implementing the electoral strategies defined by politicians. We distinguish ideological activists specialized in policy persuasion and territorial activists dedicated to serving the wants and needs of voters in their own communities. We rely on our surveys and in-depth interviews with politicians and local campaign managers to describe the size, structure, and type of activist networks in each country, emphasizing variation across and within countries. Our measures show symmetry in network size across Chilean party organizations in contrast to the larger size of the Peronist and even Radical networks in Argentina (compared to those of newer parties). Chilean partisan networks are also more connected with ideologically akin voters and more connected to richer voters than those of the Argentine PJ and UCR.
This chapter presents our explanatory framework and introduces a statistical model of vote choice, with individual-level variation on policy offers and non-policy endowments. In our framework, voters assess the non-policy endowments of parties and their policy offers. Heterogeneity in the weight that voters attach to benefits results in some groups of voters providing larger electoral returns to parties. Therefore, responsiveness should be biased toward those voters that feel more intensely about distinct policy and non-policy benefits in the portfolio of parties. Furthermore, our model shows that parties with a comparative non-policy advantage will benefit from taking policy positions that are closer to the median voter whereas parties lacking such advantage should advertise more extreme policy offers. As parties are constrained by their different non-policy endowments, they will deliver different combinations of benefits to distinct groups of voters, thereby biasing electoral competition, to the benefit of more intense voters and better-endowed parties.