Chapter 5 presents the last two case studies of the book; this paired comparison completes the four sets. This pair of rulings has in common a lack of court-promoted monitoring mechanisms as well as the absence of legally empowered advocacy organizations. The first case study delves into the aftermath of the Chaco v. Defensor del Pueblo ruling in Argentina, where the Argentine Supreme Court sought to safeguard the rights of the Qom Indigenous group in the Chaco Province. The second case study is of T-231 1993, a ruling handed down by the Colombian Constitutional Court seeking to protect the right to a healthy environment for the inhabitants around the Bogotá Canal, in Cúcuta.

This Introductory chapter previews the main argument. I emphasize that there are two key elements in shaping judicial impact for structural cases: the oversight mechanisms that some high courts deploy to monitor compliance with their structural rulings and the advocacy organizations that mobilize in the aftermath of these rulings. The chapter also presents the book’s three main contributions: First, a careful dissection of post-ruling politics uncovers the mechanisms that create impact. Second, through a comparative study of monitoring tools, the book contributes to our understanding of how judicial power is constructed in the Global South. Third, it shows that these courts do not necessarily displace democratic politics, or elected policymakers; instead, they can create new political spaces devoted to special problems.

Chapter 3 empirically addresses the question: Do citizens want to be represented by members of the working class? We demonstrate, using novel survey data from Argentina and Mexico and publicly available cross-national data from LAPOP, that citizens do prefer to be represented by legislators from the working class. To do this, we first examined patterns of support for working-class representation using a series of original survey questions in Argentina and Mexico. We asked citizens about their preferences for working-class representation and show that the average citizen in Argentina and Mexico both want more working-class deputies to occupy seats in congress. Then we introduce data on the class background of legislators obtained from elite survey data, and present descriptive information about the occupations, gender, and race/ethnicity of working-class deputies. Finally, using cross-national survey data and these data on legislators’ class background, we demonstrate that citizens have better evaluations of representative institutions when working-class deputies hold a higher share of seas in the national assembly.

Chapter 7 examines how the relationship between working-class representation and positive evaluations of representative institutions varies among citizens who are more or less likely to be aware of working-class representation. Even though voters can learn about working-class representation through political campaigns, news, and paying attention to politics, we show that levels of political interest and news consumption vary dramatically among citizens within the same country – implying that not all voters are equally likely to be aware of working-class representation. Then, using survey data from across Latin America, we demonstrate that the positive relationship between working-class representation and better evaluations of representative institutions is strongest among citizens with high levels of political interest and those who are avid news followers.

Chapter 6 addresses our final question: How do voters know workers are in office? Our theory argues that even though citizens are unlikely to know the exact share of seats workers occupy in office, they are generally aware of working-class representation. Drawing on campaign material, candidate websites, and social media websites, we show that both parties and individual politicians have an incentive to showcase politicians’ class status. Then we present qualitative evidence from publicly available data, coupled with an inventory of government websites, to show that even absent these political incentives, information on candidates’ class background is publicly available and – at least some of this information – makes it into the hands of citizens, thanks to popular press. Then we turn to evidence from two survey experiments from Argentina and Mexico that were designed to evaluate whether citizens can glean information about deputies’ class status from facial images alone. We demonstrate that participants can correctly identify the class background of the national deputies depicted in photographs at a rate significantly better than chance.

This chapter develops our theory of working-class inclusion. The chapter is structured around the three central questions that we tackle in this book: (1) Do citizens – and particularly working-class citizens – want to be represented by members of the working class? (2) Will any worker do? Or, how do citizens evaluate workers who do not represent working-class policy interests? (3) How do voters know workers are in office? In answering these questions, we develop new expectations that we evaluate in the following chapters.