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17332 results in Latin American government, politics and policy

Page 312 of 867

  • 9 - Conclusion: Theoretical Reflections

  • from Part III - Comparative Perspectives and Theoretical Conclusions
  • Kurt Weyland, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book:
    Revolution and Reaction
    Published online:
    14 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 243-264

  • Summary

    Interpreted via cognitive shortcuts, the Cuban Revolution instilled excessive hopes of proliferating revolution among leftists, and corresponding fears among rightists. Leftist efforts to replicate Castro's success therefore prompted a rightist backlash that sought to block radicalism through the imposition of authoritarianism. In general theoretical terms, the backlash dynamic was fueled by fundamental mechanisms of bounded rationality, especially cognitive heuristics and asymmetrical loss aversion. Thus, political actors commonly diverged from the postulates of standard rationality. Misperceptions and skewed choices lay at the root of Latin America's political regression, including leftwing violence and the massive human rights violation committed by right-wingers. Because nowadays, there is no broad revolutionary challenge; and because conservative forces are therefore not stricken with fear, a similar backlash is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Consequently, the recent setbacks for democracy in the world will probably not add up to a significant reverse wave like the political regression that Latin America experienced during the 1960s and 1970s.

  • 2 - The Difficulty of Accounting for Reverse Waves

  • from Part I - Theoretical Considerations
  • Kurt Weyland, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book:
    Revolution and Reaction
    Published online:
    14 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 26-42

  • Summary

    Established theories have difficulty explaining autocratic reverse waves. Structuralist and institutionalist approaches highlight causal factors that are too specific to capture the wave-like advance of political regression. Common-cause arguments, which postulate a common shock as trigger of reactionary backlash, overlook the complexity of Latin America's reverse wave with its jumble of demonstration and deterrent effects. As regards diffusion approaches, theories that stress vertical regime promotion by great powers fail to convince: The US did not "impose" authoritarianism; instead, domestic actors took the main initiative in overthrowing democracy. Normative arguments are unpersuasive because dictatorship lacked legitimacy in Latin America during the 1960/70s. And rational learning theories cannot explain why political actors commonly deviated from systematic probability assessments and rational interest calculations: Leftists strongly overestimated the ease of revolutionary transformations, while rightists overrated the fragility of the established order, lived in fear of Communism, and therefore succumbed to intense loss aversion.

  • 5 - What Clergy Do: Encouraging Partisan and Electoral Politics

  • from Part II - What Clergy Think, Say, and Do
  • Amy Erica Smith, Iowa State University
  • Book:
    Religion and Brazilian Democracy
    Published online:
    15 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 80-96

  • Summary

    When and why do Brazilian clergy encourage congregants to get involved in politics? This chapter examines what religious leaders say about different forms of participation. Religious leaders talk to congregants about elections in three ways: (a) through ostensibly non-partisan encouragement to go to the polls; (b) by advocating that congregants “carefully consider” candidates, without overt candidate endorsement; and (c) by explicitly supporting candidates for office. The great majority of clergy speech about elections is of the first and second variety, while many evangelical, Pentecostal, and particularly Catholic clergy are wary of overt candidate endorsements. What leads clergy to promote some forms of political participation, but not others? The chapter argues that clergy support for—or resistance to—political participation is motivated by several factors. First, membership pressures sometimes lead clergy to seek political allies that can help them compete against rival groups; yet membership pressures likely more often muffle clergy speech, as clergy are afraid of alienating attendees. Second, three religious and political attitudes motivate religious leaders’ speech: tolerance for democratic dissent; doctrinal conservatism; and the belief that the political system is biased with respect to their group.

  • 10 - Conclusion: Mobilizing the People of God

  • from Part IV - Representation
  • Amy Erica Smith, Iowa State University
  • Book:
    Religion and Brazilian Democracy
    Published online:
    15 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 162-175

  • Summary

    The concluding chapter takes a step back to examine relationship between the Brazilian case and religion and politics in Latin America more broadly. It considers the implications for theories of religion and politics in developing democracies. First, the chapter revisits the question of what explains religious groups’ entry into politics and the religious polarization of politics. Examining examples from Costa Rica and Chile, it is clear that demographic diversity—that is, rapid conversion to evangelicalism—is not enough to bring evangelicals into politics. Instead, evangelicals enter politics when they have the motivation, opportunity, and resources to do so. Two types of threats motivate religiously infused politics: actual or threatened liberalization of policies related to sexual and family traditionalism; and perceived threats to the religious ingroup, either from the state or from other religious groups. However, religious politics is also facilitated by the associative protections of liberal democracy, by permissive electoral systems, and by stronger demographic presence. Second, what are the consequences of religious politics for Latin American democracy? The chapter argues that religious groups can partially fulfill many functions of parties, helping to stabilize democracy as religious elites convey their political attitudes and support for democracy to citizens.

