Freed from constant persecution by army squads, rebel society consolidated in the late 1850s. Chan Santa Cruz and other villages in the surroundings and in the direction of Bacalar were transformed into more solid settlements. The Caste War rebels (kruso’b) gradually regained the initiative in the struggle with Yucatán and maintained it up to the end of the century. The reduction in military pressure opened up new opportunities to assault frontier settlements. In contrast to the first phase of the war and as a result of their reduced military capacity, the rebels refrained from the notion of conquering or controlling territory. Instead, they developed a pattern of surprise attacks to loot cattle, pigs, mules, horses and valuables, selling them in Belize in exchange for arms, ammunition and other essential supplies.

The chronological outline of the principal events and phases of the uprising serves as guideline and contextualization for the more topical discussions in subsequent chapters. This chapter discusses the origins of the Caste War in the strife between two Yucatecan political factions in 1847 and describes the advance of the rebels up to mid 1848, their retreat to the southeast of the peninsula due to internal discord and the arrival of government troop reinforcements. Particular attention is given to the most intense combat period that saw a ruthless counterinsurgency campaign lasting until the mid 1850s. The rebels were indomitable, however, and created independent polities whose autonomy endured until 1901, when Mexican forces finally crushed rebel resistance in a massive military offensive.

The use of physical force was a common experience among the kruso’b in the second half of the nineteenth century. Up to the 1870s, they suffered repeated assaults by government forces. In turn, they exerted violence for practical and expressive purposes against Yucatecan soldiers and civilians, as well as against various pacífico groups, searching for loot, scaring Yucatecans away from their frontier settlements, demoralizing soldiers etc. The chapter discusses the changes in the armament of the rebels and their guerrilla tactics. Kruso’b assaulted settlements in Yucatán ranging from small, entirely Indian hamlets to haciendas, villages and larger towns. Obvious targets were army soldiers, National Guard members, those involved in the self-defense of settlements, and Indians in positions of authority. The kruso’b killed or captured Indians, vecinos, men and women, children and the elderly indiscriminately. Kruso’b behavior during and after raids on Yucatecan or pacífico settlements did not follow a uniform pattern. While members of a certain age, gender or administrative category were slain in some cases, they were spared in others. The taking and the treatment of captives depended on a number of factors, changing rebel needs for labor being one of the most important.

Although Caste War rebels were frequently despised as “barbarians” or “savages”, their culture, their society and their military organization were strongly reminiscent of rural Yucatán. Kruso’b and soldiers were both victims and perpetrators of internal and external violence. They employed force to attack the enemy, defend themselves, appropriate valuable commodities (food, booty) and take prisoners. Soldiers and rebels used similar tactics on their thrusts into enemy territory, mostly assaulting settlements with surprise attacks. Looting was a key incentive for both soldiers and kruso’b when it came to combat. Both rebels and government forces rarely distinguished clearly between combatants and non-combatants and both employed strategies of terror to induce inhabitants of frontier settlements to abandon their homes, thereby expanding the no man’s land between rebel territory and areas under government control. Internal violence occurred in both groups, although the underlying causes differed. Force served to maintain obedience of subalterns to superiors in army and militia units; violence was vital among the rebels to establishing and upholding the political hierarchy.

The chapter discusses the results from the anthropology and sociology of violence that seem most significant for the topic of this book. These help to understand the dynamics of the Caste War and to recognize the key structural and social contexts in which violent acts evolved. Rather than interpreting it as an irrational outburst of atavistic instincts, violence should be understood in most cases as a multi-faceted means to achieve certain ends. It can be used to obtain material gain, establish dominance or express ideas. Violence and war have strong transformative qualities, so that the composition of the contending parties as well as their motives for fighting can undergo change over time. In addition, the reasons why leaders take part in the struggle may differ radically from those of the rank and file.

Warfare is not only about exerting military force but also about logistics. Men need arms to fight efficiently and, above all, they have to eat. Thus to a significant degree the struggle for survival and foodstuffs determined the Caste War during its first two decades. Although government forces often suffered as a result of insufficient supplies, they could at least rely on existing structures of production, distribution and transport, such as haciendas, trades and roads. The Caste War rebels, on the other hand, had to create their own economic system from scratch. While insurgents were mostly in a position to live “off the country,” commandeering or plundering the required resources in the areas under their control during the first year of the conflict, provisioning combatants and their families became more trying after their withdrawal to the eastern and southeastern parts of the peninsula. Firearms, powder, lead and other desired items had to be procured either by looting in the government-controlled area or purchasing them in Belize.

