The FA, like every political party organization in a democratic context, has a tension between choosing policies and candidates that are closer to the preferences of the median voter versus those that are closer to members´ preferences. This chapter analyzes the role that the organizational structure exerts over the party in opposition and the party in government. The chapter presents observational evidence concerning the influence of the party on crucial policy issues and on the government’s decision-making. Also, it briefly details the process of ideological transformation of the FA. The chapter shows that the FA organizational structure limits the leaders’ and government’s room to maneuver. It limits party leaders´ incentives to moderate their positions because major decisions need to have the organization´s explicit support, or at least an absence of opposition. When the FA is in government, the party organization also constrains government action concerning substantive and crucial policy issues. The lesson from the analysis in this chapter is that the party´s organizational structure can present challenges for strategic adaptation but provides insurance against the risk of brand dilution.

This chapter uses process tracing to argue that organizations that grant voice and veto power to activists in the decision-making process avoid oligarchization of the party. The FA presents an opportunity to analyze how party organization per se affects the performance of political parties. The FA is a successful case of party building and reproduction that sheds light on the role organizational structure plays in reproducing activists. The process tracing systematically describes and explains the formation and reproduction of the party. It shows how the party´s first steps as a political organization established a reproduction mechanism with a lock-in effect that explains the persistence of the party’s activism.

The professionalization of politics and the disappearance of party organizations based on activists seems an inescapable trend. This chapter shows the relevance of organizational rules for explaining the reproduction of party activism. Using data from both an online survey of people differing in their levels of engagement with the FA and in-depth interviews with party activists, we show that those with relatively low levels of engagement – “adherents” – and activists differ in their willingness to cooperate with the party and in the amount of time they devote to party activities. Also, we find that reducing the perceived efficacy of political engagement strongly decreases activists’ self-reported willingness to engage with the party, while this reduction has no effect upon adherents. These findings suggest that the design of organizational rules that grant a political role to grassroots organizers can promote party activism.