  • 3 - Methods and Case Studies

  • from Part I - Introduction
  • Amy Erica Smith, Iowa State University
  • Book:
    Religion and Brazilian Democracy
    Published online:
    15 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 46-58

  • Summary

    This chapter introduces the quantitative and qualitative studies of clergy, citizens, and legislators to be analyzed in subsequent chapters. In addition to several national-level surveys, the book incorporates a rich in-depth case study of religious politics in the city of Juiz de Fora, a medium-sized city in Brazil’s Southeast region. This city is broadly representative of the country in key religious and political trends. The Juiz de Fora studies include a neighborhood-based survey of the 2008 local election; a congregation-based study of the 2014 presidential campaign; and 2017 reinterviews of clergy interviewed in 2014. The book also incorporates survey experimental studies of both clergy and citizens.

  • 5 - Waves of Radicalization and Reaction

  • from Part II - Revolution and the Reactionary Backlash in Latin America
  • Kurt Weyland, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book:
    Revolution and Reaction
    Published online:
    14 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 111-130

  • Summary

    Inspired by the Cuban Revolution, and unintentionally stimulated by the reform efforts of the Alliance for Progress, a wide-ranging, deep process of radicalization affected numerous Latin American countries during the 1960s and early 1970s. Using cognitive shortcuts and drawing facile inferences from Castro's success, many leftist and populist forces came to believe that profound transformations were now feasible in their country. Drawing similar inferences and therefore regarding the established order as fragile, elites and other conservative sectors were stricken with fear of "Communism." Leftwing agitation therefore provoked a rightwing backlash that imposed reactionary authoritarianism to forestall the perceived menace of revolution. As leftwing challengers started to create paramilitary formations and the military therefore saw a threat to its monopoly over organized coercion, the armed forces took the lead in these coups and consolidated dictatorial power afterwards. Driven by intense loss aversion, conservative sectors employed all the resources at their disposal to defeat the radical left. Consequently, determined counter-revolution overpowered revolutionary initiatives.

  • 4 - What Clergy Think and Say: Religious Teachings and Political Views

  • from Part II - What Clergy Think, Say, and Do
  • Amy Erica Smith, Iowa State University
  • Book:
    Religion and Brazilian Democracy
    Published online:
    15 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 61-79

  • Summary

    This chapter examines the religious and political views and speech of clergy. First, Catholic, evangelical, and Pentecostal clergy differ in the policy issues they prioritize in preaching. Evangelical and Pentecostal religious leaders are much more likely than Catholics to emphasize conservative religious teachings such as God’s wrath, the need to avoid sin, the need for chastity, and the “sin of homosexuality.” By contrast, Catholic leaders talk more frequently than evangelicals and Pentecostals about left-leaning issues, including ministry to the poor, racism, and the environment. In experimental studies, when Catholic religious leaders are primed to think about the threat of losing members, they further deemphasize conservative teachings. However, clerics’ choice of what to talk about is also driven by their core religious beliefs and religious traditions. Second, Catholics also differ from Pentecostals and evangelicals in attitudes toward the political process—that is, toward how political decisions should be made. While democracy is universally held in high regard in the abstract, Catholic leaders are more supportive than evangelicals and Pentecostals of diversity in opinions, both within their congregations and in society at large. Third, Pentecostals and evangelicals perceive much greater levels of state bias toward their groups than do Catholics.

  • 1 - Introduction

  • from Part I - Theoretical Considerations
  • Kurt Weyland, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book:
    Revolution and Reaction
    Published online:
    14 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 3-25

  • Summary

    The introductory chapter explains the puzzle of autocratic reverse waves that un-do liberal democratic progress. As an explanation, the book highlights the reactionary backlash to revolutionary challenges. As left-wingers inspired by a "successful" revolution try to spread radical change across countries, fearful right-wingers try with all means to block these efforts. Radical diffusion thus provokes reactionary counter-diffusion. Both the hopes of the left and the fears of the right are exaggerated, however, because cognitive heuristics that humans commonly employ suggest distorted, problematic inferences. With this argument, the book contributes to the debate about the nature of rationality, which recent theories of democratic breakdown have renewed. To substantiate its arguments, the book uses comparative-historical analysis based on a wealth of primary documents and secondary literature. A summary of the following chapters concludes this introduction

Religion and Brazilian Democracy
  • Mobilizing the People of God
  • Amy Erica Smith
  • Published online:
    15 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019
  • As Brazilian democracy faces a crisis of legitimacy, political divisions grow among Catholic, evangelical, and non-religious citizens. What has caused religious polarization in Brazilian politics? Does religious politics shore up or undermine democracy? Religion and Brazilian Democracy: Mobilizing the People of God uses engaging anecdotes and draws on a wealth of data from surveys and survey experiments with clergy, citizens, and legislators, to explain the causes and consequences of Brazil's 'culture wars'. Though political parties create culture war conflict in established democracies, in Brazil's weak party system religious leaders instead drive divisions. Clergy leverage legislative and electoral politics strategically to promote their own theological goals and to help their religious groups compete. In the process, they often lead politicians and congregants. Ultimately, religious politics pushes Brazilian politics rightward and further fragments parties. Yet Religion and Brazilian Democracy also demonstrates that clergy-led politics stabilizes Brazilian democracy and enhances representation.

Page 312 of 867