The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement famously featured as one of the available models in the EU chief Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier's scale of options for the UK–EU post-Brexit future relationship, sandwiched between the EU– Swiss system of bilateral agreements and the EU–Turkey Customs Union. It was selected by the European Commission in view of its comprehensive scope, covering political dialogue and coordination of foreign policy, justice and home affairs, trade, economic and social matters, as well as a considerable depth of legal commitments which, if sufficiently implemented, would offer significant opportunities to access the EU internal market. As was stated by the then European Council president, Herman Van Rompuy, at the time of its inception the EU–Ukraine Association represented the most advanced framework of relationships ever concluded between the EU and a third country.

Yet the Agreement's origins and its evolution were taking place in a markedly different political context compared with the EU enlargement history from 1973 onwards. First, from the political perspective, the EU was placing its relationship with Ukraine and other countries of the former Soviet Union on a different conceptual premise as compared with the EU pre-2004 neighbours in Central Europe, avoiding a political commitment towards their EU membership perspective, as well as taking a cautious approach towards closer trade ties and economic cooperation in the first generation of bilateral agreements, known as Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). Only after the 2004 EU enlargement, as the success of transformations in the candidate countries was attributed to the transformative power of the pre-accession processes, did the EU start to contemplate ways of replicating the winning formula without the apparently high political, institutional and economic costs of continued expansion. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) sought to substitute the membership perspective instrument by a carefully calibrated idea of a “stake in the EU Internal Market” achievable through consistent, enforceable and verifiable processes of legislative approximation to the EU's acquis communautaire and accompanying institutional reforms in the partner countries.

In the United Kingdom's early discussions about leaving the European Union, there were many proposed new models for the country's ongoing economic configurations and policies, with much argument about possible new approaches to integration. Among the most unexpected of these was the claim that the UK could follow the model of one of the smallest, most distant, and most unusual of its ex-colonies: Singapore. On the surface, the two countries would seem to have little in common: a traditional largely Anglo-Saxon country in a long historical relationship with the European continent on the one hand, and a tiny, newly founded, largely Chinese country in a poor but bustling and populous South East Asian region on the other.

However, this unlikely comparison did not go away. Indeed, it resurfaced in various forms, as politicians and commentators argued that Singapore offered a model for Britain to follow in its Brexit negotiations. This chapter considers whether these comparisons have any economic validity. Initially I recount Singapore's modern history (both the official and unofficial versions). Then I examine the Singapore development model and look for useful comparisons to make for post-Brexit Britain.

SINGAPOREAN BACKGROUND

Official histories of Singapore like to portray it as an ancient trading centre. In fact, it was little more than a swampy island at the foot of the Malay Peninsula, a tiny Malay sultanate where the harbour offered watering facilities for vessels trading between China, the East Indies Archipelago and India/the Middle East. Its key was its location: it commanded the narrow passage between the Malacca Straits and the South China Seas, the shortest route between Canton and Calcutta. Singapore was not originally a sovereign state, but rather part of a Malay sultanate, with whom Stamford Raffles contracted in 1819 to allow the East India Company to build a trading port there.

Its early role as a trading hub set the pattern of Singaporean development for the next two centuries: a small settlement that transhipped cargoes, serviced trading ships and provided fuel and provisions. It was run by a growing population of British administrators, local Malay villagers, Chinese merchants and labourers from the region.

No member state has been as influential as the United Kingdom in shaping EU policies to fight serious crime, including terrorism. Paradoxically, no country has been more effective in blocking initiatives to have the EU play a role in defence. In both domains, the effects will be felt long after the UK has left the EU. This chapter discusses the UK's chequered legacy in European security policy, and how this may affect future cooperation. Will police forces and intelligence agencies continue to act in concert to mutual advantage, or – as will be argued below – are data exchanges and mutual assistance more likely to suffer? Will European military and security cooperation benefit from the UK's departure, or will the EU's credibility and effectiveness diminish? What measures could prevent unnecessary damage to European and British security?

This chapter proceeds in three stages. First the effects of Brexit on criminal justice cooperation will be assessed. The discussion then turns to the external dimension of foreign policy, security and defence. The final section reflects on repercussions for the future.

INTERNAL SECURITY

The United Kingdom played a leading role in shaping the EU's internal and external security policies. It was the 2005 British presidency that proposed, jointly with the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, the EU's counterterrorism strategy, which still directs EU policy. The European Commission's first two directors for criminal law and justice were British (Adrian Fortescue, 1999–2003, and Jonathan Faull, 2003–10), as was the first president of Eurojust (Michael Kennedy, 2002–7). Rob Wainwright, a former Security Service (MI5) agent, directed Europol for nearly a decade (2009–18). Claude Moraes chaired the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (2014–19). Britain's last commissioner, Julian King (2016–20), was in charge of security. It is a record unmatched by any other member state.

Following Brexit, the UK will lose its voice in the institutions, preparatory committees and agencies that decide and implement EU security policy. It will be out of the room when the European Council, the Council, the Commission or the European Parliament set policy.

The “Norway Option” was a term that cropped up repeatedly in the UK's Brexit debates. Possibly this caused some confusion to a good number of Britons, but for many the term became a shortcut for the idea of the United Kingdom remaining in the Single Market without being a member of the EU. That is the deal that Norway and Iceland (since 1994) and Liechtenstein (since 1995) have with the EU, via their participation in the 1994 European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement. These three states are in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and are known as the EEA EFTA states. Switzerland is also in EFTA, but it is not in the EEA, having opted not to join after a referendum in 1992. Switzerland has its own very different arrangement with the EU, managed through numerous bilateral agreements, as Georges Baur describes in Chapter 4.

