This chapter examines the practice of internal self-determination in the context of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. It examines the Tamil minority struggle for self-determination, and how the demands for both federalism and separatism have been made through the broader language of self-determination. The chapter shows how different minority groups make demands which amount to internal self-determination, how the government responds to such demands, and also how the language of internal self-determination has been viewed skeptically by the Tamil minority. The chapter shows the potential and problems internal self-determination as a concept holds in the context of a protracted ethnic conflict.

This chapter examines how internal self-determination is understood and applied by courts of law. The ICJ's jurisprudence is silent on internal self-determination, even though Separate Opinions of judges contain helpful discussions about the principle and its relevance in a post-colonial world. After the discussion about the jurisprudence of the ICJ, the chapter focuses on two specific cases decided in domestic courts. These are two cases decided by the Supreme Courts of Canada and Sri Lanka, respectively. In doing so, the chapter shows how domestic courts approach issues of internal self-determination. The chapter argues that domestic courts generally tend to acknowledge the relevance of internal self-determination and its application to peoples within states. The courts are however cautious in discussing aspects relating to internal self-determination.

The final chapter of the book discusses the nature of internal self-determination, i.e. the duality of internal self-determination, its causes and implications. The chapter also discusses four key challenges that confront internal self-determination and how those challenges could be faced – even though success is never guaranteed. The chapter ends by arguing that an important task before us is to critically appreciate the principle of internal self-determination – realizing and taking note of its many facets, potentialities, and problems – in a complex and changing world.

This chapter examines how internal self-determination applies to populations of states. It argues that populations have a right to internal self-determination amounting to democratic governance. But this is not all. What democratic governance means is a contestable topic, and the very concept of democracy encapsulates many things. Also, states can promote internal self-determination as a continuing right which legitimizes pro-democratic intervention, if necessary. In short, to understand internal self-determination as a right of a population is an important task, but such an understanding carries implications which need to be noted.

This chapter discusses Western and Third World approaches to internal self-determination. Traditionally, international lawyers argued that it is the West that supports internal self-determination, while the Third World supports external self-determination. This chapter argues that that claim is not valid anymore. There are many similarities in how states and institutions of the West and the Third World appreciate and understand internal self-determination. The chapter develops, however, a Third World critique of internal self-determination that questions the content of the principle as well as the purposes for which internal self-determination is promoted by the West. Concerns arising from this critique apply not only to Third World states but also to small and weak states, both in the West and the Third World generally.

This introductory chapter introduces the reader to the topic of internal self-determination and why a study on it is required. The chapter also explains the critical approach adopted by the author and the chapter outline.

This chapter examines the case of Hong Kong from the perspective of internal self-determination. It provides two distinct images of Hong Kong: as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China which enjoys a high degree of autonomy (and therefore, internal self-determination); and as an entity which is struggling to achieve universal suffrage (i.e. denial of internal self-determination). The chapter argues that in the struggle for universal suffrage, the principle and language of internal self-determination can play a mixed role. It can help Hong Kong people to articulate their demands for democracy; but it can also heighten tensions with China. Whatever the case may be, engaging with the concept of internal self-determination will be unavoidable.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

INTRODUCTION

Towards the end of the previous decade, the term “Trump Derangement Syndrome” (TDS) became part of common parlance in American opinion pages. For supporters of Donald Trump, the term refers to a tendency by progressive elites and media organizations to view everything the President does as destructive to American leadership and institutions because these elites and organizations have never come to terms with the victory of Donald Trump over Hilary Clinton in the 2017 presidential elections. For detractors of the President, TDS represents an outrageous coinage by Trump's supporters to deflect what are legitimate and serious charges against the President's exercise of his powers.

The temptation to treat the Trump's administration's policies as being irretrievably tied to the character and whims of America's historically most unconventional commander-in-chief is strong, the embedded implication being that a different President in the White House will lead to a very different suite of external policies.

However, allowing TDS to define what American approaches to regional policy might look like over the next four years—with or in the absence of a change of administration—would be a mistake. To be sure, every President has their own idiosyncrasies, the current one more than others, while every administration has their own approach. But overemphasis on the uniqueness of Trump is the wrong place to begin. Some aspects of his presidency might well be an aberration but many more are not, either because the current administration represents an evolution or synthesis in pre-existing thinking or else because Trump has deeply changed the policy dial on many issues. Getting the balance of factors and mindsets right is crucial when it comes to understanding the future of frameworks such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and the grouping of the United States, Japan, India and Australia known as the Quad.

This article does not attempt to predict specific policies that a secondterm Trump administration or a first-term Democrat one will pursue. Specific policies are mostly shaped by empirical events and by the responses of senior individuals in the administration. Especially in the case of a possible Democrat White House, it is impossible to know these factors ahead of time.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• This article traces China's foreign policy transformation from 2013 to the present. It also examines Deng Xiaoping's doctrinal response to the political crises of 1989–91 and compares it to current Chinese foreign policy doctrines.

• From the early 1980s until the 2010s, China's foreign policy has generally focused on keeping a low profile. Deng's Tao Guang Yang Hui foreign policy doctrine is characterized by its “No’s”, while Xi Jinping's Xin Xing is marked by its “New’s”. The move from Tao Guang Yang Hui to Xin Xing is a major doctrinal shift in China's foreign policy.

• Since the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi's “new” narratives have seemingly dominated Chinese foreign policy. However, old principles, particularly that of “non-interference” or “no hegemony”, are still alive, albeit in a different form.

• This transformation is driven by three forces, which this paper describes in the 3As framework: China's Ambition to be a “great country” and a “non-hegemon” in a changing world; its provision of Alternatives to fill the gaps in regional and global governance structures; and its Adaptation to what it deems as “unprecedented major changes in a century” (Da Bian Ju).

• As China undergoes this foreign policy transformation, contradictions and dilemmas inevitably emerge.

• While China's foreign policy transformation is currently being disrupted by the coronavirus crisis, there have been adjustments which were already apparent before the crisis. The ambitious “One Belt and One Road” strategy, for instance, was replaced by the “Belt and Road Initiative”; “constructive intervention” was replaced by “constructive role”; and “common destiny” was replaced by “shared future”. Looking ahead, China's foreign policy transformation could include more strategic or, at least, tactical adjustments.