Violence was part of everyday life beyond the wars and rebellions for many Yucatecans, particularly in the countryside. This background provides clues to what was considered normal or expected behavior and should make it easier to understand why, for example, acting violently was not a remote form of settling affairs and why fleeing to the bush or joining the Caste War rebels were attractive options to many lower-class Yucatecans. Life was grim for the lower classes in nineteenth-century Yucatán. Their situation varied considerably depending on whether they lived in urban or rural environments, whether they were self-employed or not and whether they lacked or had access to some means of production. Physical force intensified the severity of these living conditions, in particular for the lower classes and dependents, i.e., wives, children, and domestics, all of whom were subject to patriarchal authority. As in most parts of the world at that time, violence was a day-to-day affair in nineteenth-century Yucatán. Lower-class males suffered physical aggression at the hands of superiors and were beaten regularly by hacienda overseers and parish priests.

Organized groups of combatants such as warrior bands or armies are shaped by violence in at least two ways. One is their capacity to exert force against outsiders when, for instance, enemies are attacked or the squad is defended against external aggression. Violence is also frequently applied to group members to establish and maintain the internal hierarchy and uphold discipline. The chapter also discusses factors that foster the use of violence, such as the social or cultural distance between the conflicting parties, the dehumanization of the opponent or the reduction of personal responsibility by explicit orders or tacit encouragement. Civil wars differ from interpolity wars insofar as the contending parties are “subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas 2006:5). They frequently imply guerrilla tactics and counter-insurgency strategies that are particularly savage, with a disproportionate share of non-combatant victims. In addition, the violence here is “more intimate,” often among people with a high degree of closeness and peaceful interactions.

Offensive and defensive army action responded to multiple, partly contradictory logics. The supreme commander and his staff designed the official strategy to defeat the rebels, which officers at the lower levels were called upon to implement. The motives of officers and soldiers “on the spot,” such as personal gain, were frequently at odds with the official strategy, however, and shaped military activities and the use of force to suit their own needs. Finally, situational factors such as the immediate threats soldiers faced on duty, i.e., attacks, hunger and illness, impeded the pursuit of long-term goals. The need to procure food by harvesting enemy cornfields, or the quest for enrichment by looting or putting prisoners to work often triggered external violence. Both rebel and government forces were guilty of strategic massacres and other atrocities in a show of force or an attempt to demoralize the enemy or as acts of hatred and revenge. Looting was not simply an incidental feature of warfare. It became an integral part of the government system to compensate soldiers and volunteers for their efforts in the struggle against the rebels and to cover campaign expenses.

Organized groups of combatants such as warrior bands or armies are shaped by violence in at least two ways. One is their capacity to exert force against outsiders when, for instance, enemies are attacked or the squad is defended against external aggression. Violence is also frequently applied to group members to establish and maintain the internal hierarchy and uphold discipline. The chapter also discusses factors that foster the use of violence, such as the social or cultural distance between the conflicting parties, the dehumanization of the opponent or the reduction of personal responsibility by explicit orders or tacit encouragement. Civil wars differ from interpolity wars insofar as the contending parties are “subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas 2006:5). They frequently imply guerrilla tactics and counter-insurgency strategies that are particularly savage, with a disproportionate share of non-combatant victims. In addition, the violence here is “more intimate,” often among people with a high degree of closeness and peaceful interactions.

Kruso’b military organization was less formalized and hierarchical than that of the Federal Mexican Army or of Yucatecan militia units, but a certain amount of discipline was called for during combat and on raiding expeditions. In addition, fundamental norms had to be guaranteed to maintain order in kruso’b settlements or to settle personal disputes. The threat or use of force was key in achieving these aims, and the kruso’b political system as a form of strongman rule (caudillaje) made violence a recurrent part of the system. Follower loyalty depended much on lucrative raids. Since the success of such ventures could never be guaranteed, numerous leaders set about gaining additional revenue with the promise of more reliable returns. The wealth generated by these activities allowed them to draw on their own resources to prefinance raids or weather periods of scarcity when looting was impossible. Hence, farming or commercial activities such as the sale of rum would have rendered the authority structure more stable. The accumulation of wealth, however, was a double-edged sword. Kruso’b were not only suspicious of taxation but also of individual wealth (unlike that for the cult).

When the original military and social organization became untenable as a result of death, destruction, flight and dispersal during the war, the religious cult of the Speaking Cross provided solace and hope, and an alternative organizational focus. Allegiance to the town of origin and a number of chiefs endowed with traditional legitimacy as community leaders was replaced by identification with the cult and fealty to potent warriors. Rebel leaders began to legitimize their violent deeds as “orders from the cross.” Beyond this, the use of force was an essential component of the emerging political structure, which could be described as strongman rule (caudillaje or caudillo politics).

Internal violence played a crucial role when it came to enforcing order and military discipline and as a deterrent against desertion. For many men in the armed forces violence began with their enlistment. Each Mexican state was obliged to deliver a contingent of soldiers to the federal army. Since recruitment practices were never precisely regulated, some soldiers were enlisted by bounty, while others were forced to serve for several years, as in the case of wrongdoers or vagabonds. Soldiers not only experienced ill-treatment during recruitment but were also subjected to various forms of hardship and abuse as members of military units.