The EEA agreement is complex and unique. There is no other trade agreement between trading partners anywhere in the world that comes close to resembling it. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the agreement is that its negotiation is perpetual. It is never completely or finally negotiated. This is because every time the EU legislates to update and improve the Single Market, the EU and the EFTA states talk with each other to see whether and how that legislation should be incorporated into the EEA Agreement. Together, each year, the EU and the EEA EFTA states make several hundred Joint Committee Decisions (JCDs), with or without technical adaptations, to incorporate EU legal acts into the EEA Agreement. It is the only example of a dynamic trade agreement that ensures homogeneity of market conditions between the parties to the agreement. “Dynamic” and “homogenous” are central terms in EEA parlance, because they uphold the principle of a level playing field that is an essential requirement for full participation in and integration into the Single Market.

WHY A EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA?

A question that has not been asked enough by participants in the Brexit debate is why the EEA Agreement came into being in the first place.

Chapter 2 critically examines Uyghur inclusion through official Zhonghua Minzu narratives in mass education as an identity-security practice after the July 2009 violence. The chapter analyses how party-state historical narratives demarcate hierarchical boundaries between majority Han and ethnic minorities (shaoshu minzu少数民族), particularly in universal ‘ethnic unity’ (minzu tuanjie 民族团结) education. The first section shows the party-state narrates Zhonghua Minzu by unifying all peoples’ histories within China’s contemporary borders as timelessly constituted by the minzu category and hierarchical majority-minority relations. Section 2 shows how nation-building texts relationally constitute and normatively evaluate identities of the Han as a timeless, modernising “frontier-building culture” against ethnic minorities as passive, backward recipients. The final section analyses how 'bilingual education' (Mandarin-medium education) policy is presented as the means to 'fusion' and national unity within these hierarchical relations. Official texts deploy concepts of fusion (jiaorong 交融) and minzu extinction (minzu xiaowang 民族消亡) to narrate the disappearance of shaoshu minzu identities as teleological progression of Zhonghua Minzu. The chapter shows that official nation-building narratives produce a hierarchical and ethnocentric China by framing Uyghur identity as backward obstacles to China’s unity and security.

Chapter 3 analyses exclusion of Uyghur identities in Zhonghua Minzu, specifically the 'East Turkestan' (dongtu 东突) narrative in minzu tuanjie education texts that explain contemporary violence and articulate Uyghur-ness as an external threat through the Turk category. The first section analyses how official East Turkestan narratives project external territorial borders and internal ethnic boundaries through each other, marking Uyghur language and religion as internal security problems from outside China’s cultural boundaries. The second section analyses official explanations of violence and protest in Xinjiang through East Turkestan and 'inside/outside Three Evils' ('terrorism, separatism, and extremism') narratives. This analyses how the party-state turns external cultural boundaries inward, demarcating ethno-spatial boundaries between sub-regions that are more and less secure and more and less Chinese. The final section uses semi-structured interviews and discourse analysis of Nurmehemmet Yasin’s short story 'Wild Pigeon' to examine the productive effects of these narratives. It analyses how Uyghurs redeploy official East Turkestan narratives to articulate alternative configurations of identity and security. The chapter argues that tensions between inclusion and exclusion in official security discourses, which ambivalently inter-weave civilisational and nationalist discourses by identifying intertwined threats inside and outside Zhonghua Minzu produce possibilities for resistance within its logics.

I return to tragedy as a necessary but insufficeint lens for policymaking and contrast the mindset that gave rise to tragedy with that of the Enlightenment and its reliance on reason. I suggest ways of combining the benefits of both prspectives.

Using two data sets I constructed, I show how initiators won only about half the wars they started since 1648, and fewer than 20 percent since 1945. Using case studies, I attempt to show that their lack of success post-1945 has much to do with the emergence of the norm against territorial conquest.

The political science, psychological, and organizational literature is replete with technical fixes for policymaking and assume s that better policymaking will result in better policy. I argue that that these fixes will not work or cannot be successfully applied and will not improve policy. I argue instead for ethical improvements in policymaking and identify what they are and where they should be applied.

To document my claim that ethical policies are more successful, I offer case studies of the Marshall Plan, China’s border settlements with most of its neighbors, and Germany’s rapprochement with its neighbors. I analyze the general principles behind these successes and their broader implications for foreign policy.

Cycles of violence and insecurity in Xinjiang are reproduced on the ground through relations among Han, Uyghurs, and an ethnocentric state. This book has shown how the party-state’s securitisation of Zhonghua Minzu identity produces multiple identities and insecurities in Xinjiang. These multiple identity-insecurities make the party-state more insecure and it responds with more securitisation, perpetuating cycles of mistrust and violence in the region. The party-state’s production of Zhonghua Minzu, perpetually encircled and infiltrated by multiple threats to China’s identity, hierarchically organises difference between superior, safe Han and inferior, dangerous minorities. Hierarchical nation-building reinforces the differences it aims to convert by targeting Uyghurs as perpetual identity-threats, exacerbating existential insecurities between and amongst Han and Uyghurs on the ground. Targeting Uyghur language and religion as existential threats to China leads Uyghurs and Han to securitise their own identities against perceived threats from each other and the state. The party-state, therefore, exacerbates spiralling cycles of ethnicised violence in Xinjiang that produce the perceived need for nation-building, further perpetuating these cycles and the impossibility of security.

How this book should be read as an atni-Kissinger foreign policy project.