This chapter considers how certain values may come to shape the law. It explores the institutions, processes and actors that facilitate the emergence of altruistically oriented legal norms. In doing so, the link between ideology and law will become more apparent. The evolution in international law presented in this book is the product of an underlying cosmopolitan altruistic ideology which coexists with a statist individualistic ideology that shape the content of legal rules. A legal system can be influenced by one or more philosophical ideologies, and the international legal system has been and continues to be shaped by different variations of these two major ideologies. As such, cosmopolitan altruism and statist individualism have a dialectic existence in the formation of law and its interpretation. Despite the fundamental differences in the nature and effect of these ideologies, they are capable of having simultaneous normative influence on the behaviour of states and the formation of international law.

Chapter 2 counters each of the policy arguments that have been mounted against the criminalisation of State acts of aggression, including arguments relating to uncertainties surrounding the prohibition of the use of force; that acts of aggression are too complex an episode for adjudication by a criminal tribunal; that the criminalisation of aggression will politicise the ICC; that there is a risk of a fragmentation of relevant rules of international law caused by differing decisions of the ICC, the UN Security Council, and the International Court of Justice; and claims that the criminalisation of acts of aggression will have a chilling effect on States’ willingness to use force when they should (namely, to prevent atrocity crimes). The dissection of such arguments demonstrates that each objection is misguided and sets out the case in favour of criminalisation. The chapter also assesses the geopolitical significance of the crime, considering the extent to which the criminalisation of the unlawful use of force represents a shift in the balance between power and law. Finally, the chapter examines the likely impact of the crime of aggression on the rules of the jus ad bellum.

Chapter 3 develops some of the basic arguments underlying the concept of the sovereignty cartel. It develops the idea of using property rights as a lens through which to study sovereignty and contextualizes that lens in a broader ontology of sovereignty. It builds on the property rights lens to develop the core idea of the book, that sovereignty can usefully be seen as a recognition cartel in which a small group of actors arrogate to themselves, and work communally to protect, a set of exclusive rights to global governance. It also addresses the question of why the sovereignty cartel should be read as a social construction, as the political expression of a set of norms of sovereignty, rather than as a simple interest-based argument. Yes, interests matter and power matters. But both matter in the context of, and can only be understood as expressions of, an ontologically prior set of norms associated with sovereignty.

Chapter 9 addresses the “So what?” question: what do we learn from studying sovereignty through a property rights lens? One key upshot of the argument is that changes in international patterns of economic regulation and use of force are not necessarily indicative of either the strength of or the content of claims of sovereign right. Sovereignty maintains its centrality in the international system not only (arguably not even primarily) through the practice of governance, but also through collusion to reinforce a normative structure of sovereign right. The chapter concludes with some thoughts about the “So what?” question for international relations theorists. For theorists of foreign policy the sovereignty cartel helps to explain deference by bigger states to the sovereign rights claims of smaller states when national interest would argue against such deference. For globalization theorists the cartel shows that globalization and sovereignty do not vary inversely on a unidimensional spectrum. For theorists of the social structure of the international system it highlights the often-overlooked agentive processes needed to maintain existing social structures rather than just agentive mechanisms for changing structures.

Chapter 8 fills in the last piece of the theoretical story of this book. It looks at the various normative tensions and governance gaps in contemporary state sovereignty and asks how sovereignty can be maintained as a set of broadly recognized norms, rather than simply as rights claims, in the face of those tensions. It introduces the idea of normative dissonance and connects this idea to arguments from political psychology about the cognitive mechanisms people use to navigate dissonant information and beliefs. It runs the idea past normative tensions in questions both of what sovereign property rights are and of who should hold those rights. This introduction of political psychology into the story of the sovereignty cartel provides a mechanism for thinking about state sovereignty as a system that cannot be reduced to a rational set of rules or to a simple discussion of interests, but that reconstitutes itself nonetheless. It is in this sense like any other social system; it does not make coherent sense, but it functions, so we make what sense of it that we can.

This chapter considers the major features of international environmental governance that are manifestations of altruism. It begins from the observation that the very premise of international environmental law is the no-harm principle which, while not altruistic per se, illustrates the structurally inherent concern for the other at the heart of the regime. The chapter continues by appraising the emergence of concern for the individual, and in particular procedures through which those in other countries can participate in environmental decision-making or have recourse to justice where they are subject to environmental harm. Moreover, international human rights law is interacting with international environmental law to extend the environmental obligations that states have to people third countries. The universality of international environmental law obligations is also manifested in principles such as intergenerational equity, which is an altruistic consideration for people of the future. Finally, the chapter considers the increasing prevalence of common but differentiated responsibilities and commitments made to developing countries in the area of environmental protection. A particular focus is placed on the importance of financial and technical assistance.

This chapter introduces the tension at the heart of international law, traces the evolution of international legal relationships and provides an overview of the dimensions of altruism in international law. It also provides a roadmap for the study.

This chapter uncovers the meaning of altruism. First, an understanding of the essence of altruism is garnered from the consideration of a wide range of scholarship from different disciplines. Certain common themes of the concept are identified. Second, the connection between altruism and cosmopolitanism is revealed in an effort to show how altruistic behaviour between people from different countries can develop. Third, the influence of altruism in legal systems at the domestic level is considered by having reference to major studies that have analysed manifestations of altruism in European and US private law regimes. Other references to altruism or related concepts in international legal scholarship are also explored.