TheFriendly Relations Declaration of 1970 may be seen as the culmination of a process of reassessment of international law in the time of the Cold War. It was the most advanced product of agreement between East and West in the field of international law since the UN Charter.

The prevention principle, in its accepted formulation of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and, later, of Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration (hereafter ‘Principle 21/2’) is an extension of an older norm aimed at ensuring respect of the rights of other States which could be hampered as a result of activities conducted in the territory of a State. The activities which called for such an extension concerned inter alia the exploitation of natural resources. Before the emergence of an environmental consciousness in the 1960s, the ‘environment’ was perceived through the lenses of ‘natural resources’ and, to a far lesser extent, of ‘conservation’. What today is called ‘environmental’ harm was only a concern inasmuch as the exploitation of natural resources would have damaging consequences on a neighbouring State. The international legal response to such damage rested on the rules of State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. The focus on reparation and compensation in case of environmental harm was an application of the traditional legal concepts protecting State sovereignty – these included in particular the sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas rule (‘use your own property so as not to harm that of another’), the prohibition of abus de droit and the rules on good neighbourliness. These concepts translated the idea that, in an interdependent world, sovereignty can only be relative and is limited by the obligation to respect the sovereignty of other States. Such recognition crystallised in the ‘no harm’ rule, the obligation of States not to cause transboundary environmental harm.

The 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration is a peculiar document. This is so even by comparison to the battery of legally non-binding but rhetorically charged and politically resonant General Assembly resolutions with which the non-aligned world created through decolonisation attempted to craft a new international order in the decades after the Second World War. Consisting of seven basic concepts of contemporary international law, the 1970 resolution purports to map the rules, norms and practices that States and international lawyers are willing to recognise as necessary for a real commitment to ‘friendly relations’. It spells out with varying degrees of clarity and specificity a host of propositions, many of which had already found at least partial expression in multilateral treaties, UN resolutions and rules of customary international law prior to October 1970, when the resolution was finally adopted formally. The result is a lengthy and at times unwieldy document cobbled together through a series of complex negotiations – an instrument that is more a patch-and-mend aggregation of bits and pieces of conceptual furniture than it is a crystalline conceptual blueprint for the new world orders envisioned by the greater and lesser powers of the 1960s.

Good faith is the object of a surprising consensus. Most authors writing about good faith as a general principle of international law stress that it is an essential element for the very existence of the international legal order. In other words, without good faith, it would be impossible to have international law. At the same time, they also agree that good faith escapes any precise definition.

The year 2020 marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations Organisation, the cornerstone of the post-war international order, and the fiftieth anniversary of the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, which provided the canonical formulation of seven foundational principles of international law. Yet, the current international context seems largely inauspicious for genuine celebration. Although the world order engineered by the victorious powers after the Second World War has faced daunting challenges in the past, what is particularly disquieting about the present situation is that the challenges come, to a significant extent, from the main proponent and guarantor of the post-war rules-based international order, the United States, in the absence of any comparable stabilising forces. Whether it is the inward reflexes and blame game of major countries in reacting to a global pandemic, or the use of force by Russia for the annexation of Crimea or its interference in electoral processes in the United States, France, Italy and the UK, or the trade war triggered by the United States against China and the EU, or its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, or China’s defiance of the basic rules of the law of the sea to assert its power within a ‘nine dash’ line in the South China Sea, all these cases go beyond mere controversy over the applicability of a principle to a given situation and constitute open defiance of the letter and/or spirit of the very principles that have served, since 1945, as the normative standards determining the lawfulness of international action.

The period leading up to the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States was characterised by numerous claims of intervention by one State levelled against another State or group of States. The case of alleged Russian involvement in the presidential elections of the United States, the decision by some States to recognise a rival government in Venezuela, the provision of arms to fighting groups in Saudi Arabia in the conflict in the Yemen are but some recent examples. These claims raise the question of the scope, content and status of the duty of non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.

There is nothing surprising in this, remembering that the very objective of this statement of the principles already contained in Article 2 of the UN Charter is ‘to secure their more effective application within the international community’. This was a particularly topical issue in 1970 with respect to the prohibition of the use of force. It can hardly be said that this prohibition was uniformly and systematically applied after being solemnly proclaimed in the Charter in 1945. The stringency of the prohibition, presented by many as a major advance in international relations, was soon confronted with the harsh realities of practice: besides major conflicts such as the Korean War (1950–53), the Arab–Israeli wars (especially the Six-Day War in 1967) or the Indochina and then Vietnam war (which was still being waged), the United Nations had already experienced multiple flash points by 1970, from the Cuban missile crisis (1962) to the Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1967), by way of US military operations in Cuba (1961) and the Dominican Republic (1965), and the Suez crisis (1956), not counting the colonial or post-colonial conflicts (such as the Belgian intervention in the Congo in 1960) or other local conflicts. Against this backdrop, it is understandable that, if they were to continue on an idealistic or even utopian course, the UN Member States might as well see the reaffirmation of the outline definition of the prohibition of the use of force as a way to make it more effective. The solemn proclamation of the existence of the rule, which was set out at the time as a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens), thus appeared to be a way to curb the reign of force that it seemed was to characterise international relations.

On the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, it is time to reflect upon its enduring influence upon post-1970 international relations, which have to a considerable extent been built on its interpretation of the principles of the UN Charter. What is to be examined in this chapter is not only what fundamental principles of international humanitarian law the Friendly Relations Declaration has neglected, but also whether this instrument must, for sake of continuing vitality and authority, reflect these basic tenets of international humanitarian law.

Mr Chairman, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Mr Prime Minister, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen. I am grateful to my friend and senior statesman Lee Kuan Yew for his kind remarks. This is a truly historic moment for all of us, not merely in a temporal, but also in a historical sense. Although my own association with Southeast Asia and Singapore goes back to a decade and a half, the ties that bind India and Southeast and East Asia are so old that they are still being fully traced by historians, who increasingly have to get the assistance of archaeologists.

Singapore has graciously hosted Alamkara, an exposition titled “Five Thousand Years of India”. It was conceived as a presentation not merely of the ancient Indian civilization but a reaffirmation of the ties that bound our ancestors together. You may be interested to know that even the name of your city is very common in India and I know at least two villages close to my own with the same name. And I myself carry part of your city in my own name. I am sure you cannot think of another guest so closely identified with you.

I was therefore not a little perplexed when I faced the task of drafting an address to this distinguished gathering on the “new relationship” India is forging with the Asia-Pacific. I suppose the connotation has something to do with the fact that in Asia, the industrial and technological revolution was heralded only late in this century, but the advances in development have been so rapid in recent decades or even years that it would be fair to say that it is not the reality that is changing, but change which is becoming a reality.

Your Excellency, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, Your Excellency, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Tony Tan, Ladies and Gentlemen.

I am greatly honoured to give this speech here in Singapore, the final stop on my schedule of visits to the countries of ASEAN.

Singapore is a remarkable nation with remarkable people. Bursting through the constraints of size and resources, Singapore through sheer energy and willpower has created a tremendous place for itself in the world. Through its economic and diplomatic vitality, it contributes to the international community far in excess of what size alone would warrant. And so to the government and people of Singapore, let me express my admiration and respect for your achievements.

I am told that Singapore is called the “Lion City”. Maybe it has something to do with my hairstyle, but in Japan I am known as the “Lion Prime Minister”. Perhaps that is why I am so delighted to be here in the Lion City.

Today I would like to speak about co-operation between Japan and ASEAN and my concept of how this co-operation can contribute to all of East Asia.

Let me begin by defining what co-operation truly is. Co-operation is working in common purpose with others in order to accomplish more. In the simplest terms, this is what I would like to see Japan and ASEAN accomplish—more prosperity, more peace, more understanding, more trust. This co-operation requires an exchange of ideas, opinions and people.

Introduction

Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Chairman Wong Ah Long, Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen,

I am very grateful to have been invited to deliver this Singapore Lecture. I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to everyone at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies for affording me this opportunity.

I consider myself to have been presented with a very timely opportunity today, in two or three senses.

Five days ago on Sunday, Japan held an election to select half of the members of our House of Councillors. Today is my first opportunity since the election to deliver a structured talk on the Japanese economy and various other issues.

Most importantly of all, the will to change has returned to Japan, and so has strength. The “revolving door” politics with its high turnover for which Japan is now known has disappeared and is now a thing of the past.

The second sense in which today's address is timely is that three days ago, Japan made its debut in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement process, joining the negotiations underway in Malaysia, your neighbour.

I am intent on Japan expanding the potential of the economy of the Asia-Pacific region further, together with the United States and the other member countries in the negotiations.

The third reason is that this year marks exactly the fortieth year of ASEAN-Japan relations. To commemorate this, Japan has invited the ASEAN heads of state and government to Japan in December, when we will hold a special summit.

Today is therefore a truly ideal opportunity to consider the future of ASEAN-Japan relations.